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Introduction 
This article discusses the "new" due process. Perhaps new 
is a misnomer. Due process was not discovered recently. It has 
been around a long time protecting varying interests from arbi-
trary action. The discovery called the "new" due process is 
merely that procedural protections are not so limited as pre-
viously thought. This article will examine the interests encom-
passed by the new due process and the remedial apparatus now 
being developed to protect those interests. 
PART I-RIGHTS 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has decided a number 
of cases construing the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. These appeals have dealt with procedures for seiz-
ing chattels purchased by time payments, 1 garnishing wages 
before judgment,2 suspending a driver's license,3 evicting a ten-
ant, 4 terminating public assistance5 or public employment, 6 
depriving a person of local access to alcoholic beverages7 and 
removing children from their parents' home. 8 Additionally 
* Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Visitor at University 
of North Carolina School of Law 197 4-75. Gary F. Roth contributed to the research and 
assisted with the footnotes herein. Shortly after I began this article, I realized that I 
had taken on an imposing task. A lot of law existed; more law was being made. As the 
advance sheet cases piled up, the law, I concluded, was so volatile that anything 
written was obsolete before it could be published. Events, however, ameliorated this 
conclusion; the due process doctrine began to match previously developed remedial 
doctrine, and the new cases increasingly replicated previously developed points. 
I completed a "final" draft in June 1974. Since then the editors in Lexington and 
the author in Williamsburg and Chapel Hill have added cases and other matter. In 
general, we think this was successful. But the burgeoning law created two conse-
quences and a caveat. First, it was difficult to arrive at a "final" draft: several things 
came unraveled between the summer of 1974 and 1975. Second, because of the time-
distance problem, changes may have occurred which the article fails fully to reflect. 
That it is difficult to publish anything completely current on this topic does not mean 
that one should refrain from trying. 
1 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67 (1973). 
2 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
3 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 534 (1971). 
' Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
• Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969). 
1 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
7 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
• In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); 
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there have been many such cases in state appellate courts. 9 
Procedures recently assailed include impounding trespassing 
cattle10 and "abandoned" automobiles, 11 sterilizing mental re-
tardates, 12 applying for a chauffeur's license, 13 withdrawing 
patients from a nursing home, 14 terminating township poor re-
lief, 15 destroying a public nuisance without notice to the mort-
gagee16 or compensation to the landowner,17 impounding alleg-
edly infringing articles, 18 ejecting a tenant from public hous-
ing, 19 terminating disability benefits, 20 expelling a student from 
West Point Military Academy,21 terminating unemployment 
compensation, 22 excluding a person from a college campus, 23 
and requiring a bond for costs in a personal injury lawsuit. 24 
Creditors' remedies assailed include the mechanic's lien,25 
Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. N.C. 1973). 
• See, e.g., Arnold v. Knettle, 460 P.2d 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); C.V.C. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973); Inter City Motor Sales v. Szymanski, 201 
N.W.2d 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 176 
N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Lucas v. Stapp, 487 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972). 
10 McVay v. United States, 481 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Freeman, 400 
F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968). 
11 Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. lll. 1974). 
12 Wyatt v. Aderholdt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
13 Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 
(1st Cir. 1973) (driver's license); Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (M.D.N.C. 1974). 
u Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wise. 
1973). 
15 Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973). 
11 Pioneer Sav. & Loan Co. v. City of Cleveland, 479 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1973). 
17 Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974). 
11 Jondora Music Publ. Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494, 499 
(D.N.J. 1973). 
11 Caulder v. Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 
u.s. 1003 (1970). 
28 Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
21 Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Brown v. Knowlton, 370 F. 
Supp. 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
22 Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev., 490 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 
1973). 
22 Braxton v. Municipal Court, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973). 
21 Nork v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (Ct. App. 1973). 
23 Ceasar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. 
Supp. 24 (S.D.S.D. 1973); Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 
364 F. Supp. 452 (1973); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). 
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landlord's lien,26 banker's lien,27 garnishment,28 attachment,29 
foreclosure, 30 lis pendens, 31 attachment of real estate, 32 dis-
tress,33 detinue,34 possessory liens,35 and wage assignment.36 
Several features strike one who considers changes in due 
process in the last few years. Probably most important among 
these is the concept's burgeoning expansiveness-due process 
has been extended into many spheres which had previously 
escaped its influence. Part I of this article will trace that exten-
sion and develop a comprehensive pattern for judging due pro-
cess interests. In addition to broadening the application of due 
process constraints, the deluge of liability opinions has brought 
remedial issues out of the region of abstractions and into the 
realm of reality, where basic decisions are inevitable. As the 
opportunities for legal ex parte procedures dwindle, remedies 
must be fashioned to vindicate those deprived of due process; 
Part II of this article will deal with those remedial issues. The 
28 Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Adams v. Joseph F. Sanson Inv. 
Co., 376 F. Supp. 61 (D. Nev. 1974); Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240 
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-
Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
27 Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974). 
23 Stackers v. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 178 (D.S.D. 1974); Union Barge Line Corp. 
v. Marble Cliff Quarries Co., 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.W. Va. 1974); Morrow Elec. Co. 
v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. 
Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973); Raigoza v. Sperl, 110 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1973). 
211 Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974); In re Northwest Homes of 
Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Clement v. Four North State St. 
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 (D.N.H. 1973); McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 360 
F. Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1120 (1973); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). 
30 Garner v. Tri State Development Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich 1974); 
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Johnson v. 
Glenn's Furniture Co., 372 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Law v. United States Dep't 
- of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
•• Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973). 
32 Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 
365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973). 
33 Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 
F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971). 
'" Yates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
35 Huber v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 491 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1974); Hernandez 
v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973); Adams v. Department 
of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). See also Cockerel v. Cald-
well, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974). 
38 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
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focus will be on the interplay between the theory of due process 
and various remedial devices. 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 37 sometimes known as 
the Ku Klux Klan Act, is the major vehicle for due process 
suits. Coupled with § 1343(3), it provides federal jurisdiction 
in such actions. 38 The Civil Rights Act is a versatile tool which 
has had a vast civilizing influence, reaching beyond due pro-
cess to encompass any situation in which a person has been 
deprived of a consitutional right under color of law.39 
Nevertheless, a study of due process is inevitably a study of the 
Civil Rights Act. In addition, federal jurisdiction problems and 
overlapping state common law and statutory remedies often 
arise in the due process context and will be dealt with as they 
appear. 
A short review of recent legal history is useful in under-
standing the new due process. Lawyers have always known that 
a court should not constrict liberty or take property without 
notice and a hearing. Yet in many provisonal and nonjudicial 
procedures, the interests protected were hazy and the proce-
dure required was unknown. In the late 1960's, the Supreme 
Court began to consider these interests. 
The intellectual foundation of the new due process was 
laid in the late Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Sniadach 
v. Family Finance Corp. 40 There, the majority opinion, stress-
ing the particular issues in the appeal, struck down a wage 
garnishing scheme which allowed the plaintiff to seize wages 
from the defendant's employer without notice and a hearing. 
Justice Harlan, meanwhile, formulated some general princi-
ples. First, he identified the interest affected as a "property" 
interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment in "the use of the garnished portion of her wages 
during the interim period between the garnishment and the 
37 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
31 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Sections 1983 and 1343(3) will be referred to herein· 
after as the Civil Rights Acts. 
31 For an excellent recent article with more general analysis of the Civil Rights 
Act, see McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974). See also C. ANTIEAu, 
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Ac:rs: CIVIL PRACTICE (1971). 
" 395 u.s. 337, 342 (1969). 
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culmination of the main suit."41 This interest was not "de 
minimus." There was no "vital governmental interest" which 
would allow the state, in an emergency, to take property "by 
summary administrative action taken before hearing."42 
Having found that due process applied, Justice Harlan 
discussed what due process required. He stated it in a sentence: 
"[D]ue process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 
'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at 
least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the 
alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its 
unrestricted use." 43 When the threshold interest and the re-
quirement of due process were established, it made no differ-
ence that the loss was not permanent, that interim relief was 
possible, or that notice was received when the property was 
taken. If a constitutionally cognizable interest in the use of 
property was affected, prior notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing were required. 
Mter Sniadach, the advance of due process marked the 
steady encroachments of a rising tide. The Supreme Court de-
fined constitutionally cognizable interests in liberty and prop-
erty in a variety of situations.44 The lower courts absorbed wave 
after wave of lawsuits. 
The new due process reached intellectual fullness in 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 45 which like Sniadach, was a debtor-creditor 
case. In that action a due process attack was mounted against 
statutes which allowed a plaintiff, without notice and a hear-
ing, to secure an order requiring a state official to seize property 
from a defendant. Notice and an opportunity for a hearing were 
necessary, it was argued, to protect individual privacy and 
property. For," absent these protections, the adversary system 
cannot sort valid from invalid seizures. The state must hear 
both sides first because the applicant may be mistaken, over-
zealous or dishonest. Due process, in short, prevents litigants 
from misusing state machinery. 
u Id. 
~· Id. at 343. 
~· Id. 
41 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 
(1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971). 1 
.. 407 u.s. 67 (1972). 
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The majority of the Court, persuaded by this logic, invali-
dated the statutes. In so doing, it articulated the intellectual 
underpinning of the new due process in response to several 
arguments in favor of the statutes. To the proposition that the 
statutes were permissible because if property were wrongfully 
taken, damages could be awarded, the Court stated that after-
the-fact damages were insufficient. Undoing a consummated 
wrong was not enough especially when notice and a hearing 
before the taking could prevent that wrong from occurring in 
the first place. Similarly, the applicant's bond was an inade-
quate check-the decision to use state power still turned on the 
applicant's possibly biased judgment.46 
The proponents of the statutes also argued that an emer-
gency obviated notice and a hearing. The Court, however, held 
that emergency cases dealt with more importunate matters 
than defaulting installment buyers, matters such as spoiled or 
mislabeled food and bank failures. The cases before the Court 
interposed state power into private disputes and, because there 
was not notice to one disputant, the state acted without ade-
quate information.47 
To the argument that the installment buyers had waived 
their right to due process, the Court tendered two responses. 
First, the agreement was an unexplained, small-type form and· 
difficult to elevate to an informed waiver. Second, the form 
said merely that the seller might retake the merchandise but 
did not say how. This, said the Court, did not constitute a 
conscious waiver of a legal right to notice and a hearing.48 
Finally, it was asserted that the statutes were constitu-
tional because: (1) the taking was not final, (2) the conditional-
seller applicants had financial interests in the items, and (3) 
the property was not a necessity of life. The Court rejected each 
of these interrelated arguments. First, it declared, due process 
is necessary before the state disturbs any significant property 
interest. Second, installment buyers have a constitutionally 
cognizable property interest, established by contract, in pos-
sessing the property. Third, even though the taking was tempo-
rary, the interest protected was in using the property. Even a 
41 Id. at 80-86. 
47 Id. at 73-94. 
'
8 Id. at 94-97. 
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"temporary" taking disturbed that interest. Last, there are no 
degrees of property interests; instead, due process protects all 
property interests, luxuries as well as necessities.49 
The Fuentes majority owed a palpable intellectual debt to 
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach.50 If an interest is 
defined at the threshold as constitutionally cognizable, due 
process mandates notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
the state, at a private party's behest, disturbs that interest. 
Moreover, the Court marshalled prior cases to show the thrust 
of due process, and that more recent developments were in the 
mainstream of due process.51 
Justice White, dissenting, rejected the Harlan-Stewart 
method of delimiting constitutionally cognizable interests by 
defining property. Instead, he adduced a different analysis of 
fourteenth amendment property interests: "[I]n the typical 
installment sale of personal property both the seller and the 
buyer have interests in the property until the purchase price if 
fully paid .... ''52 Thus, Justice White narrowed the issue to 
secured consumer transactions and perceived the interests to 
be less clearcut. The questioned procedures accommodated the 
interests of both parties to the tranaction: "[T]he buyer loses 
use of the property temporarily but is protected against loss; 
the seller is protected against deterioration of the property but 
most undertake by bond to make the buyer whole in the event 
the latter prevails."53 To invalidate these procedures, Justice 
White observed, "represents no more than ideological tinkering 
with state law."54 
It may be argued that Fuentes' principles apply only to 
"property" interests, but that limited view is difficult to con-
ceive. 55 "Liberty" is difficult to distinguish from "property" 
and if the two can be distinguished, it is incongruous to exalt 
one over the other.56 The idea underlying Fuentes, simply 
•• Id. at 85-91. 
50 The short concurrence is cited for at least four major points. See 407 U.S. 67, 
85 n.15, 86, 90 n.21, 91 n.23, 97 (1972). 
•• Id. at 88-89. 
oz I d. at 99. 
53 Id. at 100 . 
.. Id. at 102 . 
.. Cf. Murphy, Free Speech and the Interest in Local Law and Order, 1 J. PUB. 
L. 40, 58 (1952). 
56 See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972): 
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stated, is that it is alien to our political and legal traditions for 
people to be governed in their daily lives by decisions in which 
they have had no voice. This idea springs from an increasing 
awareness of individual dignity and worth and of the value of 
citizens participating in the process of government. As this idea 
advances, whim, caprice and secrecy will decline. Procedural 
fairness is, above all, a conservative doctrine because it exacts 
cautious, deliberate decision-making and serves as a brake on 
rapid change. At the same time, fair procedure insures rule by 
law. "The history of liberty," Justice Frankfurter wrote, "has 
largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards. "57 
Fuentes, a four to three decision by a court of seven, hung 
by a thread for almost two years. The tide of lower court cases 
became a torrent. Then in December of 1973, attorneys argued 
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. before the Supreme Court. 
Mitchell concerned the constitutionality of repossessing con-
sumer collateral by sequestering the property under the Louis-
iana vendor's privilege. The assailed procedure varied only in 
detail from the replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes but 
counsel for the seller argued that Fuentes could be distin-
guished without being overruled. 58 
The decision in Mitchell59 was ultimately rendered in May 
of 1974. Justice White authored the majority opinion; Justice 
Powell wrote a concurring opinion; Justice Stewart dissented 
for himself and two others; and Justice Brennan dissented sep-
arately. The Louisiana procedure, the Court held, did not deny 
due process. Fuentes was not overruled but distinguished. Nev-
Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal liberties and 
property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have 
rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than 
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a "personal" right, 
whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings 
account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal 
right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have mean-
. ing without the other. 
See also Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 70 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1946); Cohen, Transcen-
dental Nonescence and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815-16 
(1935). 
57 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
51 Arguments before the Court: Installment Sales, 42 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec. 
11, 1973). 
5I 416 u.s. 600 (1974). 
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ertheless, as is always true when a case is "distinguished" in a 
later decision by a dissenter in the original case, both opinions 
must be examined carefully to determine whether the earlier 
opinion's continuing vitality is real or merely apparent.60 
The Mitchell majority opinion, properly conceived, turns 
on a narrow question. In a consumer credit transaction, does 
the debtor-buyer or the creditor-seller have a right to the se-
cured property? Under state law, the majority stated "both the 
seller and buyer had current real interests in the property. " 61 
Under Louisiana law, the debtor-buyer may transfer the prop-
erty to a bona fide purchaser and if the transferee takes posses-
sion of the property, the creditor-seller loses his vendor's lien 
or privilege against the property, retaining only an in personam 
right against the debtor-buyer.62 
Given the dual interests and the ease with which the 
debtor-buyer might prejudice or destroy the creditor-seller's 
rights by transferring the property to a bona fide purchaser, 
hiding it or de-stroying it, the constitutional question was 
whether the procedural scheme accorded due process to the 
debtor-buyer. Several factors strengthened the majority's con-
clusion that it did. Even though the provisional writ issued 
upon ex parte application, the creditor-applicant was required 
to post a bond and allege specific facts. Further, the issues-
debt, default, and possession-were capable of documentary 
proof; a judge issued the writ; the sheriff retained the prop-
erty for ten days; the debtor could apply immediately to dis-
solve the writ; and if the writ were improperly issued, the 
debtor would be entitled to damages, attorney's fees, and the 
property. 63 
How Mitchell will affect Fuentes remains to be deter-
mined, especially since Mitchell rests on the premise that Jus-
tice White expressed in his Fuentes dissent. Since in a secured 
transaction both the debtor and the creditor have a property 
interest in the secured property, the procedures involved must 
accommodate both these interests. Fuentes rests on the thresh-
•• See id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring). 
•• Id. at 604. 
02 In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Berhard v. Beneficial Fin .. 394 U.S. 930 (1969) . 
.. 416 u.s. 600, 604-06 (1974). 
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old premise that the debtors contractual right to possess the 
property is a constitutionally cognizable property interest and 
the mere possession cannot be disturbed without notice and a 
hearing. Particular procedural protections may vary depending 
on the interests at stake, but notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing are mandated before this interest may be disturbed.84 
There is, it is true, a basis in legal reality to distinguish 
Louisiana law from that of the other 49 states. In Louisiana, 
the vendor's privilege is defeated when a bona fide purchaser 
possesses the secured property. In jurisdictions which have 
enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, an installment seller 
who files properly does not lose his security interest in the 
property even though the transferee from the debtor possesses 
it. 65 Thus, in Louisiana, as distinguished from commercial code 
jurisdictions, the interests are truly dual. However, Justice 
White first developed his dual interest analysis in Fuentes 
which did not involve Louisiana personal property law. There-
fore, while the creditor's rights against the secured property 
possessed by third parties is a factor in Mitchell, it is not the 
sole basis for the decision. 
The principal doctrinal difference between Mitchell and 
Fuentes, however, flows from the way this threshold interest is 
conceived. Doctrinally, Mitchell only affects due process in 
repossessing secured personal property. Justice Stewart, dis-
senting, stated that "the deprivation of property in this case is 
identical to that at issue inFuentes."86 He criticized the major-
ity for approving factors in Mitchell which were disapproved in 
Fuentes: the allegations were specific but nonetheless could not 
be contradicted; a judge is required but unless both sides are 
heard the act is not considered; and the issues are relatively 
simple but that is irrelevant to notice and a hearing. 67 But the 
result appears to flow from the majority's view that the inter-
ests in secured property were dual, an issue which Justice 
Stewart does not confront. 
The majority can be criticized for a more fundamental 
u Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 87 n.18, 90 n.21 (1972). 
15 UNIFORM CoMMERICAL ConE § 9-307(2) (1972 text). See also LA. REv. STAT. § 
9:5354 (1950)(comparable protection by chattel mortgage). 
" Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 631 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
17 /d. at 631-34. 
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reason. From Justice Harlan's concurrence in Sniadach 
through Fuentes, the Supreme Court's due process analysis 
entailed a two-step inquiry. The first question was whether 
there was a constitutionally cognizable interest. If the answer 
to the first question was yes, the Court then asked the second 
question: What procedural protections does due process re-
quire? But under the approach in Mitchell, if the interests are 
dual, the Court must combine the two questions68 and weigh 
the interests against one another. This dilutes Fuentes' "first 
define, then balance" approach and may diffuse analysis of due 
process interests. 
In future decisions, Mitchell may be read broadly or, alter-
natively, confined to its rather narrow and unique set of 
facts-sequestration of personal property-security by means of 
judge-issued writs in Orleans Parish. If the former, then 
Mitchell may well sound a requiem for the new due process; a 
signal to lower courts and legislatures that the due process tide 
has turned. On the other hand, if the latter more nearly ap-
proximates reality, Mitchell may become no more than a mere 
aberration, little affecting the two-step69 Fuentes "constitu-
tionally congnizable interest" due process analysis. The ob-
server can only speculate. 70 This article, though advocating a 
broad construction of Fuentes and due process, proceeds in the 
face of uncertainty, and attempts to limn prior cases and dis-
cern the trend of the future. The recent case of North Georgia 
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 11 suggests that Mitchell was 
not in fact the death knell of Fuentes. There, in an opinion by 
Justice White, author of the Mitchell opinion, the Court relied 
upon Fuentes to hold a prejudgement garnishment invalid. 
Mitchell was distinguished because the supportive affidavit 
was merely conclusory in form, and there was no judge to over-
18 See, e.g., id. at 624, 625 (Powell, J., concurring). 
" Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. ·Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
70 Early commentary on Fuentes emphasized the financial situations of the par-
ties. See, e.g., Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 
521 (1973); Note, Cumulative Remedies Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: An Answer to Fuentes v. Shevin, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 213 (1972). But 
obviously the case meant much more. Perhaps like Fuentes, early commentary on 
Mitchell might focus upon the wrong issues. 
n 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). 
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see the entire matter. Thus, while there still is uncertainty in 
the area, it is too early to sound the requiem for the new due 
process. 
To understand the new due process it is necessary to exam-
ine several threshold ideas. Before due process guarantees at-
tach, there must be state action which affects a constitution-
ally cognizable interest. In addition, only liberty and property 
interests may not be affected without due process. There is also 
an exception. Even though there is state action which affects 
a recognized interest, due process is not required in an emer-
gency. It thus becomes crucial to consider liberty, property, 
state action and emergency. 
A. Constitutionally Cognizable Interests: Liberty and 
Property 
It is difficult to include the ~ocial and economic meaning 
of liberty and property within the ambit of a word formula. 
Liberty comprehends more than freedom from bodily restraint, 
while property encompasses more than conventional real and 
personal property. Both are growing and mobile concepts.72 
Older definitions of liberty tend to be circular and are not 
particularly helpful. In 1923, the Supreme Court defined lib-
erty as the right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men."73 Thirty years later the Court said 
"liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which 
the individual is free to pursue."74 The "property" interest is 
easier to grasp for it turns on the "paper" record and mutually 
held, objectively discernable understanding.75 But forty years 
ago, Felix Cohen taught that "property" as a legal conclusion 
is useless.76 Perhaps imprecision is salutary. It allows courts the 
requisite flexibility to adopt the concepts to a changing so-
n Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
73 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
74 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 479, 499 (1954). See also Grosjean v. American Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1935); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281-85 (1st Cir. 1970); 
Madiera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1967). 
75 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
71 Cohen, supra note 56, at 814-17. See also Note, Entitlement Enjoyment ahd Due 
Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89 (accurate description: questionable prescription). 
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ciety's needs and aspirations. Nevertheless, the outside bound-
aries of the terms liberty and property are murky. 
Some uncertainties may be summarized. It is not clear 
whether certain conduct or interests are liberty or property, nor 
is it clear whose interest is protected. For example, In re Gault71 
requires due process before a child is committed as a juvenile 
delinquent. Yet it is not certain whether the interest protected 
is the child's interest in being free from restraint or the parents' 
interest in retaining custody of the child. It is, moreover, not 
certain whether a posited interest is sufficient to be constitu-
tionally cognizable. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. introduced yet 
another complicating factor, dual property interests. Liberty, 
it has been frequently stated, varies with the setting.78 Even if 
the interest is constitutionally cognizable, it is not clear what, 
in practical terms, due process requires.79 A major source of 
uncertainty is that ours is a complex, pluralistic and changing 
society; the problems litigated deal with fundamental values. 
Due process aims to control private abuse of public power and 
to reconcile individual freedom with the social service state. It 
seems inevitable, then, that major differences of opinion and 
periodic changes in emphasis will be encountered. But, as time 
passes, more clarity may be anticipated. The generalizations 
already available will become more precise as the decided cases 
place fact patterns in and out of the categories. 
The above-discussed uncertainties notwithstanding, some 
general conclusions about liberty and property interests can be 
drawn. "Liberty" refers to status and conduct. Liberty inter-
ests are the leftovers, those not protected under the Bill of 
Rights or fourteenth amendment "life" or "property." The lib-
erty concept is currently growing because of due process and 
other lawsuits postulating intangible and novel interests 
against the state or other citizens. The difficulty of developing 
an intelligible frame of reference around the liberty concept is 
apparent. Still more apparent is the necessity of so doing, for 
77 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Newton v. 
Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973); McGee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578 (W.D. Va. 
1973); C.V.C. v. Superior Ct., 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973). 
78 See, e.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior Collr.ge, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). 
78 The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 90-91 (1972). 
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liberty is vital to our notion of a limited government and our 
preference for individual decision-making, unfettered by gov-
ernmental constraints.80 
Where liberty interests are involved, there are three pos-
sible results, the differences· in which flow from the varied 
magnitude of the interests the citizens postulate as liberty. In 
the first class, the citizens interest is so significant that the 
government cannot interfere at all. This is where Judge Clark, 
quoting Faulkner, said "the Law stops and just people 
starts."81 This class now includes such disparate interests as a 
pregnant female's interest in terminating a pregnancy during 
the thirteen weeks following conception82 and a college stu-
dent's interest in remaining unshorn.83 Procedural due process 
is not involved in this class of liberty interests. 
The second class of liberty interests is generic. It includes 
economic, expressive and locomotive conduct. Examples are 
boycotting, picketing and demonstrating. These interests must 
be protected as liberty because it is generally held that they are 
not entitled to full fledged first amendment status.84 This sec-
ond class also includes other interests such as freedom from 
government action which attaches a stigma, restrains personal 
freedom or works a hardship. Examples are branding a person 
a drunk, committing an individual as mentally ill and impos-
80 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
31 Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). 
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (constitutional privacy founded upon 
fourteenth amendment liberty). See also Justice Stewart concurring id. at 167-71. 
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes 
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 299-311 (1973). 
13 Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); See also Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir.1973) 
(patrolman); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (fireman); Harris v. 
Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769, 775-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (army reserve haircut; wearing wig 
at reserve meetings); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.H. 1972) (pretrial 
detainee's haircut); Chambers v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1973) (mechanic unemployed for length of hair could continue 
receiving unemployment even though continued unemployment caused by refusal to 
cut hair). 
M See, e.g., Mimsv.Duvall CountySchoolBd., 350F. Supp. 553 (M.D. Fla.1972); 
Sumbry v. Land, 195 S.E.2d 228, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Board ofEduc. v. Kankakee 
Fed. of Teachers Local 886, 264 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Til. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 
(1971). 
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ing discipline in prison. In this class, the state may regulate 
after according procedural due process. 
In the third group of cases in which a liberty interest is 
asserted, the claim is rejected. T4e interest is so small, the 
court holds that no liberty is involved. Therefore, the person 
has no constitutionally cognizable interest and the state may 
proceed without concern for procedural due process. 
Fourteenth amendment property interests are also ex-
panding. The courts are developing the concept of property in 
a novel way, a type of "new property."85 The "new property" 
is analogous to the second class of liberty interests and perhaps 
overlaps somewhat. But this overlap creates few problems, be-
cause if an interest in either liberty or property is found the 
result is the same. The interests may be affected only after 
extending procedural due process. There is also a class of prop-
erty cases where, as in the third class of liberty cases, a prop-
erty interest is asserted but rejected. Here, too, the state may 
proceed without due process. 
In Board of Regents v. Roth86 and Perry v. Sindermann,81 
the Court examined the minimum interest in both liberty and 
property. The question in each was whether a college teacher's 
employment could be terminated without a hearing. Both dis-
trict courts decided the teacher's claim without a plenary hear-
ing on motion for summary judgment. In both cases the Court 
first considered the property issue, i.e. , whether the teachers 
had a reasonable expectancy of continued employment. In 
Perry the Court found an arguable de facto tenure policy, and 
this interest could be sufficiently cognizable as property. 
Though Robert Sindermann had not been extended tenure, the 
school officials may have created a reasonable expectancy of 
continued employment. Since Mr. Sindermann alleged a cog-
nizable property interest, that interest could not be dismissed 
without according Sindermann an opportunity to prove de 
facto terms. Though a liberty interest had been asserted, the 
35 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1972); Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 
383 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (7th Cir. 1972); Ross v. Wiscon-
sin Dep't of Health and Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See Reich, 
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
Sl 408 U.S. 564 (1972), 
S7 408 u.s. 593 (1972). 
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Court found it unnecessary to pursue that issue. But in Roth, 
the teacher had been explicitly employed for a single academic 
year and had no promise of reemployment. The Court predicta-
bly found no sufficient expectancy of continued employment to 
amount to property, and then went on to consider the asserted 
"liberty" interest. The issue was whether any reasons were 
given for the failure to reemploy which would be stigmatic 
enough to interfere with the teacher's search for future employ-
ment. At the summary judgment stage in the litigation, the 
Court found none. But Roth was remanded to build a record 
on that issue. Thus, both cases were sent back to district court. 
In deciding whether due process was compelled, the Court 
looked to the presence, not the magnitude, of the citizen inter-
est. It refused to balance state and citizen interests, observing 
"[W]e must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the 
interest at stake."88 Of course, the demonstration of liberty or 
property is a question of fact, 89 and if either is shown, the state 
cannot act without due process.90 Once it has been determined 
that due process applies, i.e., that there is a cognizable liberty 
or property interest; the Court will "weigh" the citizen and 
state interests to determine what particular procedures due 
process requires.91 
In Roth, th~ Court explicitly repudiated the "wooden" dis-
tinction between "rights" which give rise to procedural protec-
tions and "privileges" which do not.92 Fundamentally the Roth-
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,570-71 (1972). This threshold interest 
test was followed in Fuentes v. Shevin. The majority found a contractual interest in 
possessing the property which was a constitutionally cognizable property interest 
under the fourteenth amendment. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). But Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 
found dual interests in a similar secured transaction. Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 739 
(1975) (grievous loss test rejected by majority of five). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 480, 482 (1972) (grievous loss balancing test); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973) (Roth-Perry analysis suggested); Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Health and Social Serv., 369 F. Supp. 570, 571 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McCormack, 60 VA. 
L. REv. 1, 65 (1974). 
" Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1973). 
" See McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, 1347-50 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 410 
u.s. 943 (1972). 
11 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 491, 492 (1972). See also Graham v. Knutzen, 351 
F. Supp. 652, 664-66 (N.D. lll. 1972). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-58 
(1974). 
12 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968); K. DAVIS, 
(i 
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Perry idea is that if there is a cognizable liberty or property 
interest, the authorities are compelled to accord due process 
before the interest may be affected. If, however, there is no 
interest, the government may proceed without due process 
even though the individual is adversely affected.93 The liberty-
property test, it may be argued, resurrects the repudiated 
right-privilege distinction-in a new guise. The Roth-Perry anal-
ysis and the right-privilege dichotomy do in fact have one thing 
in common: both formulate a cut-off. If the interest postulated 
does not meet this minimum, it is wasteful to require a hearing. 
The Roth-Perry test, however, is an advance over the right-
privilege distinction because it is a fresh start. The "learning" 
accumulated around the right-privilege doctrine can be dis-
carded and the courts can begin anew to sort out those interests 
felt to be important enough for due process. 
Like Perry and Roth, many recent liberty-property cases 
have arisen in educational settings. In fact, several recent opin-
ions have applied the Roth-Perry test to teacher terminations 
and found no cognizable interest.94 Typically, a contract for a 
term is not renewed and no opprobrious reasons are given. In 
such cases, there is neither an objective expectancy of contin-
ued employment nor an interference with future employment 
prospects. The teacher lacks recourse unless the decision 
turned on an impermissible basis such as dismissal due to the 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExT §§ 7.12-7.14 (3d ed. 1972). Cases rejecting the distinction 
include, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parole revocation); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (government employment); Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (public assistance); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 
1062, 1079 (M.D. Fla. 1973)(prison discipline). 
13 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972): 
It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of "lib-
erty" when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before 
to seek another .... Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonreten-
tion in one job taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to 
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of oppor-
tunties amounting to a deprivation of liberty. 
14 See, e.g., Bradford v. Tarrant County Jr. College Dist., 492 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 
1974); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974); Robbin-
son v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 485 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1973); Lipp v. Board of 
Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972); Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); 
Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1972); Watts 
v. Board of Curators, 363 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Moore v. Gaston CountyBd. 
ofEduc., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
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exercise of first amendment rights.95 Even so, freedom to speak 
out may be construed narrowly to advance a presumed interest 
in harmony.96 A teacher, finally, has an insufficient interest to 
compel a hearing upon failure to promote.97 
The property cases from educational institutions are fairly 
straightforward. If an objectively discernable, mutual under-
standing of continued employment based on a "paper" record 
of some kind is found, the teacher has a constitutionally cogniz':' 
able property interest.98 Statutory tenure is an adequate ex-
pectancy of continued employment, 99 and since property grows 
out of both contractual arrangements and implied mutual un-
derstandings, 100 de facto tenure has been recognized as a prop-
erty interest.101 In contrast, a unilateral, subjective hope is an 
insufficient property interest.102 In the absence of a contract, 
understanding or statutory tenure, there is no property inter-
est. 103 Due process requirements attach not only to dismissal or 
15 See, e.g., Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Donahue v. Staunton, 
471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1972); Moore v. Gaston County Bd. 
of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D.N.C. 1973). But see Amburgey v. Cassady, 370 F. 
Supp. 571 (E.D. Ky. 1974). 
11 See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 
(1973); Vanderzahden v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67 (D. Ore. 1973). 
See also Rowe v. Forrester, 368 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Abbott v. 
Tetford, 354 F. Supp:1280 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
17 Olson v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 351 F. Supp. 430 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See 
also Schwartz v. Thompson, 497 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974)(merely failing to promote, 
with no discharge or demotion, does not affect liberty or property); Green v. Board of 
Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973); Rowe v. Forrester, 363 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Ala. 
1974) (teaching assignment); Zumalt v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 107 Cal. Rptr. 
573 (removal of department chairman), aff'd, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 351 (Ct. App. 1973). 
15 See, e.g., Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (M.D. Cal. 1973). 
" See, e.g., Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Idaho 1974); Peacock 
v. Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1974); Bowing v. Board of 
Trustees of Green River Com. Col., 521 P.2d 220, 225 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
100 Soni v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Tenn., 376 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tenn. 
1974) (professor allowed to exercise rights and privileges ordinarily only given to ten-
ured faculty, told he would be recommended for tenure upon attaining citizenship); 
Thomas v. Ward, 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (language in teacher's handbook 
could lead teacher to believe tenure automatic after 3 years). 
101 Huntley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1021 (4th Cir. 1974); 
Pelisek v. Trevor State Graded School Dist. No.7, 371 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Wis. 1974); 
Chung v. Park, 369 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Ward v. Board of Regents, 360 F. 
Supp. 1179 (E.D. Ky. 1973); See also Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 
(W.D. Va. 1973) (custom of tenant permanency). 
102 Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D. Nev. 1973). 
113 McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 1973); Hirsch v. Green, 368 F. 
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failure to rehire. A demotion also affects a property right, and 
the procedure used to demote must comply with due process.104 
The "liberty" interest is more difficult. Liberty as used 
here embodies two similar ideas.l05 The first is the citizen's 
interest in relations with the community at large, 108 which is 
injured by damage to good name, reputation, honor and integ-
rity }07 In Perry, the Supreme Court defined "liberty" in such 
a way as to closely parallel the Restatement of Torts definition 
of defamation. At § 559, the Restatement says that a statement 
defames if it will "deter third parties from ... dealing" with 
the object of the statement. The second is the interest in eco-
nomic or employment relations which is injured by events or 
disparagement which hamper freedom to take advantage of 
economic opportunities.108 The clearest injury to community 
and economic relations is to be accused of dishonesty.l09 Teach-
ers are particularly vulnerable to charges of sexual improprie-
ties.U0 Others are conclusory charges of racism, disloyalty, mis-
conduct, improper conduct, insubordination, or hostility.m 
Supp. 1061 (D. Md. 1973); Velger v. Cawley, 366 F. Supp. 874,877-78 (S.D.N.Y.1973); 
Snead v. Department of Social Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Cf. 
Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (29 years service gives rise to some-
thing); Perkins v. Regents, 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (7 years). 
1
'" Davis v. Barr, 373 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (tenured teacher-coach 
removed from coaching position, though remaining on faculty as teacher). 
105 Cf. Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65 (1938) 
in LrrtGATION PRoCESs IN ToRT LAw 413 (L. Greened. 1965). 
101 Pelisek v. Trevoe Graded School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 1064 (E. D. Wis. 1974). 
107 Lengthy service alone is not enough; some stigma must attach. Cannady v. 
Person County Bd. of Educ., 375 F. Supp. 689 (M.D.N.C. 1974). There the plaintiff 
had been teaching in the school system for 19 years. The stated reason for the removal 
was ineffectiveness in team teaching. The court analyzed the case on the issue of denial 
of liberty, and held that in order to be a denial there must be a stigma or other 
disability attaching to the dismissal, or injury to the teacher's good name, which was 
lacking in this case. ld. at 699-700. 
108 Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Velger v. 
Cawley, 366 F. Supp. 874, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
101 Huntley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1974); 
McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319-20 (4th Cir. 1973); Hirsch v. Green, 368 F. Supp. 
1061 (D. Md. 1973); Schunemann v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 875 (N.D.lll. 1973). 
See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 939 (1972) (veracity). 
110 Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974); 
Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 149 (W.D. Ky. 1973). 
111 Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 158 (8th Cir. 
1973); Wilderman v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir. 1972); Amburgey v. Cas-
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General accusations such as "lack of performance in the 
functional program" and "failure to contribute to general·pro-
gram" are sufficiently stigmatic to impinge on liberty .112 Like-
wise, a charge of mental illness diminishes employment 
opportunities113 and impairs e·conomic prospects. The charge 
made need not be specific-summary firing plus factual testi-
mony that the teacher was unable to secure employment may 
be adequate. 114 Moreover, even scheduling a "probable cause" 
hearing may "dampen the reputation of an educator."115 And, 
as one lawsuit demonstrated, actions may speak louder than 
words. In that case, a department chairman who had no "prop-
erty" interest in continuing in office was removed without writ-
ten reason. Subsequent to his departure, campus policemen 
changed the locks and sealed the filing cabinets. The court 
found interference with a constitutionally cognizable interest, 
stating "the show of force implied that force was necessary: 
resort to locks implied that locks were necessary ."116 
Other courts construe liberty differently. For example, a 
single charge by a superior of being "anti-establishment" not 
accompanied by further action was not considered sufficiently 
damaging to impair the charged teacher's liberty.117 Also, "fail-
ure to coordinate efforts," 118 "general ineffectiveness as an 
sady, 370 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Larkin v. Withrow, 367 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. 
Wis. 1973); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D. Minn. 1973). 
nz Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 713 (M.D. Fla. 1973). 
111 Lombard v. Board of Education of the City of New York, q02 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 
1974); Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973); Snead v. Department of Social 
Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 1 11
' Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 510-11 (E.D. Pa. 
1973). See also the factual testimony in Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 713 
(M.D. Fla. 1973). 
115 Haines v. Askew, 386 F. Supp. 369, 373 (M.D. Fla. 1973). 
111 Zumwalt v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 353 (Ct. 
App. 1973). 
117 Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1972). Compare Snead v. 
Department of Social Serv., 355 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Some courts give 
rather short shrift to the issue of denial of liberty. In Frazier v. Curators of the Univ. 
of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1974), the court turned the case on the lack of tenure, 
saying that a non-tenured professor can be dismissed for any reason that is not consti-
tutionally impermissible. This resulted even though a letter to Dr. Frazier, included 
in her file, was severely critical of her emotional stability and scholarly ability. 
m Shriek v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 408 U.S. 940 (1973). See 
also Irby v. McGowam, 380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ala. 1974) (charge of being "noncoop-
erative" does not deprive individual of liberty without further proof of injury to 
reputation). 
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employee, " 119 "insufficient academic performance, " 120 and 
other serious professional criticism 121 were held not to injure the 
employee's liberty interest. Allegations that future employ-
ment prospects were impaired were held to be insufficient.122 
These cases extend the statement in Roth that being less desir-
able for employment because. of "nonretention" is not, stand-
ing alone, a constitutionally cognizable interest.123 Yet they are 
difficult to reconcile with the decisions in the preceding para-
graphs which place primary emphasis upon the effect that the 
charges have upon future employment possibilities. 
To some courts, an opprobrious basis for possible adverse 
action in the future is sufficient to require due process. 124 If 
there are letters in the "file" which may be based on false 
information, and which may diminish future opportunities, 
due process attaches.125 If this interest is to be meaningful, 
there should be a supporting right to examine that "file."126 
This approach is not without merit. Secrecy's decorous equivo-
cation is without virture to those who feel that secrecy may be 
a mask for callous exploitation.127 They assert that the authori-
ties "only concealed what they would have blushed to dis-
close"128 and feel that honest people do not keep cards up their 
11
' Robinson v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 485 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1973). See 
also Pavlov v. Martin, 381 F. Supp. 707 (D. Del. 1974), which held that a charge of 
"incompetence" does not damage the individual's good name, and thus constitute a 
denial of liberty. 
128 Jablon v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974). 
121 Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Neb. 1973). See also Blair v. 
Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974), which held that damage to reputation 
arising from dismissal due to failure to meet minimum requirements for a teacher's 
professional relationships with students does not violate due process. 
122 Perkins v. Regents, 353 F. Supp. 618, 622-24 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
123 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972). 
12
' Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D. Minn. 1973). But 
cf. Whatley v. Price, 368 F. Supp. 336, 339, (M.D. Ala. 1973); Kennedy v. Engle, 348 
F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (E.D. N.Y. 1972). 
123 Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 158 (8th Cir. 
1973); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Servs., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (N.D. 
Fla. 1973). 
123 Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1972). 
127 Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 567, 585-86 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Wickham, 
Let the Sun Shine In, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480 (1973). 
123 1 E. GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE RoMAN EMPIBE, 452 (Modem Lib. 
Ed. 1963). 
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sleeves. Some, on the other hand, think that a certain amount 
of decorum may occasionally be mandated. 129 
Non-employment cases also refine the interest necessary 
to require due process. For example, a citizen's interest in the 
length of his hair, it seems, is not property but rather liberty.l30 
This is true even though the sheriff who promulgated the rule 
is named Sampson.131 A tenant in a government housing project 
has a sufficient property interest to compel notice and a hear-
ing before failing to renew.I32 In prisons, forfeiture of "good 
time" or any significant time in "segregation" constricts liberty 
sufficiently to require due process}33 If a student is to be sus-
pended from school for 10 days or more, his interest in securing 
an education is affected and the authorities must accord a prior 
hearing.I34 A student's liberty is also interfered with if he is 
dismissed from an honor society for misconduct, and the dis-
121 Haines v. Askew, 368 F. Supp. 369, 376 (M.D. Fla. 1973). But the mere lodging 
of unfavorable memoranda in a file is not alone sufficient to give rise to a constitution-
ally cognizable grievance. There must be allegations that the entry of these memo-
randa has or is likely to lead to disciplinary action or sanctions; will delay or prevent 
later favorable action; chill the exercise of first amendment rights; or in some other 
way damage or threaten to damage the complainant. Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100, 
1104 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Sims v. Fox, 505 F.2d 857, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1974). 
130 Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 
648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Harris v. Kaine, 352 F. Supp. 769, 775-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 
Chambers v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 109 Cal. Rptr. 413, 415 (Ct. 
App. 1973); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 58 Cal. Rptr. 520, 526-27 (Ct. App. 
1967). But cf. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
has taken a position that will perhaps make dismissals due to the personal appearance 
of the employee not cognizable in federal courts. In Miller v. School District No. 167, 
Cook County, lllinois, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974), the court held that even if the 
plaintiff could prove that dislike for his appearance was a factor in the school board's 
decision to dismiss him, such claim did not allege a violation of deprivation of liberty 
forbidden by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court said that 
the board had a legitimate interest in protecting the image projected by school teach-
ers, and to protect the students from being subjected to teachers whose appearance 
they deemed harmful. Additionally, the court suggested that the board's discretion 
would not be over-turned unless it was acting without good faith. 
131 Smith v. Sampson, 349 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973). 
131 Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973). 
133 Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 
F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 664-65 (M.D. 
Ala. 1973); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 944 (E.D. Pa. 
1973). 
•~ Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th 
Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). 
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missal procedure does not conform to due process require-
ments. This dismissal is a blackmark on his educational record 
that is an injury to his integrity and good name and can ad-
versely affect his future. 135 Similarly, liberty is hindered when 
a driver's license application is denied without reasons.136 The 
California Court of Appeals held that prospective adoptive par-
ents have an interest in the custody of an adoptable child suffi-
cient to compel notice and a hearing before the child is taken.137 
In addition, serious charges against a physician impinge upon 
a constitutionally cognizable interest and give rise to due pro-
cess.138 Finally, the next of kin of soldiers "missing in action" 
have a cognizable interest in proceedings which may deprive 
them of statutory benefits and, accordingly, have a right to due 
process.139 
Mitchell's view that both the buyer-debtor and the seller-
creditor have an interest in secured personal property may cre-
ate difficulties in defining constitutionally cognizable "old" 
property interests. Litigants have questioned various legally 
and statutorily created liens. Mter Fuentes, many courts fol-
lowed the Harlan-Stewart analysis and found that an owner or 
one entitled to possession has a constitutionally cognizable in-
terest in using and alienating property and that this interest is 
sufficient to compel notice or an opportunity to be heard before 
possession or liquidity is circumscribed.140 Mitchell's dual in-
135 Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043 
(N.D. Tex. 1974). 
131 Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973); Raper v. Lacey, 488 F.2d 748, 
752 (1st Cir. 1973). 
137 C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973). 
131 Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1973); Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. 
Supp. 796 (E.D.Wis. 1973); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1209 
(W.D. Wis. 1973). Additionally, a physician's staff privileges in a hospital are a consti-
tutionally cognizable interest, and the procedures used for denying or rescinding them 
must meet due process requirements. Christhilfv. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 
496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); Poe v. Charlotte Mem. Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302 
(W.D.N.C. 1974). 
101 McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
140 Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. lll. 1974); Bay State Harness Horse 
Racing & Breeding Ass'n Inc. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (D. 
Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (S.D. 
Me. 1973); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973); 
Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 423 (N.D. Ga. 1973), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 
(1973); Nork v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428, 432 (Ct. App. 1973). But cf. Harri-
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terest analysis leaves these cases in doubt. In answer to coun-
sel's concern that affirming Mitchell "would set off a rip tide," 
the Court stated that "our decision will not affect recent cases 
dealing with garnishment or summary self-help remedies of 
secured creditors or landlords."141 But the Court also noted that 
it "had unanimously approved prejudgment attachment liens 
effected by creditors without notice, hearing or judicial 
order." 142 
The better course of decision is to resolve these incon-
gruous statements by limiting Mitchell's dual interest analysis 
to consensually created written security interests.143 The owner 
or possessor should have a cognizable, due process interest in 
using or alienating property unless the property was subject to 
a consensual security agreement. Attaching property to accom-
plish jurisdiction may have been acceptable before in per-
sonam jurisdiction was expanded by long-arm statutes. Today, 
however, personal jurisdiction is almost always available.144 
Attachment accomplishes jurisdiction but may also cause the 
defendant to lose a sale or require him to borrow money. Also, 
when a creditor moves to foreclose a consensual security agree-
ment, the written agreement itself is some evidence of the debt. 
But when property previously unrelated to the controversy is 
attached at the beginning of a lawsuit, the plaintiff's allega-
tions are the only evidence of the claim's validity.145 
son v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 
(S.D.S.D. 1973) (mechanics lien de minimus because value of property enhanced by 
improvement). 
111 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 620 n.14 (1974). 
uz Id. at 613. 
143 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(1)(a) (1972 text). (Written agreement re-
quired to create a security interest unless the secured party possesses the collateral). 
w Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 
1023, 1032-36 (1973). 
1
" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972). This was the type of analysis used 
by Judge Lasker in Sugar v. Curtis Cir. Co., 377 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), when 
he held that Mitchell did not foreclose a constitutional attack on a statute that admit-
tedly closely resembled the Louisiana statute procedurally, but allowed attachment of 
property on other bases than a security interest in the property. Judge Lasker cited 
language from Mitchell for his position that the dual interest test in Mitchell arises 
when the creditor has an actual possessory interest in the attached property, such as 
is given by a security interest. Id. at 1062-63. See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. 
v. D. Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975) (garnishment of bank account invalidated along 
with statute without relying on the attachment of property unrelated to a security 
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Additional problems of discerning a constitutionally cog-
nizable interest appear in possessory liens. The owner has sur-
rendered possession to a repairman or creditor, normally under 
a contractual arrangement. Under a repairman's lien, the cred-
itor has added material and labor to the property, something 
the repairman has a right to possess. Furthermore, he has en-
hanced the property's value. Thus, the owner no longer has a 
possessory interest in the Fuentes sense and the "property" in 
the item is dual in the Mitchell sense. The holder of the prop-
erty may retain it without notice and a hearing, but the owner 
has a constitutionally cognizable interest in not being perma-
nently deprived of the property. Therefore the property cannot 
be sold under the lien without prior notice and a hearing.l46 
Various liens must be examined to determine where the 
constitutionally cognizable interest lies. For example, an ar-
tisan or mechanic who improves the owner's property adds 
value but the owner continues in possession. May the artisan 
file a lien against the property without notice to the owner? The 
lien affects the owner's right to sell or mortgage. One court, 
nevertheless, has allowed the lien to attach without prior no-
tice, saying that the owner's interest was de minimus because 
the value of the property was enhanced by the improvements.147 
Even though a tenant's property may technically be in the 
interest feature of the statute); Welch v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mass. 1975); 
In re Law Research Services, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But see Balter 
v. Bato Co., Inc., 385 F. Supp. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
us This was precisely the view of the court in Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 
491 (W.D. Ky. 1974). It was the first case to deal with Mitchell's implications for 
possessory liens. There the court decided that the portion of the Kentucky garageman's 
lien statute that authorized sale of the automobile to liquidate the claim was unconsti-
tutional. This completely extinguished the owner's rights in the automobile. But the 
portion of the statute authorizing the garageman to hold the automobile as security 
for his claim was upheld, because of his property interest in the chattel. The court in 
Cockerel relied upon and adopted the views expressed in Adams v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); see Hernandez v. European 
Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378, 383-86 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., concurring); 
Ceaser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Mason v. Garris, 364 F. Supp. 452, 
360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); R. BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PRoPERTY§ 119 
(2d ed. 1955); Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The Creditor Meets 
the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 383-91 (1973); but see Straley v. Gassaway Motor 
Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (entire scheme unconstitutional); Quebec v. 
Buds Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973) (garageman cannot retain 
property) . 
.., Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973). 
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landlord's possession, courts have struck down landlord's liens, 
apparently because the landlord's or innkeeper's lien violates 
the core values of due process. It allows one private party to use 
state power to take another private party's unsecured property 
before the controversy is examined by a state official. 148 When 
a bank and a debtor-depositor have a controversy, the bank 
may seize the depositor's account under a banker's right to set-
off. The bank's possession or "ownership" of a demand account 
is technical, while the depositor and his creditors have a palpa-
ble interest in liquidity. To allow summary seizure is to appoint 
the bank the judge in its own case. 149 
While there are numerous other security devices such as 
pledges, liens for storage and statutory liens, enough has been 
said to indicate the topic's variety and to posit a solution. Two 
factors should be considered. First, to assert that the property 
is enhanced in value, or that the property interest is mixed or 
dual frequently begs the question. That question is the genu-
ineness of the putative creditor's claim. Allowing that claim to 
attach without disinterested review may lend the state's cred-
ence to an unfounded or disputed claim.150 One primary pur-
111 See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. 
Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
111 Stillwater, The California Banker's Lien Law: A Reappraisal of a Creditor's 
Remedy in a New Economic Context, 27 Bus. LAWYER 777 (1972); Kruger v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 531 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
449 (1974) (no state action). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 146, at § 117, at 577-
81; Clark and Landers, supra note 146, at 400-402. But see Burke & Reber, State 
Action, Congressional Power and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth 
Amendment m, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 33-43 (1973); Note, Bank Credit Cards and the 
Right of Setoff, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 89, 108 (1974), where the author notes that summary 
banking setoff is very similar in practicality to constitutionally prohibited practices, 
but is not unconstitutional because of lack of state action. The author suggests legisla-
tive treatment. 
15° For example, in most litigated garageman liens, the existence or amount of the 
debt was in question. See Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378, 
381 (2d Cir. 1973); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Mason v. 
Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 422 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassoway Motor Co., 359 F. 
Supp. 902 (S.D. W.Va. 1973); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 
113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). In contrast, most § 9-503 plaintiffs have admitted failure to 
make payments. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1974). 
This causes "welfare Cadillac" tirades in some circles. See, e.g., R. HENsoN, HANDBOOK 
ON SECURED TRANsACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE§§ 10-18 (1973). For 
almost a century it has been clear that the substantive validity of the claim and the 
truth of the alleged facts have no relevance when due process is denied. Pennoyer v. 
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pose of due process is to sort spurious from real claims, and the 
Mitchell dissenters were unwilling to extend this credence to 
the creditor's claim absent notice and a hearing. Yet the 
Mitchell majority felt that the security agreement was a suffi-
cient guarantee of genuineness to allow the Court to conclude 
that the property interest was dual. This willingness to accept 
the secured creditor's word is the principal practical difference 
between the majority and the dissent. Unless the dual analysis 
is confined to written, consensual security agreements, the 
mixed interest analysis may destroy the new due process. Even 
in consensual security agreements, Mitchell allows the creditor 
to beg the default question. But the practical reasons to allow 
this, such as the creditor's desire for future business, are absent 
in many nonconsensual liens. 
The second factor to be considered grows out of the prop-
erty issue. Property as an unexamined conclusion may create 
serious analytical difficulties. 151 In Roth and Mitchell, the 
Court stated that fourteenth amendment property is to be de-
fined under state law .152 But the Court in both Mitchell and 
Sniadach distinguished particular kinds of property as deserv-
ing additional protection. 153 State definitions of property 
should be followed generally but not adhered to slavishly. In 
dealing with a similar problem, the question of what passes to 
the bankruptcy trustee under Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), a 
federal definition of property was developed.154 Lines v. 
Fredrick155 defines vacation pay accrued on the date of bank-
ruptcy to be outside of§ 70(a)(5)'s definition of property. Thus 
a federal definition of property advances a social welfare pur-
pose. In dealing with questionable or hazy state property inter-
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 n.17 (S.D. Ohio 
1973), pro b. juris. noted, 415 U.S. 912 (1974). But it is unrealistic to assume that these 
social facts will be ignored in deciding, in the first instance, whether due process is 
required. 
151 Cohen, supra note 56, at 815-16. 
151 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 u.s. 564, 577 (1972). 
153 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Co., 
395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1967). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970). 
But cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-89 (1972) (disapproving this branch of 
Sniadach). 
151 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
155 400 u.s. 18 (1970). 
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ests, the social welfare purpose is an analytical variable with a 
sounder basis in reality than chameleon conclusions like pos-
session.156 In many lien questions which raise issues of whether 
there is a constitutionally cognizable fourteenth amendment 
property interest, courts might well adopt the Lines approach. 
Thus, a line-drawing process is taking place. As interests 
are posited, courts analyze their magnitude in terms of liberty 
and property. 157 If the interest is minimal, courts refuse to in-
terfere: administrative discretion is preserved and expensive 
hearings are avoided. 158 If the interest is defined as liberty or 
property, the authorities must respect the citizen to the extent 
of according due process. 
B. Affecting Constitutionally Cognizable Interests Without 
Due Process 
Constitutionally cognizable citizen interests can be af-
fected in several ways without notice and a hearing. The gov-
ernment may act in a non-adjudicatory fashion, it may act in 
an emergency, there may be a finding that the interest was 
affected without state action, or the defendant may not be a 
"person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Acts, thus 
barring federal jurisdiction. 
1. Legislation versus Adjudication 
The distinction between adjudicatory and legislative ac-
tion results from the doctrine of separation of powers.159 The 
government, without individual notice or an adjudicatory hear-
ing, may affect citizen interests in a myriad of ways. The legis-
lature can increase taxes, lower transfer payments, declare a 
type of business to be a public nuisance or extend subsidies.160 
Still, there are limits on legislative action; the statutory and 
1
" Cf. Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (impounding "aban-
doned" automobiles). 
157 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515 (1973). 
153 Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974). 
15
' K. DAVIS, supra note 92, at§§ 7.03, 7.05. 
1 
.. See Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974); Trager v. Rea-
body Redev. Auth., 367 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Mass. 1973); Whitefield v. King, 364 F. 
Supp. 1296, 1301-02 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 
1280 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
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constitutional procedure applicable to the legislature must be 
followed. A legislative hearing generally includes advance 
warning and a chance to state a position. But the testimony 
need not be sworn and there may be no cross-examination and 
no transcript. In comparison, when dealing with individual 
cases rather than general policy, the government must follow 
adjudicative due process. The government cannot, for exam-
ple, without notice and opportunity for an adjudicative hear-
ing, raise the assessed value of a particular piece of property 
or enjoin a particular business. 
The courts apply a practical analysis to determine whether 
government action is legislative or adjudicative. If a court is 
functioning as a legislature, the legislative rules govern the 
procedure.161 If the legislature is adjudicating, it must follow 
adjudicative procedure.162 This is a more realistic approach 
than classifying a governmental body as either a legislative or 
an adjudicative body and reasoning that all the action of a 
legislature is legislative and all the action of a court is adjudi-
cative. Moreover, it is the only workable approach in some 
areas, such as local government, where separation of powers is 
at best an obscure and elusive concept. 
Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority163 il-
lustrates the difference between legislation and adjudication as 
well as the due process consequences flowing from the 
distinction. Burr, which ultimately established the procedure 
necessary for a public housing authority to increase rent, origi-
nated when the deficit-plagued Authority imposed a "service 
charge" of $2 per month on all tenants. Since the service charge 
affected the tenant's property interest, they filed suit, charging 
a violation of due process and requesting the court to compel a 
hearing. The district court found that due process was violated, 
and ordered written notice, a public hearing, oral evidence, 
assistance of counsel for the tenants, an opportunity to adduce 
contrary evidence, a verbatim transcript and a written decision 
1
" In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1971). 
112 Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
183 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973). Burr was followed in Thompson v. Washington, 
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1974), wherein it was held "that the tenants of public housing 
constructed under the National Housing Act are entitled under that statute to an 
opportunity to be heard before rents are increased." Id. at 639. 
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based on the record. On appeal the court of appeals considered 
the administrative burden on the Authority, the lack of indi-
vidual issues of fact, and the need for an expert weighing of 
complex economic data. The Authority, the court of appeals 
held, could increase charges without a full adversary hearing. 
Notice, an opportunity to submit material, and a statement of 
reasons were enough to protect the tenant's interests. The dis-
trict court decision appears to grow out of a conclusion that the 
decision to impose the charge was adjudicatory. The court of 
appeals rejected that conclusion and held that the decision was 
legislative. Safeguards, nevertheless, were required to ensure 
that the issues were properly examined and to prevent the 
Authority from acting in ignorance. 164 
2. State Action and Private Conduct 
A second limit on due process stems from the principle 
that the fourteenth amendment only limits state action.165 
Likewise, plaintiffs asserting denials of due process under the 
Civil Rights Act must allege that action was taken under color 
of law, 166 a concept similar, if not identical to, the fourteenth 
amendment state action concept. 167 The issue may be stated 
simply: what is sufficient state action or action under color of 
law to give rise to due process? Nonetheless, the problem is 
complex. As will be seen, this difficulty is at least partially 
generated by the fact that both state action and color of law 
are expanding concepts. 
At the outset, it is clear that adjudicative procedures ap-
plied to resolve purely private disputes must follow due pro-
114 K. DAVIS, supra note 92, at §§ 7.02, 7.05. See also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 
1243 (1st Cir. 1970). But see Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp. 789, 
802-04 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants' Organization v. 
Federated Mortgage, Inc., 504 F. 2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974). 
115 See generally P. KAUPER, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, 779-831 
(1972); McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 19-28 (1974). 
111 See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). 
111 Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 161 (6th Cir. 1973); Joy v. Daniels, 479 
F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973); Trapper Brown Const. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 
F. Supp. 105, 106 (D.N.H. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia 
Psychiatric Cent., 356 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But cf. Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (state action 
and color oflaw may not be congruent). 
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cess.168 Limits on the state action-color of law concepts, how-
ever, cause the other dispute-settling environments to be less 
clear-cut. Neither New York University, the Brooklyn Law 
School, Chatham College, nor the Miami Woman's Club acts 
with "color of law" even though all have tangible connections 
with the government. 169 On the other hand, a federal district 
court in New York held that a privately owned utility, Consoli-
dated Edison, was engaged in state action and could not termi-
nate a patron's electricity without some kind of "due pro-
cess."170 The Fifth Circuit decided that the Montgomery, Ala-
bama YMCA acted under "color of law" when it refused to 
accept applications for membership.171 Most earlier state action 
cases dealt with equal protection, but equal protection is re-
lated to due process. The equal protection question refers to 
access. May the YMCA exclude these people? The due process 
question refers to termination. If the YMCA board decides to 
expel the new members, must it give them notice and hold a 
hearing? Thus, the equal protection question must be answered 
affirmatively before the due process question can arise. 
The contours of the "new" due process are not clear but 
the direction is apparent. Due process is expanding into places 
which have heretofore been considered sacrosanct and escaped 
its influence. Today a serious argument for state action and 
due process can be mounted against any defendant who has a 
continuing relationship to a governmental body and is carrying 
on a function with a general public interest or concern.172 This 
1
'
3 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1878). 
1
" Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law 
School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Solomon v. Miami Womans' Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973). 
But see Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974}. 
170 Bronson v. Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). See also 
Limuel v. Southern Union Gas Co., 378 F. Supp. 964 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Salisbury v. 
Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1973). But see Edwards v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison, 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974); Lucas v. Wisconsin 
Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). 
171 Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972). 
172 Associated Students v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1974); Rackin 
v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Golden v. Biscayne 
Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 
1254, 1258-59 (W.D. Va. 1973); Keller v. Kate Maremount Foundation, 365 F. Supp. 
1975] THE NEW DuE PROCESS 563 
is especially true when the function is also carried out by the 
state.173 
Several decisions in which plaintiffs attacked reposses-
sions under § 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code are highly 
relevant to the issue of state action. These cases emerge from 
a common factual and legal pattern. Initially, a purchaser 
enters into an installment contract for a consumer purchase. 
The contract allows the seller or the holder of the debt to repos-
sess the purchased item upon a default, usually failure to make 
periodic payments. Pursuant to the contract and § 9-503, the 
"self-help" section of the commerical code, the consumer loses 
the chattel. Next the purchaser sues, charging that due process 
was ignored because there was no notice before the item was 
taken. In defense, the sellers argue that there was no state 
action and no federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act. 
The purchasers reply that there is state action because the 
statute allows the seller or financier to repossess through self-
help. They agree that no state official stamps papers, serves 
process or tows the car, but contend that statutory permission 
to repossess lends the required "color" of law. Notice and a 
hearing are thus required.174 To date, however, such arguments 
have been largely unpersuasive; several courts have accepted 
the seller's private action defense175 and, only a few have found 
798, 800-01 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Geneva Towers Tenants' Organization v. 
Federated Mortgage, Inc., 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. 
& Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 
362 F. Supp. 1196, 1199, 1209 (W.D. Wis. 1973). 
173 The educational institution cases are admittedly an anomoly. See, e.g., Grafton 
v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Broderick v. Catholic Univ., 365 
F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1267-80 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973). They may be explained by the tradition of excellence in private education, 
deference to academic expertise, fear of a barrage of lawsuits and lack of compelling 
facts. 
174 See generally Note, Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the De-
priued Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1973). 
170 Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974); Gary v. Darnell, 
505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974); Nichols v. Tower 
Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 496 F.2d 
1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 
1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'! Bank, 493 
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'! Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); McDuffy v. Worthmore Fum., Inc., 380 F. 
Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974); Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. 
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state action. 176 
The arguments against finding state action in self-help 
repossession are varied. Courts have found that there was no 
state action because no government official participated177 and 
because governmental process was not used. 178 In one recent 
suit, the buyer argued that the official act of issuing a "repos-
sessed title" to the buyer of the- vehicle was sufficient state 
action. The court held, however, that issuing the title was min-
isterial and adequately severed from the repossession and sale. 
There was, therefore, no state action. 179 One court stated that 
the statute creates "passive" state action but held that there 
must be "active" state action before due process is required.180 
Courts rejecting due process have also cited history and the 
common law181 as well as the need for efficient and economical 
Mo. 1973); Calderon v. United Fum. Co., 371 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Kinch v. 
Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Shelton v. General Electric 
Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 
(D. Colo. 1972); Peasev. HavelockNat'lBank, 351 F. Supp.118 (D. Nev.1972); Green 
v. First Nat'lExch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va.1972); Ollerv. Bank of America, 
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (the leading case); McCormick v. First Nat'! Bank, 
322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971). See also Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 
1974) (mechanic's lien); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 
927 (1st Cir. 1972) (bank set off is not state action); Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F. Supp. 
1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (mechanic's lien); Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 
F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (warehouse lien); Leisure Estates of America v. Carmel 
Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (repossession via deed of trust not state 
action); Bichel Optical Labs, Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 
1973), aff'g 336 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1971) (bank seizure of account and accounts 
receivable); Krugerv. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (bank 
setoff); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973) (state decision of no 
state action). 
171 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Gibbs 
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass.1973); Adams 
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. 
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). See also 
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974) 
(mortgage foreclosure); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974) (mechanic's lien). 
177 Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
178 Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D. Neb. 1972). 
171 Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374, 377-78 (E.D. Mo. 1973). But 
cf. Gamer v. Tri-State Development Corp., 382 F. Supp. 377, 379 (E.D. Mich. 1974) 
(ministerial enough); Ceaser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 647-48 (M.D.N.C.1975) (issu-
ing title enough). 
180 Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672, 674-75 (W.D. Va. 1972). 
181 Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. South-
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business operations.182 Prior cases finding state action in simi-
lar circumstances are distinguished as arising from race dis-
crimination, not due process.183 Finally, cases finding state ac-
tion and lack of due process in statutory liens are distinguished 
because the lien was created by statute alone and not by both 
the statute and a contract.184 
The premise that self-help repossession lacks state action 
is stoutly defended in scholarly quarters.185 The scholarly argu-
ments are neither doctrinal nor constitutional, usually consist-
ing of unsupported and perhaps unsupportable assumptions 
about individual and business motivation and the economic 
result of a decision striking down the code section.188 The casual 
reader should be able to discern the alliance between these 
em Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir., cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); 
Shelton v. General Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973); 
Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 730 (D. Colo. 1972); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 
402 (N.J. Super. 1972). 
112 Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1(W.D. Mo. 1973); Kirksey v. 
Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 730-31 (D. Colo. 1972). 
1
" Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. South-
em Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 325 (1974); 
Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Shelton v. General 
Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 
351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118, 
121 (D. Nev. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
See also Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (statute 
allowing setoff recognized but did not create right). 
tu Shelton v. General Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 
1973); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
u.s R. HENsoN, supra, note 150, at § 10-18; Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 
WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973). See also Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional 
Power and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, Parts I & II, 
46 s. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (1973); Part m, 47 s. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973). These creditor's 
briefs are well researched, well written, well reasoned and wrong. Stripped of doctrine, 
the authors take the economic royalist-small government position. Their position is 
that the government should not intercede in existing economic-social power relation-
ships; that generally, freedom for the trout is death for the minnow, which is good. 
1
" SeeR. HENsoN, supra note 150, at 265: "The patent absurdity of finding uncon-
stitutional a provision appearing in a statute promulgated by the American Law Insti-
tute and The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws .... In 
essentially all instances where self help repossessions are used, there is no question of 
the debtor's being in default .... " See also id. at 263-64; Mentschikoff, supra note 
185: "With notice of impending repossession, the dishonest debtor tends to disappear 
so that the collateral in fact relied on in making the loan is gone." Id. at 779. 
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academicians and the financing interests and to discount the 
argument accordingly. 187 The economic argument, as Professor 
White demonstrated, is overstated.t88 Professor Wallace has 
stated the other side of the economic argument189 with contrary 
arguments that are equally compelling. Due process seeks to be 
protective and, perforce, is expensive and time consuming.t90 
Constitutional questions, however, should not be decided solely 
for economic reasons. This is especially true when a plausable 
argument can be mounted for the other side.191 All the values 
which will be advanced and retarded should be tested in a 
factual crucible. 
The district courts in Boland v. Essex County Bank & 
Trust Co.,t92 Adams v. Egley193 and Gibbs v. Titelman194 found 
state action. The Adams court first recognized the self-
executing private contracts and distinguished taking property 
solely under the statute.t95 Reitman v. Mulkey 196 was held to be 
187 Cf. Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the 
Underworld and Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L. REV. 302, 306-08 (1972). Beutel, The 
Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 
(1952). 
188 White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 
1973 Wtsc. L. REV. 503. Professor White, although sound in what he assails, is mischie-
vous in some of what he accepts. See also Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: 
An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973); Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics 
of Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial 
Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 116 (1973); Johnson, A Response to Dauer and Gilhool: A 
Defense of Self-Help Repossession, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1973) (the full debate). 
18
' Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L. J. 409 (1973). See 
also Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 55-57 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 
(3d Cir. 1974). 
1
'
0 Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 
535, 540-41 (1971). 
101 See Clark & Landers, supra note 146, at 377-83. Professors Clark and Landers 
conclude that there is sufficient state involvement to invoke the fourteenth amend-
ment in § 9-503 cases. They say that it could be found to be so under the "state 
functions" theory (private individuals doing what state officials would ordinarily do, 
with the distinction blurred in the consumer's mind); or the "entwinement" theory 
(that the UCC is not a neutral legislation, considered in totality, but is rather creditor-
oriented; and the state's enactment of it inextricably involves the state in a reposses-
sion case). 
1
'
2 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973). 
1
'
3 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First 
Nat'! Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974) . 
.,. 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). 
1
'
5 Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams 
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'! Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 
(1974). 
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decisive on the issue of state action. In Reitman, the Supreme 
Court struck down a state constitutional provision which inter-
dicted the government from regulating the sale or rental of real 
property. The constitutional provision, in the particular ambi-
ence, placed a governmental imprimatur on "private" dis-
criminatory conduct. If the· discrimination were performed by 
the government, it would be unconstitutional. The Court found 
in this the requisite state action to bring the equal protection 
clause into play and to void the provision. The Adams court 
applied Reitman to self-help repossession. Since the contract 
allowing the secured party to take and the later taking were 
authorized by § 9-503, and because "the right is created by 
state law," the property was taken under "color oflaw" and the 
court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the due process 
issue. 197 
Other courts have developed state action reasoning fur-
ther. In Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co. ,198 the court 
suggested a state action theory in self-help repossessions. There 
might be, the court said, "a close working arrangement be-
tween repossessors and the police and court officials .... " 199 
This arrangement needed to be explored. In Gibbs v. 
Titelman, 200 the court faced the historical and passive-
ministerial arguments. Self-help repossession's historical ante-
cedents were located, traced, found slim and rejected as in-
applicable to the present day.201 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the state was only passively involved as begging the 
Ill 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
117 Adams v.Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams 
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 
(1974). See also Central Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. Supp. 1395, 1396 (D. Nev. 1973); 
Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1379-81 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 920-21 (D. 
Mass. 1973); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Adams v. Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). 
113 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973). 
111 ld. at 921. 
200 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). 
201 Id. at 45-47. See also McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to 
Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973). The article narrowly and legalistically traces 
legal terms without referring to social context. Judge Bechtle views self-help as a stage 
in social evolution and as a feudal anachronism. 
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question. By looking at the actions of the state at the time of 
the repossessions, the real thrust of state action is overlooked. 
The thrust is the power to do the acts that deny due process, 
and the state action comes when that power is delegated.202 
Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co. 203 and Bond v. 
Dentzer204 posit a similar state action theory in due process 
cases. The litigation in Blye attacked a seizure under an inn-
keeper's lien law and in Bond a wage assignment agreement. 
State conduct was absent in both procedures, yet in each the 
court found state action. In Blye the court focused upon the 
actions taken, and held that even when a traditionally public 
function such as execution or attachment is performed by pri-
vate persons, the conduct is sufficiently state action to compel 
due process.205 In Bond, the court found state action under 
another theory, reasoning that the wage assignment scheme 
merged "state power and private economic interests," and that 
the state, by delegating the power, became a "silent business 
partner with private interest."206 
In yet another case, Cockerel v. Caldwell, 201 the court 
found state action even though the statute involved merely 
202 Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 47-48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 
(3d Cir. 1974). For an interesting and novel approach to the delegation argument, see 
Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 
PENN. L. REv. 954, 962-63 (1974). There Professor Yudof concludes that there is suffi-
cient precedent for a court to find state action if it is so inclined. He concludes that 
the power to repossess should not be delegable to private parties, absent the restric-
tions that would be placed on the state. Thus, under this approach, private parties 
could not have power to repossess without the attendant procedural requirements, or 
the delegation of the power itself violates due process and is unconstitutional. 
203 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973) . 
..,. 362 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974). 
205 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1381 (N.D. N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d302 
(2d Cir. 1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174-75 (1973). 
See also Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 
(1974); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Pri-
vate Activity, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 656, 690-98 (1974). 
:zot Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 
302 (2d Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(Kaufman, C. J., in dissent argues that there is state action because the statute 
delegates the state monopoly of dispute settlement); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mort-
gage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (statute allows foreclosure). See 
also Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Mass. 1973); 
Countryman, supra note 70, at 553. 
207 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974). 
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codified the common law. In Cockerel, the defendant sold the 
plaintiff's automobile to satisfy his claim for a repair and stor-
age bill, pursuant to a Kentucky garageman's lien statute. The 
court held that the sale of the automobile violated due process 
where no procedural requirements were met and the fact that 
the statute merely restated decisional law was held to be im-
material. Where a statute confers upon an individual the right 
to act in derogation of the fourteenth amendment, then the 
necessary element of state action is present.208 The court con-
sidered the state action question, and determined that because 
the statute gives the garageman the means of extinguishing the 
owner's right in the automobile, there is sufficient state action. 
But as to the garageman's authority to retain the automobile, 
this only preserved the garageman's possessory interest in the 
improvements made, and only delays the owner's rights until 
an adjudication is possible, rather than extinguishing them.209 
Thus when the legal arguments against state action are exam-
ined in depth, they are reduced in force. 
The weakness of the "no state action" position in § 9-503 
repossession is further illustrated by an examination of the 
analytical approach taken by its adherents. They view the 
basic issue as, ". . . whether all conduct authorized by a stat-
ute is state action. "210 This states the question so broadly that 
it raises the specter of expanded governmental power and in-
creased judicial business. The issue needs to be stated more 
precisely and realistically. The question as ordinarily stated 
also ignores part of the problem. Unjustified interference with 
a possessory right in personal property is conversion, an ancient 
and well recognized tort. 211 Property normally cannot be taken 
201 ld. at 494. But it should be pointed out that only the statute authorizing the 
garageman to sell the automobile was invalidated. The statute authorizing its deten-
tion was upheld. See Motion to Alter and Amend Order, id. at 496-98. See also Ceaser 
v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975) . 
.., 378 F. Supp. at 498. 
211 White, supra note 188, at 506; Horowitz and Karst, The California Supreme 
Court and State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Leader Beclouds the 
Issue, 21 U.C.L.A. REV. 1421 (1974). 
211 W. PRossER, ToRTS § 15 (1971); Cf. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970); see Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions 
to Private Activity, 74 CoLUM L. REV. 656, 666 n.59 (1974), where the author points 
out that the draftsmen of the fourteenth amendment intended for it to apply to state 
statutes changing the common law. 
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without procedural due process. 212 Both conversion and due 
process are intended to prevent misuse of power and to protect 
private property. The tort protects the citizen from private 
overreaching, and due process prevents abuse of public power. 
If a litigant takes another's property without proper procedure, 
due process is denied. If a private person takes another's prop-
erty, it is converted. Section 9-503 l~galizes conduct which is a 
tort if privately done and a denial of due process if publicly 
done.213 
Fuentes v. Shevin sheds additional light on the complex 
state action question. In Fuentes it was unnecessary to discuss 
the state action issue, since, under the procedure attacked, 
officials processed the paper which set the taking in motion.214 
The concern in Fuentes, i.e., to prevent private persons· from 
abusing public power, was expressed by the Court: 
The statues, moreover, abdicate effective state control over 
state power. Private parties, serving their own private advan-
tage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods 
from another. No state official participates in the decision to 
seek the writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim 
to repossession; and no state official evaluates the need for 
immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the 
plaintiff provide any information to the court on these mat-
ters. The State acts largely in the dark. 215 
To prevent potential misuse, the Court required an adversary 
hearing as a check to determine whether the applicant's claim 
is valid before the possessory interest is disturbed. The process 
is designed to identify both debtors' and creditors' false conclu-
sions. 
Under Fuentes, then, the amount of concern over possible 
overreaching should be inversely proportional to the amount of 
official inquiry into the private taking. When property is taken 
by private initiative without filling out any forms and without 
any state official participating in the process, the potential for 
abuse is greater than when pleadings, certification and service 
are required. The argument against state action in § 9-503 
212 Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972). 
213 McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 (1974). 
2
" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74-75 (1972). 
215 ld. at 93. 
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repossession asserts that the smaller the governmental inquiry 
into a private person's using statutory power, the less reason 
to be concerned. But this is palpably contrary to the thrust of 
the due process cases.216 Under due process theory, self-help 
repossession is, therefore, more clearly unconstituional than ex 
parte replevin.217 Protecting the possessor's interest from the 
completely unchecked use of publicly endorsed power is more 
compelling than the specious state action issue. The argument 
against state action in § 9-503 cases stressed the absence of 
state involvement. But focusing on the amount of action taken 
by the state poses one grave risk. It allows the protections 
stated by the Court in Mitchell to be important (e.g. approval 
by a judge, posting of a bond) to be whittled away because the 
court is only looking to the issue of whether agents of the state 
were involved, not to the more fundamental issue of due pro-
cess protections. Government power will not expand except to 
insure that private disputes are settled fairly and to stunt the 
growth of private tyranny. The courts should be willing to find 
state action to ensure public control over repossession, to give 
the state control over all coercive interference with a possessory 
interest. 218 Focusing judgment on § 9-503 as a delegation of 
state power to private persons and following the analysis in 
Fuentes yields only one conclusion-that § 9-503 self-help re-
possession denies due process. 219 
211 Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), reu'd, 502 F.2d 1107 
(3d Cir. 1974). 
217 Countryman, supra note 70, at 551-52. Chief Judge Kaufman's state action 
analysis of debtor creditor cases is similar. State action exists, he argues, when a 
statute delegates to a creditor the state's dispute resolving or adjudicative function. 
Thus, when a creditor asserts default and seizes property pursuant to statute, state 
action is present. See Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 312-14 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent); 
Shirley v. State Nat'! Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent). This argu-
ment would appear to include a taking by bank setoff, as an "adjudicative" function, 
but this is contrary to the views of many commentators. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, 
supra note 146, at 400-02. 
21
" Yudof, supra note 202. 
211 The Mitchell u. W. T. Grant majority explicitly refrained from ruling on § 9-
503. 416 U.S. 600, 618 n.13 (1974). In addition, the majority stressed judicial control 
as a factor in affirming ex parte repossession. But there is reason to think that self-
help repossession will be approved. First, in article 9 repossessions, the property inter-
est may be called "dual" because of the security interest. Second, Justice White has 
expressed willingness to defer to legislative judgment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 
103 (1972) (dissent). Third, Justice White stressed the cost of procedural protections 
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The fact that a contract is involved in no way alters this 
conclusion, though it may have a practical effect on the out-
come of a particular case. In the repossession cases, the sales 
and financing agreement allows the seller to repossess,220 and§ 
9-503 creates and endorses the right to so agree. The Court in 
Adams v. Egley correctly holds the agreement irrelevant to the 
state action question.221 The agreement, however, raises a sepa-
rate issue: whether the right to notice and a hearing has been 
waived.222 Waiver is a factual and pragmatic issue which turns 
on disclosure, knowledge and equality.223 In a consumer trans-
action, significant barriers to waiver are present. The 
merchant-consumer relationship connotes unequal sophistica-
tion and bargaining power: consideration may be lacking_ and, 
in any event, standarized forms normally are used. Moreover, 
in view of the great number of such transactions, it is safe to 
assume that these forms are seldom read or understood, since 
few people will knowingly place their property at another's 
mercy.224 If, however, the buyer has an opportunity to compre-
while almost ignoring their value. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 618 n.13 
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972). 
220 See, e.g., Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D. Mo. 1973); 
Giglo v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816,818 (Del. Ch. 1973). 
221 Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972), Reu'd sub nom. Adams 
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 
(1974). 
222 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 
(1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). Professor White states that waiver is an 
"essentially dishonest" solution in self-help repossession cases. White, supra note 188, 
at 508-09. 
223 See, e.g., Gamer v. TriState Development Corp., 382 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 599 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974); Law v. United States Dep't of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 
1973); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 89-91 (D. Del. 1974). If the waiver 
issue grows out of an "adhesion" contract, the courts are less willing to find waiver 
and may decide the issue on "social facts." See Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 
F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1973); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 57-58 (E.D. 
Pa. 1973), reu'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974) ("A buyer's signature to a contract of 
this type does not amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional 
rights"). But see W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, 191 (1972) (finding 
knowledge and relinquishment from signing agreement), aff'd, 416 U.S. 600 (1974) 
(waiver not mentioned). 
224 Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1973); Gibbs 
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 57-58 (E.D. Pa. 1973), reu'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); 
Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1387-88 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), reu'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
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hend what is at stake, to consider the alternatives, and to reject 
his right to due process, then despite the presence of state 
action, notice and a hearing may be waived.225 There may also 
be a cost which must be either absorbed by the enterprises or 
passed on to the consumers, 228 but these expenses might be 
reduced by notice providing for waiver and by attenuated hear-
ings.227 If in most cases the creditor's grievance is legitimate, 
waivers and brief hearings should be the rule rather than the 
exception. 228 Finally, the need to repossess can be lessened by 
increased care in extending credit. 229 
An additional consideration bearing on the § 9-503 state 
action issue can be summarized as follows: if the argument that 
state action is absent in self-help repossession is upheld, there 
will be an effect far beyond § 9-503. As due process has ad-
vanced, a variety of ex parte statutory procedures have been 
called into question. Many statutes allowed private persons to 
take property without any governmental restraint. The cases 
include utility terminations, 230 landlord's liens on tenant's 
property, 231 landlord's liens on tenant's property plus ejectment 
from the leased premises, 232 confession of judgment, 233 trustee 
judgments234 and bankers' liens.235 In striking down these stat-
m Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the Sniadach-
Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 CoM. L.J. 283, 288 (1973); Law v. United 
States Dep't of Ag., 366 F. Supp. 1233, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
m But cf. Wallace, supra note 189. 
:m Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 
(1972). 
221 Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
m Wallace, supra note 139. 
m Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Edwards v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 
F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 
449 (1974). 
%3l Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 
(E.D. Pa. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer 
v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 
S.E.2d 770 (W.Va. 1972). 
m Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Blye v. Globe-Wemicke 
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
233 Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). 
2U Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 
1973). 
m Krugerv. Wells Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr.133 (Ct. App.1973), rev'd, 521 P.2d 
441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974). 
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utes, the courts have found state action in the statutory per-
mission to perform an otherwise illegal act.236 Because they 
bestow on one person the unbridled power to take another's 
property, the statutes are unconstitutional.237 By and large, 
these statutes are indistinguishable from § 9-503 in allowing 
one private citizen to take another private citizen's property.238 
The sphere of conduct permitted under them was broad. For 
example, it was legal to enter a home,239 to expel a citizen from 
his home, 240 to seize unsecured property,241 and even to confis-
cate property from people unrelated to the controversy.242 The 
statutory schemes, moreover, were less protective than the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Often no remedy other than an 
unnamed tort was provided, while under the Code, breaches of 
the peace are forbidden and a commercially reasonable resale 
is required. 243 In short, the ex parte statutes presented a wide 
field for overreaching, and there were thus compelling reasons 
233 See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Adams v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); Blye v. Globe· 
Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
237 See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1972); Barber v. Rader, 
350 F. Supp. 183, 185 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153, 161-65 
(6th Cir. 1973); Salisbury v. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 
1973). 
233 Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 
(3d Cir. 1974). In two§ 9-503 cases Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972), which 
invalidated landlords lien statutes, was distinguished as a permissible finding of state 
action. In Hall, the courts said that the taking was under statute alone, while under § 
9-503 the taking was pursuant to both statute and agreement. Shelton v. General 
Electric Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1097, 1081 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Oller v. Bank of 
America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But§ 9-503 allows the parties to agree. 
The agreement may relate to waiver but is irrelevant to state action. Another § 9-503 
case distinguished Hall by saying that there was state action because the landlord 
could enter the tenant's home and seize property unrelated to the debt. Calderon v. 
United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974). Whether the interest in the seized 
property is dual may relate to what due process requires. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 
416 U.S. 600 (1974). But it seems irrelevant to the state action issue. 
23
' Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke 
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
240 Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183, 185 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Blye v. Globe-
Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
2
" See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 
(Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke 
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). 
m Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
213 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE § 9-503, § 9-504(3) (1972 text). 
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to abolish them. If, however, it is held that there is no state 
action under § 9-503, it is questionable whether these statutes 
were properly abolished on due process grounds. Thus, the ulti-
mate effect of finding no state action in § 9-503 repossessions 
may be to validate procedures far more opprobrious in their 
operation than any available under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
There is, finally, an alternative to repossessing. In con-
sumer finance cases, the creditor has a legitimate interest in 
either being paid or recovering the collateral. For this reason 
the debtor should be prevented from selling the collateral, re-
moving it from the jurisdiction, or hiding it. But Fuentes held 
that the creditor cannot disturb the debtor's contractual right 
to possession without notice and a hearing, 244 and this makes 
it more difficult to recover secured property from defaulted 
debtors. A creditor may justifiably fear that a debtor will de-
stroy, hide, remove or sell the property upon receiving notice 
of an impeding repossession hearing. If so, a creditor can secure 
an ex parte order that does not disturb the debtor's possessory 
interest but interdicts destruction, sale or removal. 245 Then the 
creditor can give notice and repossess. This remedy has the 
obvious drawbacks of possible expense for the extra hearing, 
and the loss to the creditor of the leverage of summary taking 
of the property. But it backs the creditor's contractual rights 
with the threat of contempt.246 So long as this less onerous 
alternative is available, creditors can protect their legitimate 
interests without interfering with debtors' property rights. 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, a great deal has 
been written on the state action issue in self-help repossession 
and other due process cases. The heart of the matter can be 
simply stated. Fuentes and other leading due process cases 
struck down statutes because they allowed one private citizen 
to affect another private citizen's constitutionally protected 
interest without adequate government control. Private power 
was subjected to a judicial scrutiny. The argument against 
w Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972). If Mitchell dilutes or changes Fuentes 
by finding dual interests in secured personal property, this paragraph is less relevant 
than it was before Mitchell was decided. 
245 FED. R. Cxv. P. 65(b); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-614 (1950). 
211 Cf. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1972). 
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state action converts 'the defect into a virtue by allowing the 
absence of any governmental restraint to become a reason to 
deny relief completely. This logical flaw rev~als the irony of 
accepting the argument that statutory permission to repossess 
is not state action. The state action line must be drawn some-
where. It should be drawn to embrace conduct which, except 
for statutory permission, is a cQmmon law tort.247 The opinions 
which refuse to find state action should suffer the same fate as 
those which read Sniadach v. Family Finance narrowly. They 
should be disapproved.24s 
3. "Persons" and Other Defendants 
The Civil Rights Act limits. defendants to "persons" acting 
under color of law who cause plaintiffs to be deprived of consti-
tutional rights.249 As might be expected, this limitation, though 
based upon sound policies, creates both practical and concep-
tual difficulties. The person concept is related to personal250 
and sovereign immunity.251 The personal immunities were bor-
rowed from the common law where they were designed to pro-
tect government officials who erroneously but legitimately 
exercised official discretion.252 The personal immunity concepts 
will be treated extensively below, but the primary concern here 
is with sovereign immunity to which the discussion will return 
after focusing upon some preliminary background matters. 
Governmental liability to a Civil Rights Act plaintiff was 
debated by Congress in 1871 and omitted from the Civil Rights 
Act.253 Thus, in 1961 the Supreme Court held that the City of 
Chicago was an improper defendant in a Civil Rights Act dam-
217 Note, supra note 211. Since interruption of possession without permission was 
a tort of common law, and § 9-503 authorizes the creditor to do so legally, the drafts-
men of the fourteenth amendment would have intended to include this change from 
the common law by statute within the concept of state action. 
us Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69 (1972). 
211 See generally McCormack, 60VA. L. REv. 1, 28-34 (1974). The plaintiffs are not 
so limited. A corporation may be a § 1983 plaintiff. Trapper Brown Construction Co. 
v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (D.N.H. 1973). See also Undergraduate 
Student Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Til. 1973). 
200 McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 11-17 (1974). 
251 Jd. at 36-52. 
252 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
253 The legislative history is discussed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-92 
(1961). 
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age action.254 In Moor v. County of Alameda,255 the Court con-
sidered the impact of § 1988 which, if federal law is incomplete 
in a Civil Rights Act suit, allows federal courts to use state law 
to fill gaps. The state had abrogated county damage immunity. 
Plaintiff argued that when dealing with the § 1983 claim, § 
1988 authorizes the district court to pick up the state cause of 
action against the county. The Supreme Court, citing the plain 
language of the Civil Rights Act and legislative history, re-
jected plaintiff's argument and affirmed the decision to grant 
the county's motion to dismiss.258 
Moor was extended in City of Kenosha v. Bruno.251 In that 
case licensees had sued the city charging that a refusal to renew 
their licences denied them due process, asking only declaratory 
and injunctive relief. There was some previous thought that 
cities could be proper defendants in a Civil Rights Act case 
seeking only equitable relief. The Supreme Court, however, 
held that a district court lacks Civil Rights Act jurisdiction 
over a city even though no damages are asked. 258 
Moor and Kenosha should not create many serious prob-
lems. The governmental defendants will merely be dis-
missed. 259 Prior cases against governmental defendants280 will 
be treated as aberrational. As has always been true in damage 
actions, plaintiffs must sue the responsible color of law defen-
dants. Injunction cases offer a little more difficulty, because 
relief is prospective and officers change. But Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 25(d) has been held to bind a successor to 
public office to obey an injunction granted against his prede-
m Id. at 191-92. 
2$5 411 u.s. 693 (1973). 
:.a Id. at 710. 
l5l 412 u.s. 507 (1973). 
:zsa /d. at 512-13. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the legislative history did 
not support a bar to equitable relief against a local government entity. Id. at 516-20. 
%5t See, e.g., Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377, 1384 (7th Cir. 1973); Harper v. 
Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1973); Monos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. 
Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Edwards v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974); Tilli v. City of Northampton, 370 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Perzanowski 
v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974); Downs v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 
368 F. Supp. 454, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 361 F. Supp. 932, 
937 (D. Minn. 1973). 
210 See, e.g., Pioneer Sav. & Loan Co. v. City of Cleveland, 479 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 
1973); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1038-39 (lOth Cir. 1970). 
578 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
cessor.261 Thus, the injunction will continue to be an effective 
remedial tool under the Civil Rights Acts. Even so, conceptual 
problems appear because citing Rule 25(d) focuses attention on 
the fictional nature of the inquiry. Rule 25(d) substitutes a 
successor in office only when the predecessor is a party "in his 
official capacity." But only "persons" can be defendants. Ten-
sion lurks in the personal~official dichotomy. 
Ex Parte Young262 held that a federal court could enjoin a 
state officer from enforcing an unconstitutional state act. The 
Young result is ostensibly incongruous with the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity expressed in the eleventh amendment. 
Reconciling this incongruity in an intellectually satisfactory 
fashion is difficult. The Court handled the problem by looking 
at the state official's act as simply illegal if pursuant to an 
unconstitutional statute. In such instances, the official is de-
prived of sovereign immunity as a defense. He is "stripped of 
his official or representative character and is subjected in his 
person to the consequences of his individual conduct."263 
Ex Parte Young solves the sovereign immunity problem 
with a legal fiction. 264 Since the fourteenth amendment only 
bars state action, most lawsuits of this sort are, in fact, against 
a governmental policy rather than an individual or person. Yet, 
only persons may be sued. Ex Parte Young's person fiction, 
however, allows the federal courts to avoid sovereign immun-
ity's potentially serious injustice, preserve judicial review and 
maintain federal supremacy while simultaneously paying sym-
bolic obeisance to the role of states in the federal system. Under 
Rule 25(b) a successor to office may be substituted as a defen-
dant when his predecessor was sued officially. Yet, under 
Young a state official can only be sued individually. Thus, as 
if to further expose the person fiction, Rule 25(d) appears to 
bind the office in addition to the individual. 265 
211 Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
212 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
213 Id. at 160. 
m K. DAvts, supra note 92, at§ 27.03. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS§ 48 (2d ed. 
1970). Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REv. 977, 984-88 (1972) is an excellent 
and incisive discussion of the fictional nature of Ex Parte Young. 
215 See 0. Ftss, INJUNCTIONS 702 (1972). 
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The person concept in the Civil Rights Act anticipates the 
Ex Parte Young person fiction. The problem did not become 
apparent until the Act became a litigation tool in the 1960's. 
Some Civil Rights Act actions are run-of-the-mill tort cases 
brought against an official who has behaved aberrationally. 266 
In most Civil Rights Act suits, however, a governmental policy, 
a statute, an administrative regulation or practice is attacked. 
The official is a defendant only as a formality. In these cases, 
even though the conduct is mandated or general, Moor and 
Kenosha compel the plaintiff to name individuals as defen-
dants.267 
In a damage case, the Civil Rights Act plaintiff is deprived 
of the governmental entity as a solvent defendant. The Act's 
language is clear, and has not been amended even though it 
may be based on superannuated notions of sovereign immun-
ity.268 As a policy matter, limiting a plaintiff to individual de-
fendants could be supported by a desire to punish the individ-
ual malefactor's fault. Also, depriving the plaintiff of the entity 
as a defendant could be supported by a desire to protect the 
general public purse. 269 These factors coupled with the comity 
inherent in federalism might be sufficient to outweigh the 
plaintiff's need for the entity as a defendant. The final result, 
however, is that a plaintiff may be deprived of damages simply 
because the responsible defendant is impecunious.270 
The person concept and the accompanying fictions have 
additional consequences in Civil Rights Act cases. Courts lack-
ing an understanding of the underlying fictions hold that an 
action against named individuals is "really" against the gov-
ernment and extend sovereign immunity's injustice.271 Krause 
v. Rhodes,272 which grew out of the May 1970 Kent State shoot-
211 See, e.g., York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (police officer allegedly 
stripped plaintiff and forced her to pose for indecent photographs). 
217 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 
411 u.s. 693 (1973). 
m The legislative history is quoted in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 
708 n.24 (1973). SeeK. DAVIS, supra note 92, at§§ 26.01-27.07. 
"" This point is mAde in Justice Douglas' dissent in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 
412 u.s. 507, 516-20 (1973). 
no Note Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, GINn. L. REv. 509, 515 (1973). 
n• K. DAVIS, supra note 92, at§ 27.03. 
nz 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 
(1974). 
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ings, reveals this tendency. Rhodes is a wrongful death case 
brought against several officials by the victim's parents. The 
court of appeals, affirming the district court's dismissal, said 
that although individuals were named defendants, the lawsuits 
"are in substance and effect actions against the State of Ohio" 
and were "prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment."273 The 
blunder is apparent when it is remembered that the doctrine 
of Ex Parte Young and the Civil Rights Acts were designed to 
allow lawsuits which are "in substance and effect actions 
against the state." 
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the officials 
were protected by sovereign immunity.274 Applying Ex Parte 
Young, the Court held that sovereign immunity is "no shield 
for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived 
another of a federal right under the color of state law."275 The 
Court refused to distinguish between damages and the injunc-
tion in Young, observing that "in some situations a damage 
remedy can be as effective a redress for the infringement of a 
constitutional right as injunctive relief might be in another."276 
Had a sensitive and highly charged controversy like the Kent 
State shootings been dismissed at the pleading stage because 
of sovereign immunity, the courts would have taken a step in 
the direction of abrogating the Civil Rights Acts. Instead, the 
Kent State litigation will be decided on the merits. If the courts 
apply the requisite personal immunity to the function and facts 
involved, 277 legitimate official discretion will be adequately pro-
tected. 
Nevertheless, while holding that damages were available 
to the shooting victim's parents, the Court reaffirmed sovereign 
immunity's continued vitality. This was compelled by 
Edelman v. Jordan218 in which the Court held that sovereign 
immunity barred a suit for retroactive welfare benefits. Future 
difficulties were created by these opinions because, at least on 
273 Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 442 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Williams v. Eaton, 
443 F.2d 422, 429 (lOth Cir. 1971) for similar conclusions. 
21~ Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
275 I d. at 237. 
211 Id. at 238. 
277 The Court generally accepted the dissent in the Court of Appeals. See 471 F.2d 
at 447·68. The personal immunities are discussed at length in Part II below. 
211 415 u.s. 651 (1974). 
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a verbal level, the differences between Edelman and Rhodes 
are elusive. In Rhodes, the Court said that sovereign immunity 
"bars suits not only against the state when it is the named 
party but when it is the party in fact."279 But, while a plaintiff 
may not seek damages from the public treasury, the Kent State 
plaintiffs were not barred by sovereign immunity because 
". . . they are seeking to impose individual and personal liabil-
ity on the named defendants for what they claim . . . was a 
deprivation of federal rights by these defendants under the 
color of state law."28° 
Edelman involved "a very substantial amount of money 
which should have been paid, but was not. "281 The Court ap-
peared to hold that retroactive payments were interdicted by 
sovereign immunity because the award "must be paid from 
public funds in the state treasury" and the action was, there-
fore, "in essence" against the state.282 This conclusion appears 
to flow from the size of the damages. "These funds will ob-
viously not be paid out of the pocket of petitioner Edelman"; 
"the funds to satisfy the award in this case must inevitably 
come from the [state's] general revenues."283 But to distin-
guish sovereign immunity from potential liability on amount at 
issue is to place a premium on doing evil in large portions. 
Moreover, the Kent State plaintiffs asked $11,000,000,284 a sum 
that "obviously;' will not be paid out of most defendant's pock-
ets. 
Also, while the "prospective" relief asked in Ex Parte 
Young may be distinguished from the "retroactive" relief asked 
in Edelman, these verbal categories do not serve to distinguish 
Rhodes and Edelman. The court system cannot extend either 
retroactive or prospective relief to dead children's parents, 
therefore money damages are substituted. The best that can be 
said for this analysis is that where the wrong has stopped, as 
in Rhodes, money damages will be extended. But where the 
wrong continues, as in Edelman, the defendant will be merely 
271 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Court appeared, therefore, to 
reject McCormack's analysis. See McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 36-52 (1974). 
w Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974). 
231 415 u.s. 651, 664 (1974). 
212 Id. at 663. 
233 Id. at 664, 65. 
:zu Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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ordered to cease. Now the inquiry is back where it began be-
cause this places a premium on continuing to do the wrong. 
There are several verbal categories, such as legal-
equitable, compensatory-remedial, and substitutionary-
prospective; and the categories can be manipulated at leisure. 
But one thing is palpably clear. None provide an intellectual 
fabric which is responsive to underlying social reality. Sover-
eign immunity is a jumble too impenetrable even to be enter-
taining.285 Realistically, sovereign immunity's effect can be 
obviated from the date of the decision into the future. Edelman 
holds that the courts may force a state to do what it should do, 
but may not force a state to do what it should have done. Thus, 
the proper tactical course is to sue early and to request immedi-
ate preliminary relief. 
4. Extraordinary Circumstances and Nonemergencies 
Several cases decided before Fuentes allowed the govern-
ment to affect significant citizen interests without notice and 
a hearing.286 These incongruous opinions existed parallel to the 
developing new due process theories. In Fuentes, Justice Stew-
art formulated standards to explain and distinguish the earlier 
opinions. He went on to define the conditions for exercising the 
government's power on private interests in extraordinary cir-
cumstances without notice and a hearing. There are three re-
quirements: 
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to 
secure an important governmental or general public interest. 
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. 
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of 
legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a 
government official responsible for determining, under the 
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary 
and justified in the particular instance.287 
This is a significant advance over earlier attempts to distin-
285 See the extensive citations and lucid discussion in McCormack, supra 60 VA. 
L. REv. 1, 36-52 (1974). 
238 See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (drugs 
misbranded); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (con-
taminated food). 
287 Fuentes v. ·Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). 
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guish the summary seizure opinions.288 Following Justice Stew-
art's reasoning, these cases are satisfactorily reconciled with 
developing ideas of due process.289 
Almost all court actions are extraordinary situations, re-
sulting from breakdowns in the usual social processes. If the 
emergency exception is allowed to expand, notice and a hearing 
might be obviated in almost every instance. The lower courts 
have, however, been careful to carry out the spirit of the "ex-
traordinary situations" exception. Creditors, because only in-
dividual interests are at stake, have advanced the emergency 
argument without success. In MacQueen v. Lambert,290 amicus 
argued that a landord's lien could be summarily enforced 
against a tenant's property "under the recognized emergency 
exception." The court rejected the argument. "Emergency," 
the court wrote, "is the cry of intuition rather than reason. It 
should accordingly be used as an excuse for summary proce-
dures only sparingly .... " 291 In Gibbs v. Titelman292 defen-
dants argued that the "general public interest" allowed them 
to repossess without notice and that requiring notice would 
raise the cost of credit to all and prevent some consumers from 
obtaining credit.293 The court was unconvinced. Because hear-
ings might be waived, it reasoned that only the opportunity to 
be heard was at issue. Further, it noted that, if due process is 
to be protective, it inevitably will involve some expense.294 Sev-
eral other courts have summarily rejected the "cry" of emer-
gency as an excuse to proceed without notice.295 The courts, it 
:w Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. 
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339(1969). 
231 Quasi in rem seizure to attain jurisdiction over a nonresident continues to be 
somewhat incongruous with developing ideas of due process. Compare Lebowitz v. 
Forbes Leasing & Fin. Co., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); 
Balter v. Bato Co., 385 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Central Sec. Nat'! Bank v. Royal 
Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Banks v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. 
Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1972); with Welsh v. Kinchla, 386 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mass. 1975); 
In re Law Research Services, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See note, Quasi 
in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE. L.J. 1023 (1973). 
21o 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
211 I d. at 1337-38. 
212 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). 
213 Id. at 56. 
211 Id. at 55-57. A trenchant note hints that "[c]reditors may never qualify ... 
on ... creditor status alone." Note, supra note 289, at 1027. 
215 Gonzalez v. County of Hidalgo, 489 F.2d 1043, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1973); Graff 
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appears, are rejecting generalized emergencies and are requir-
ing both statutorily defined and factually importunate situa-
tions. For example in Newton v. Burgin,296 the court applied the 
extraordinary situations exception scrupulously to a child neg-
lect case and found that the requirements were met. Thus, so 
long as the courts analyze the proper factors, Fuentes' emer-
gency exception appears to be safe.297 
One significant anomaly remains. The procedure for grant-
ing an ex parte temporary restraining order or preliminary in-
junction is significantly less restrictive than the "extraordinary 
situations" exception in Fuentes. Many state rules governing 
ex parte restraining orders are even less restrictive than the 
federal rule.298 Under Federal Rule 65(b), the applicant must 
present sworn documents to a judge showing an "immediate 
and irreparable injury" that would result before the defendant 
can be heard. The applicant must also either give reasons for 
proceeding without notice or show unsuccessful efforts to reach 
the defendant. An important public or govermental interest is 
not required. Nor is it necessary for the state, acting within well 
defined guidelines, to retain strict control of the proceeding.299 
v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974, 982 (N.D. Til. 1974); Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. 
Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1973); Bay 
State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 
1301, 1306 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'! Bank, 360 F. Supp. 
720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric 
Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 
110 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), 
vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974);·c.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
123, 127 (Ct. App. 1973); Cf. Braxton v. Municipal Court, 514 P.2d 697, 700, 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 897, 907 (1973). But see Astol Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663 (1974) (government seizure); United States v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F.2d 
893 (9th Cir. 1974) (crime); Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 
1974) (government seizure); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 28-29 (S.D.S.D. 1973) 
(incorrect); W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186, 190-91 (1972), aff'd on another 
point, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The exception is discussed in Note, supra note 289, at 1026-
32. 
211 Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 786-88 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
217 But see Aircrane, Inc. v. Butterfield, 369 F. Supp. 598, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1974) 
(apparently applying a balancing test). 
211 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b) with VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8·610-26 (1950). 
211 The due process problems in ex parte injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders were considered in earlier articles by the author. Rendleman, More on Void 
Orders, 7 GA. L. REv. 246 (1973); Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction 
Procedure, 1973 U; ILL. L.F. 221 (1973). Due Process attaches, I concluded, when the 
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Recent opinions have considered the constitutional issues 
involved in the granting of such temporary relief. In Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Waegele, 300 a creditor obtained an ex parte 
order forbidding a debtor from disposing of automobiles which 
were security for a loan. The debtor sold the automobiles, was 
held in contempt and appealed. He argued that the ex parte 
order violated due process. The court held that the ex parte 
order was constitutional and affirmed. It sought a "situation 
requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest" and 
found that in serving the interest of the plaintiff, the ex parte 
order "serves the interest of the state in the power of the courts 
to preserve the status quo as a necessary adjunct to their ability 
to, render an effective judgment. "301 The standard the court 
applied was whether the plaintiff would suffer "great or irre-
parable injury" without the order. These words, the court said, 
"have been used often in our law and are capable of accurate 
judicial application. Their presence in this statute represents 
a significant 'narrowing' of the court's discretion in authorizing 
summary relief."302 Finally, to grant an ex parte order, the 
court held, is "judicial" as opposed to "ministerial" and the 
order was only for a limited time. Thus, the Waegele court 
upheld ex parte restraining orders generally against a due pro-
cess attack. 
Waegele may be criticized. First, it can be said that to 
affirm the contempt it was unnecessary to hold the statute 
valid against a due process attack in all cases. In Fuentes the 
replevin interfered with a contractual right to possess, and in 
Mitchell both the plaintiff creditor and the defendant debtor 
had an interest in the secured property. But the Waegele order 
differs in three respects from the creditor's remedy in either of 
defendant has a constitutionally cognizable interest in his conduct. This interest is 
sufficiently affected when the order or injunction has "practical finality." Several 
arguments that due process does not mandate notice and a hearing were stated, exam-
ined and rejected. The arguments are that the order is not final, that the plaintiffs' 
need for speed and efficiency should prevail, that the standard provides adequate 
guidance, and that an improperly enjoined defendant may recover on the injunction 
bond. Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra, at 241-45, n.109-28. Injunc-
tions and restraining orders are discussed here because of decisions which were pub-
lished too late to add fully to those articles. 
* 105 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1972). 
""
1 Id. at 918. 
:soz Id. at 917. 
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those cases: it did not lead to a seizure, the defendant's privacy 
was not invaded, and he was not ordered to do anything except 
to follow the contract.303 Thus, the Waegele court might have 
held that the ex parte order was permissible because it did not 
impinge on any constitutionally cognizable interest.304 
Secondly, Waegele reads the due process cases narrowly 
and fails to consider or apply F.uentes' extraordinary situations 
test for summary procedure. The Court in Fuentes specifically 
rejected a restricted reading of prior due process opinions stat-
ing that they were "in the mainstream of past cases . . . estab-
lishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing 
before a deprivation of property takes effect."305 In Geisinger v. 
Voss306 an order that required a husband to vacate his home 
which was granted without notice or a hearing was assailed on 
due process grounds.307 The Geisinger order was designed to 
protect the applicant's physical safety rather than, as in 
Waegele, the applicant's property. The Geisinger order con-
stricted the defendant's conduct more drastically than the 
Waegele order. In Geisinger, the court applied Fuentes' "ex-
traordinary situations" test. The relief sought, the court found, 
was private and did not advance "an important governmental 
or general public interest." Because of delay between granting 
and serving the order, the court did not discover any "special 
need for very prompt action." Even if there was such a need, 
the court did not understand why the applicant should summa-
rily order the defendant to abandon his home. There was an 
alternative. The applicant could leave the home voluntarily. 
Finally, because a conclusory, standardized form was used 
without a factual inquiry, the court saw no need for ex parte 
procedure in the "particular instance." 
303 Waegele was not the type of case considered in More on Void Orders, supra note 
299, and Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 299. The order in 
Waegele related to property, not conduct. There was a bond to protect the defendant. 
And, there was no "practical finality;" rather the order protected a legitimate status 
quo. See Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, supra note 299, at 242 n.112. 
301 C{. Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.S.D. 1973). 
305 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 (1972) . 
... 352 F. Supp. 104 (E.D: Wis. 1972). 
307 Id. at 109. The order, granted by a family court commissioner, was analogous 
to an injunction. The issue was whether to convene a three judge court and the court 
discussed whether success was probable, not the ultimate merits. 
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When due process reasoning is applied to ex parte orders, 
the other branches of Waegele are underminded. The Waegele 
court stressed the presence of a judge and the "great or irrepar-
able injury" standard. Judicial control was emphasized by the 
Court in Mitchell as a factor in approving ex parte reposses-
sions of secured property,308 but that should not be read too 
broadly. Many injunctions circumscribe conduct or fourteenth 
amendment liberty. The Mitchell court was careful to approve 
only those ex parte orders which involve property.309 In addi-
tion, the great or irreparable harm standard appears to be 
similar to the "broad fault standard" which in a "liberty" or 
conduct case is particularly inappropriate for documentary 
proof and which is appropriate for notice and a hearing. This 
is because that standard is "inherently subject to factual deter-
mination and adversarial input."310 Unsupported allegations 
are no substitute for a hearing. The "great or irreparable injury 
standard" may be insignificant when the defendant has no 
right to be heard. Allegations "test no more than the appli-
cant's belief in his rights" and because "private gain is at stake 
. . . the danger is all too great that his confidence in his own 
cause will be misplaced."311 
The judicial act allowing ex parte relief is frequently not a 
deliberated one. The Geisinger court condemned the lack of a 
factual inquiry and the use of a conclusory, standardized 
form.312 Forms for a variety of ex parte temporary injunctions 
are readily available, 313 and the drafting process may be no 
more than filling in blanks.314 The order may be granted almost 
automatically.315 When the applicant asks to circumscribe lib-
"" Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). 
301 Id. at 611. 
311 Id. at 617. 
311 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972). 
m Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
313 See, e.g., Forms for injunctions to stop a student demonstration, INsTITUTE OF 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, LAW AND DISCIPIJNE ON CAMPUS 317-19 (G. Holmes ed. 
1971); INsTITUTE oF CoNTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAw 269-
326 (G. Holmes ed. 1968); PRACTICING LAw INsTITUTE, THE CAMPus CRISIS REvisiTED 40-
68 (1970). 
311 STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAw, supra note 313, at 152. While the Mitchell 
opinion stresses the requirement that specific facts be alleged, 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974), 
the application in that case was on a form. See Arguments Before the Court: 
Installment Sales, 42 U.S.L.W. 3345, 3346 (Dec. 11, 1973). 
315 Appalachian Volunteers v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1970) (injunction 
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erty under a vague standard, Justice Stewart's dissenting re-
marks in Mitchell are apt: "Whether the issuing functionary be 
a judge or a court clerk, he can in any event do no more than 
ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations, 
after which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a simple 
ministerial act. "316 
It is not a sufficient justification to note that the order is 
"temporary." Mter all, the Geisinger order required a person 
to abandon his home.317 "That a wrong can be done because it 
can be undone"318 has been rejected. "Due process is afforded 
only by the kinds of 'notice' and hearing which are aimed at 
establishing the validity or at least the probable validity of the 
underlying claim . . . before he can be deprived of his prop-
erty. "319 Thus, if an injunction or restraining order affects a 
cognizable interest in liberty or in many property interests, 
· Fuentes and Mitchell compel notice and a hearing unless there 
is an "emergency." 
The result suggested above is possible under existing stat-
utes and rules.32° For example, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals recently construed the Washington statute authorizing 
temporary restraining orders to include the Fuentes v. Shevin 
"extraordinary situations" exception.321 The Washington stat-
granted by clerk of the circuit court); Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 110 {E.D. 
Wis. 1972); Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 {W.D.N.C. 1972), reu'd, 472 F.2d 
769 {4th Cir. 1973); UMW Union Hosp. v. UMW Dist. 50, 275 N.E.2d 231 {lll. Ct. App. 
1971), reu'd, 288 N.E.2d 455 {Ill. 1972) {complaint filed at 5:33 A.M.-order granted 
at 5:33 A.M.); Note, Equity on Campus: The Limits of Injunctiue Regulation of 
Uniuersity Protest, 80 YALE L.J. 987, 988-89 nn.11-14, 1024 n.27 {1971). 
311 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 632-33 {1974). 
317 Geisinger v. Voss, 352 F. Supp. 104, 111 {E.D. Wis. 1972): "There is an old saw 
that a man's house is his castle. If modern times will not permit him moats and 
battlements, it still remains, I strongly suspect, that the constitution insists that he 
be allowed except in exceptional circumstances, a few words before the sheriff escorts 
him out the door." 
318 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 {1972). 
318 Justice Harlan concurring in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 
{1969), quoted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 {1972); See also Mitchell v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 {1974) {property); Pervis v. La Marque Ind. School Dist., 466 
F.2d 1054, 1057 {5th Cir. 1972). 
320 Cf. More on Void Orders, supra note 299, at 305; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-474.1 
{Supp. 1974). 
321 Corning and Sons, Inc. v. McNamara, 506P.2d 1328,1330-31 {Wash.1973). See 
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE 505-06 {1973) {Rule 65{b) 
valid as written). 
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ute is phrased in terms of "emergency," but the same result 
should be possible under "irreparable harm" or similar lan-
guage. This standard plus care in defining liberty-property in-
terests and complete appellate scrutiny should be adequate to 
accommodate preliminary injunctions and temporary restrain-
ing orders to the new due process. 322 
C. Conclusions and Generalizations-Part I 
The new due process can be summarized. The threshold 
question is whether the affected individual has a constitution-
ally cognizable interest. The importance of this issue has been 
purposefully stressed.323 In Fuentes, the property right which 
gave rise to the interest was a contractual right to possess the 
property. The Roth and Perry cases expand and clarify the 
liberty-property analysis. Mitchell develops the property anal-
ysis further when an interest is security for a debt. At the 
interest-identifying stage, there is no judicial balancing. Due 
process applies when the government acts adjudicatively to 
affect a constitutionally cognizable interest. If sufficient state 
action or color of law is found in ostensibly private action, 
notice and an opportunity to be heard are required. The second 
step is to determine precisely how much process is due; it is 
here that the courts consider and balance the interests of all 
affected persons and the government. But to all the above there 
is one exception. If extraordinary or emergency measures are 
necessary, the action may proceed without due process. 
Some will argue that as due process advances, society's 
progress will be clogged by excessive hearings. Due process, in 
this view, is an impediment to efficient government. Justice 
Stewart answered this in Fuentes by noting that avoiding "or-
dinary costs imposed by the opportunity for a hearing is not 
sufficient to override the constitutional right."324 If, moreover, 
322 More on Void Orders, supra note 299; Toward Due Process in Injunction Proce-
dure, supra note 299. 
323 The two step analysis as outlined here has also been recognized and commented 
upon. 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1271 (1974). In its essentials, it can be briefly stated. 
First, there must be determined whether liberty or property is bein~ affected. Only 
after that is decided does the balancing begin, in determining what due process re-
quires. See Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 739 (1975). 
m Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.29 (1972). See also id. at 90 n.22; Mitchell 
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
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as the opponents of due process uniformly contend, the issues 
are easy, then hearings will be waived or attenuated.325 Finally, 
the argument reveals that the proponents are ideologically pre-
disposed to accept the authority's word. They simply overlook 
the present arrangement's conspicuous failure to safeguard the 
public from serious and inherent defects. In many reported 
cases, the seething arrogance of unchecked official power com-
pletely refutes the argument.326 The reader, no doubt, can sup-
ply his own examples. There are, of course, many trustworthy 
officials; still, Jeremy Bentham's rejoinder will suffice: 
In every public trust, the legislator should, for the purpose of 
prevention, assume the trustee disposed to break his trust in 
every imaginable way in which the breach of it would be to 
his personal advantage. This it the principle on which public 
institutions ought to be formed; and when it is applied to all 
men universally, it is injurious to none. The practical infer-
ence is to oppose to such possible breaches of trust every bar 
that can be opposed consistently with the power that is requi-
site to the efficient discharge of the trust. Indeed, these argu-
ments, drawn from the supposed virtues of men to power, are 
opposed to the first principles on which all laws proceed.321 
Considering the evils of irresponsible power, due process should 
not involve readjustments too burdensome to be tolerated. 
What does the new due process mean? Due process embod-
ies the simple idea that no one may be the judge in his own 
case. The due process trend vindicates notice and a right to be 
heard as an indispensable cornerstone of our legal and political 
traditon.328 Notice and a hearing before adverse governmental 
action protect privacy and property. 329 The authorities are pre-
328 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.29 (1972): "[W]e deal here only with the 
right to an opportunity to be heard." See also Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 
1388 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974). 
321 See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 168 (6th Cir. 1973); Holt 
v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (prison); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp.1292 
(E.D. Va. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (prison); 
Acree v. Drummond, 336 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.Ga.), modified, 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972). 
327 J. BENTHAM, HANDBOOK OF PoLITICAL FALLAciES 82 (H. Larabee ed. 1952). 
328 See 1 REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) CoNFLicrr oF LAws §§ 97, 104 (1971); REsTATEMENT 
OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36, 511, comment bat 66, § 11 (1942); F. JAMES, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE §§ 11.5-.8 (1965); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civilized to 
Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MtcH. L. REv. 797, 802 (1971). 
321 
"So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of property without due 
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eluded from condescending to permit "no more than an oppor-
tunity for oral importunities aimed at a fait accompli. " 330 
Notice and a hearing also advance two primary goals of 
any functioning political system: legitimacy and effective-
ness. 331 If all affected by a decision participate in making it, 
there is less chance that it will be wrong.332 This advances the 
pragmatic interest in effectiveness or efficiency. 333 Due process 
does not abolish authority but reduces it from judge to accuser. 
Thus, controversies are more likely to be decided on the merits 
instead of according to relative power.334 This deters unconsi-
dered, erroneous and arbitrary action.335 
The legitimacy goal is advanced when the governed feel or 
believe that the institutions of government are proper and ap-
propriate. If due process is observed and affected persons have 
an opportunity to state their position, the losers, while not 
relishing the defeat, will more readily accept the decision. 336 On 
the other hand, if affected persons are denied access to deci-
sion-making institutions, they may feel that the institutions 
are not the appropriate ones to govern the society.337 This is the 
process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional and political 
history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental 
interference." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
331 C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1973). See also 
Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973), which gives an 
excellent exposition of the underlying reason for the new due process requirement of 
hearing before official action. There Judge Eisele explains that it is an attempt to place 
the individual in as equal a position to assert his rights as is possible; to prevent the 
individual from having to bear the burden of overcoming the bureaucratic inertia after 
an action is taken. Thus the individual "should not have to bear the burden of persuad-
ing the decision-maker to reverse a fait accompli ..•. " I d. at 882. 
331 S. LIPSIT, PouncAL MAN 64-67 (1963). 
332 Carroll v. President and Comm'r of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1968); 
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 385 (1970); Note, Defiance of 
Unlawful Authority, 83 HARv. L. REv. 626, 635 (1970). 
333 United States ex rel. Miller v. Twome, 479 F.2d 701, 715 (7th Cir. 1973); United 
States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
,... Bond v. Dentzer, 362 F. Supp. 1373, 1385 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 302 
(2d Cir. 1974); Rinhart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 114 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974). 
:ns C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (Ct. App. 1973). 
:131 T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 12-13 (1966); 
Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REv. 575, 587-92 (1961); 
Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed 
Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 489 (1973). 
:137 F. FRANKFuRTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 52-53, 130-133, 188 
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theoretical underpinning of the adversary system. 
Due process assures that affairs are conducted with more 
consideration for the interests of all concerned. Formerly closed 
lines of communication may be opened. Conflicting interests 
will be reconciled in the open. As authorities become obliged 
to give account, irrational, immature or incompetent officials 
will be exposed to public view. The corrupt will be revealed or 
find it more difficult to operate. Thus may due process function 
as a potent educational and corrective force. More importantly, 
the new due process will enable citizens to achieve a stronger 
voice in decisions governing their daily lives. As such, it repre-
sents a long-overdue realization that it is foreign to our political 
traditions for the lives and fortunes of many to depend upon 
the arbitrary decisions of a few. 
As due process advances, ex parte procedure declines. This 
accompanies the waning of paternalism, ex cathedra power and 
authoritarian relationships.338 Established institutions no 
longer evoke absolute, unquestioned obedience. Leaders must 
deign to persuade and influence. Power, it is believed, vitiates 
honest human relationships and degrades both the powerful 
and the powerless. Influence and persuasion, however, allow 
rational choices between alternatives.339 Due process, the work-
ing out of better ways to do justice, is part of the struggle to 
create a more humane society. The new due process cases mark 
the trend and accelerate its development. 
On the other hand, even if due process is mandated, it may 
simply challenge the ingenuity of the unscrupulous. More 
adroitly but no less effectively, they may conduct sham hear-
ings, affect to listen, dissemble actual motives, and substitute 
pretenses for reasons. Such a hearing is better than no hearing 
at all. A hearing exposes the institutional thought process to 
outside scrutiny and allows those interested in the result to 
speak their piece. In addition, a hearing may reveal unconstitu-
tional reasons and lay the foundation for judicial relief.340 But, 
(1930); S. LIPsrr, PoLITICAL MAN 64-67 (1963). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
483-84 (1972); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. 
Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. 
Supp. 621, 655 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
338 B. SKINNER, THE TECHNOLOGY OF '!'EACIUNG 57 (1971). 
331 R. SAMPsoN, THE PsYCHOLOGY oF PoWER 233 (1966). 
~· See, e.g., Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
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hearings will eliminate only some of the graver abuses. Due 
process is only part of the effort to build a better society. Due 
process cannot protect as well as common decency, a simple 
willingness to hear both sides and to decide on the facts. When 
common decency is absent, law may not be much assistance; 
when it is present, law may not be necessary. 
PART II-REMEDIES 
The remainder of this article will be concerned with reme-
dies for breach of the new due process. One recurring problem, 
both practically and doctrinally, is the backward reach of a 
decision that a procedure is contrary to due process. This is the 
first issue before a court, and it must be resolved before the 
court can move to the specific remedial issue. In keeping with 
that analysis, the problem of retrospective application will first 
be considered, under the voidness concept and the retroactivity 
analysis. The new due process cases will be divided into practi-
cal categories: property, public employment, mental health 
commitments and prison discipline. In each of these categories, 
the application of both traditional legal theories and the Civil 
Rights Act will be evaluated, and the gamut of injunctive re-
lief, damages, and newer remedial tools will be analyzed. How-
ever, the precise requirements of the type of procedure that is 
required in each instance will not be treated in detail because 
the courts generally do not spell out procedural requirements 
specifically. In this regard one must remember that due process 
is outspokenly experimental; procedural forms will be tried, 
modified and discarded. Thus, in assessing the following analy-
sis the proper attitude to be maintained is an open mind, above 
all avoiding dogmatism. 
A. Voidness and Retroactivity 
Few propositions are better established in traditional due 
process than that if a court lacks jurisdiction, its judgment is 
void.341 Jurisdiction, for present purposes, takes two forms: ju-
risdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person. 
Subject matter jurisdiction means that the court has constitu-
'"' See, e.g., T. CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 499 (1878). 
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tionally and statutorily defined competence to hear a particu-
lar class of cases. Personal jurisdiction means that the court 
has power over the defendant and that the proper means were 
utilized to bring him before the court. A court's decision in the 
absence of jurisdiction is a nullity and has no effect.342 The 
decision may be repudiated and is subject to collateral attack 
in any subsequent proceeding.343 At the same time, so long as 
a court has jurisdiction, it has the power to decide the case, 
even if its decision is erroneous.344 If the judgment is erroneous 
but not void, (i.e. within the court's jurisdiction) it binds the 
parties. 345 Error must be corrected by direct attack. If an erro-
neous judgment is not directly· attacked, it is binding on colla-
teral attack. Thus, a merely erroneous judgment is entitled to 
res judicata and full faith and credit. 
Many cases involving void judgments turn on a failure to 
serve proper notice.346 Notice is basic to a right to be heard. A 
proceeding purportedly commenced without notice is seriously 
defective and a perversion of the adversary system.347 Some 
cases observe a failure to accord proper procedural protections 
and refuse to inquire further.348 Under traditional due process, 
the substantive validity of the claim is not relevant. If due 
process has been ignored by a failure to give effective notice, it 
3u REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment fat 68; § 93, comment c at 462; § 
115, commentj at 561 (1942). 
"'
3 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Polansky v. Richardson, 
351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D .N.Y. 1972). But cf. cases applying res judicata to jurisdictional 
issues: Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) (subject matter); American Surety Co. v. 
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932) (personal). \ 
"'
4 United States v. Fidanian, 465 F.2d 755, 758-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1044 (1972); Brown v. Jacobs, 12 N.E.2d 10, 11-12 (lll. 1935); Z. CHAFEE, SOME 
PRoBLEMS OF EQUITY 348 (1950); F. JAMES, CIVIL PRoCEDURE 534 (1965). 
"'' T. CooLEY, supra note 341, at 510-11. 
"'' Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958); Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 
U.S. 13 (1928); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Polansky v. Richardson, 351 
F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36 
(1942). Some tum on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ex parte Bryant, 485 S.W.2d 
719 (Tex. 1956). 
347 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment a at 36 (1942). 
34
" See, e.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1964); Marcus 
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 738 (1961); Shafer v. Stephens Adamson Mfg. Co., 
183 N.E.2d 575, 578 (lll. Ct. App. 1962); REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment f 
at 39 (1942). 
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is as if nothing had happened. 349 
The voidness concept has also been applied in new due 
process litigation. In a recent school discipline case, for exam-
ple, the principal suspended students without a hearing. A 
school board hearing months later affirmed the principal. The 
district court held that failure to hold a pre-suspension hearing 
"may be cured by a valid subsequent hearing." The court of 
appeals, reversing, held that "punishment cannot be imposed 
before a hearing is given" and ordered the school to expunge 
the record of the suspensions. 350 Thus, to the extent legally 
possible, the court extirpated the effect of the suspensions. Yet, 
not even the court's equitable powers could return the missed 
school days, a fact which underscores the finite scope of judicial 
power in dealing with many of the interests asserted in new due 
process cases. This limitation could also raise the question of 
money damages to substitute for the students' loss. 
As an alternative to the traditional voidness remedy, a 
court may resolve the problem under the retroactivity doctrines 
developed in criminal procedure cases.351 For example, in 
Weaver v. O'Grady,352 the court held that it was unconstitu-
tional to suspend a driver's license without an opportunity for 
a hearing. 353 Applying traditional due process reasoning, noth-
ing legally cognizable had happened and all purported prior 
suspensions were void. Instead, the court noted that the hold-
ing was not totally unexpected in view of past practices and 
developing notions of due process. Mailing notice to the plain-
tiff group would be expensive, but, in view of the imperative 
nature of due process and the state's administrative capabili-
ties, mailed notice was not impossible. Hence, the court held 
that the decision was retroactive and required the state to send 
notice to the affected licensees within 90 days.354 Under tradi-
tional due process, the notice might have stated that the pre-
,., REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 11, comment fat 68; § 93, comment c at 462; § 
115, comment j at 561 (1942). See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also 
Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) . 
... Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School Dist., 466 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1972). See 
also Lopez v. Goss, 372 F. Supp.1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). 
351 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973). 
352 350 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. Ohio 1972). 
353 Id. at 408. 
,.. I d. at 410-12. 
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vious "suspension" was legally ineffective. Under retroactivity, 
however, licensees were notified of their right to request a due 
process hearing.355 
In Rios v. Cozens,356 a similar case, the plaintiff asked the 
court to reinstate illegally suspended licenses. The Supreme 
Court of California directed the license department to extirpate 
the order suspending the named plaintiff's license pending no-
tice and a hearing.357 The court, though refusing to vacate sus-
pension orders entered against the other members of the 
plaintiff class did require the department to hold a hearing if 
requested by one whose license had been previously suspended 
without due process.358 Nevertheless, the court rejected the 
named plaintiff's claim for money damages.359 
The concept of retroactivity will be developed more fully 
in succeeding sections. Still, even the scant overview presented 
by the foregoing cases yields some important conclusions. 
Under the retroactivity analysis, the court has considerable 
flexibility to consider various factors to determine whether a 
decision is to be retroactive or prospective. Once it is decided 
that a decision is retroactive, the court has discretion in shap-
ing a remedy. 360 
Clearly the voidness concept and the retroactivity analysis 
are alternative approaches to retrospectivity in due process 
cases. If, under the voidness concept, the assailed procedure 
denied due process, nothing legally cognizable happened.361 
The truth of the facts asserted is immaterial. 362 But someone 
has been deprived of due process and frequently property, lib-
erty or employment as well. May he then use the legal system 
to recover money damages? In many of the major new due 
process cases, plaintiffs have asked that the practice be de-
clared illegal and that it be enjoined.363 This equitable and 
355 I d. at 411. 
356 499 P.2d 979, 103 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 415 
(1973), reaffirmed on state ground, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973). 
357 Id. at 985, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 305. 
358 Id. at 984, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 304. 
35~ Id. at 985, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 305. 
36° Cf. Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (justice of the peace trials 
illegal but $1,200,000 fines not refunded). 
361 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
362 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1311 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
363 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 (1972); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 
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prospective relief ends the practice without facing all the reme-
dial implications. In other new due process cases, affirmative 
relief has been asked for denials of due process. Thus it appears 
that in redressing due process violations courts are pressed to 
scan the entire spectrum of possible remedial alternatives. The 
discussion that follows will focus on the widely varying respon-
ses to that pressure. 
B. Remedies for "Property" Due Process Violations 
The property decisions reveal a pattern which occurs in 
each category of cases. First, some courts recognize that due 
process exists but refuse to accord remedial effect, while others 
extend due process to the granting of a remedy. In analyzing 
these cases, serious remedial questions must be faced. Is it 
intellectually honest to strike down a statute without giving 
any benefit to the winning litigant? If the defendant has fol-
lowed a procedure which had not been previously questioned, 
is it fair to require him to respond in damages? Should the 
magnitude of the property or other interest asserted affect the 
remedy? 
The vehicle primarily used to vindicate due process rights 
in property cases is conversion, 364 a tort action designed to pro-
tect a possessory interest in property. 365 The conversion occurs 
when the defendant exercises dominion or control over the 
plaintiff's property; and the converting act can be any conduct 
inconsistent with the plaintiff's possessory interest. Examples 
of converting acts include a refusal to surrender possession to 
one so entitled, and taking property under illegal process. Tak-
ing property under a statute unconstitutional because offailure 
to accord notice and a hearing also appears to be a conver-
sion.366 The conversion theory may be useful in many ex parte 
transfers of property including replevin, distraint and attach-
ment. The following cases should better illustrate both the 
legal and factual context in which the property cases arise and 
are resolved. 
845, 847 (5th Cir. 1972). 
3u W. PRossER, LAw OF ToRTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971). See also Boston Educ. Research 
Co. v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 488 F.2d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 1973). 
315 W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971). 
311 Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973). 
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In Thorp Credit Inc. v. Barr,367 personal property had been 
purchased on installment payments. The buyer fell behind, 
and the seller, following the local statute, replevied without 
notice to the buyer. At trial, the seller established his right to 
the property. On the defendant's appeal, the court declared the 
replevin statute unconstituional, following Fuentes v. Shevin. 
But, because the record supported the seller's right to posses-
sion, the court affirmed the lower court decision for the seller.368 
Two factors must be considered to ameliorate the impact of the 
criticism which follows. First, the defendant-buyer was held to 
have "waived" prior procedural defects by appearing generally 
rather than entering a special· appearance to contest jurisdic-
tion. 369 Second, Barr had been decided by the trial court and 
argued to the appellate court when Fuentes was decided. 
If due process reasoning is applied to Barr, several sub-
stantial criticisms appear. Because of the lack of effective prior 
notice, no jurisdiction was attained.370 The unconstitutional 
taking was a legal non-event. Thus, no credence should be 
accorded to the fact-finding. Indeed, in such situations, the 
defendant may be entitled to the property and perhaps, upon 
a proper counterclaim, a judgment for conversion. Barr, how-
ever, appears to hold that even though the trial court obtained 
no jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff wins the law-
suit. 
There are additional criticisms. The Barr court, as noted 
above, held the statute unconstitutional. If a litigant who suc-
cessfully asserts that a statute is unconstitutional attains no 
benefit, there is no incentive to attempt to void an arguably 
unconstitutional statute or practice.371 If merchants are allowed 
to retain property unconstitutionally taken, it is fair to ask 
whether the statement that the statute is unconstitutional is 
holding or dictum.372 This paradox could be avoided by an in-
387 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 919 (1973). 
383 I d. at 537. 
38° REsTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 9 (1942). 
370 State ex rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731, 735-36 (Mo. 1973). 
371 See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (governmental tort immunity overruled pro-
spectively except for plaintiff who was allowed a cause of action to encourage the 
beneficial activity of assailing superannuated law). See also Willis v. Department of 
Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 264 A.2d 34, 37-38 (N.J. 1970). 
37z In Molitor, the court noted that unless the new rule applied to plaintiff, "such 
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junction requiring the defendant to return the property and 
proscribing future unconstitutional takings. 373 The court in 
Barr, however, did not even enjoin the defendant. The dissent 
takes the better view: "Surely that which developed in the 
instant case after pursuit by plaintiff of unconstitutional sei-
zure cannot effectively eliminate the inceptional taint of inval-
idity. "374 
Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service375 shows a marked contrast 
to Barr. Quebec, a conversion case, grew out of a repair contro-
versy. The automobile owner alleged that after the repairman 
repaired the automobile, it failed. The repairman took the ve-
hicle to his shop and performed additional repairs. Then, the 
repairman invoked a statutory garageman's lien without notice 
or a hearing, and refused to relinquish the automobile until the 
owner paid additional money. 
In holding that the owner's complaint for conversion 
stated a cause of action, the court had to resolve the issue of 
the constitutionality of the lien statute. This is because posses-
sion under a valid lien is a defense to conversion, while holding 
under a defective lien is not. The court held that the lien 
statute was no defense, giving full effect to the broad sweep 
of Fuentes and holding the lien statute unconstitutional:~ 
"[p]rejudgment remedies not providing notice and .. hearing 
violate due process except in extraordinary situations. . . . No 
justification has been advanced why a private citizen should be 
allowed unilaterally to invoke the power of the state to retain 
the property of another without notice and the opportunity for 
a prior hearing."376 Thus, the owner has a chance to prove con-
version and may in the end be entitled to damages. 377 
announcement would amount to mere dictum." 163 N.E.2d at 97. 
m See Yates v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Mason 
v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 424, modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973); State ex 
rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Mo. 1973). 
37
' Thorp Credit Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 410 
u.s. 919 (1973). 
375 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973). 
37
' Id. at 679-80. In Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974), the Supreme Court of California held that retaining a car under 
a garageman's lien did not violate due process but that selling a car without notice 
and a hearing was unconstitutional. Thus, Quebec's precise holding is repudiated. 
m Cf. Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Til. 1974) (owner of "abandoned" 
car has sufficient property interest to require notice and a hearing before towing); 
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Quebec may be criticized for overlooking the possibility 
that the defendant had reasonably relied on the continuing 
legality of an established practice.378 If the garageman did rely, 
an injunction requiring him to return the car may be more 
appropriate than damages.379 Even so, a good argument can be 
put forward for allowing damages when property is taken with-
out due process. In the long run, the damage remedy may work 
significant changes in relationships. An unscrupulous garage-
man who deals with an unsophisticated customer might not be 
deterred by the thought of an injunction requiring him to re-
turn the property. The prospect of also paying damages for 
conversion may therefore have a salutary deterring effect. On 
the other hand, Quebec may also make it harder to collect 
repair bills from unscrupulous automobile owners, by depriving 
the garageman of the practical leverage of informally retaining 
possession. It is significant to note that California's supreme 
court, in a Quebec-type case, evidently found these factors as 
well as the mixed possessory and property interests worthy of 
consideration; as a result it held that a garageman may retain 
an automobile under a garageman's lien without notice and a 
hearing, but that due process was required before the car was 
sold.380 
Alternate torts available when a non-possessory property 
interest is taken without due process are abuse of process and 
wrongful attachment.381 These actions have not been fully de-
Murrell v. Trio Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So.2d 331 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (court held that 
towing company that declined to relinquish control of automobile without payment for 
towing was not entitled to lien on vehicle, and was guilty of conversion for failing to 
relinquish control); Fendler v. Texaco Oil Co., 499 P.2d 179 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) 
(plaintiff's 1970 Chrysler Imperial towed out of "no parking" zone: conversion suit 
rejected). 
378 Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1974) held that it is inappropriate to 
grant damages for acts occurring prior to the declaration of the statute's unconstitu-
tionality, unless they would be proper under the analogous common law tort. There 
the analogous tort was malicious prosecution which required a showing of bad faith. 
Thus in the absence of a showing of bad faith, damages were not warranted. Id. at 1315. 
See Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25, 28 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
370 McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983-Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections I, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited 
as McCormack]; Wellington, Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 254-57 (1973). 
38ll Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 
(1974). 
381 Leesburg v. Builder's Plumbers Supply, 149 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App.1967); 
Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp., 80 S.E.2d 645, 649-51 (N.C. 1954). 
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veloped in non-possessory due process litigation, and several 
factors appear to be influencing the courts in shaping the pro-
spective and retrospective relief necessary to effectively remedy 
the abuses involved. A review of the cases will perhaps best 
illustrate these factors. 
In Schneider v. Margossian, 382 the court dealt with Massa-
chusetts' trustee process. The action was brought to enjoin the 
use of an ex parte procedure whereunder several civil actions 
had been initiated by attaching the defendant's property. 
While in each instance the defendant received notice soon 
after the attachment, it was impossible to contest it before the 
property was frozen. The court held that the use of property 
was taken and that due process was violated. The court ex-
tended prospective relief by enjoining all future ex parte at-
tachments, but retroactive relief presented more difficulty. 
The plaintiff sued as a class representative, the class being all 
persons whose property had been attached by ex parte trustee 
process. The court refused to allow the class and held that, 
except for the named plaintiff, the decision would not affect 
any lawsuit commenced before the effective date of the instant 
decree.383 To justify this attenuated relief, the court said, "a 
retrospective judgment would cast doubt on the validity of all 
civil actions now pending . . . that were started by way of 
trustee process. "384 The theory of prospective relief found in 
Schneider was approved on appeal, and has attracted a wide 
following in lower courts. 385 
The observer might speculate that the plaintiff's decision 
to seek class relief could bear on the court's decision not to 
extend retroactive relief. The plaintiff class causes the court to 
:saz 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972). 
333 !d. at 745. 
~!d. 
:sas Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd sub nom. 
Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974). For lower courts following the prospec-
tive theory, see, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 
502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974) (relief prospective from date of order); Roscoe v. Butler, 
367 F. Supp. 574, 583 (D. Md. 1973); Bay State Harness Horse R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Mass. 1973) (parties, amicus curiae and 
pending cases in the district to receive retroactive benefit; order otherwise effective on 
filing); Clement v. Four North State Street Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D.N.H. 1973); 
Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (D.N.H. 
1973). 
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consider the massive disruption of such sweeping relief, and to 
thereby overlook injustice to one person. The request for in-
junctive relief, the observer may speculate, might also affect 
the decision's backward reach. For an injunction is prospective 
and the court may concentrate on improving future practices 
rather than on repairing past injuries. In any event, individual 
plaintiffs suing for specific or damage relief have successfully 
attained retroactive relief. ass 
An additional factor is that the procedure followed in 
Schneider did give notice to the defendant. It seems more likely 
that a lawsuit begun with an attachment would be defaulted, 
but the defendant did have the opportunity to defend. In con-
trast, the procedure condemned in Pennoyer v. NefF'1 allowed 
no opportunity to defend; the property was attached only. after 
judgment was entered. While both deny due process, there is 
more reason to extend broad retroactive relief when rights are 
affected without any opportunity to participate in the process. 
Furthermore, a retroactive decision may affect more than 
pending cases. If a judgment is void for lack of due process, it 
may be collaterally attacked at any time.388 Thus, an unquali-
fied holding of retroactive unconstitutionality might upset 
many prior trustee process judgments. This would create, at 
the very least, administrative burdens on the courts.389 To give 
due process some credence, however, defendants who have de-
faulted in attachment cases prior to the decision should be 
allowed to reopen those cases and to contest the merits.390 
That the attaching party may have relied on the apparent 
legality of existing practice appears to be an important factor 
in denying retroactivity. In Osmond v. Spence,391 the court 
dealt with a combined confession-of-judgment/wage-
38
' Straley v. Grossway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) (reserving 
damages); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Scoggin v. 
Schrunk, 344 F. Supp. 463 (D. Ore. 1971). See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 
507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975). 
387 95 u.s. 71~ (1877). 
380 Misco Leasing v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (lOth Cir. 1971); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 
F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949); Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F. 
Supp. 1066 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE ~ 60.25[4] (1974). 
38
' Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124, 127 (D. Del. 1972). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
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garnishment scheme. The procedure was found to deny due 
process because there was no showing of waiver before execu-
tion issued. While the court refused to void all prior confessed 
judgments, the decision was afforded some retroactive effect. 
Money held under confessed judgments combined with wage 
garnishment was returned to the debtors, the court observing 
that this procedure was "a form of the prejudgment garnish-
ment [previously] declared unconstitutional in Sniadach 
"392 
But even if reliance is an important factor, it is difficult 
to determine what reliance is reasonable. One court held that 
attachments before the decision date in Fuentes were not vul-
nerable to a Fuentes attack.393 The reasons were fourfold: (1) 
Fuentes "was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) retroactivity 
"would frustrate the legitimate expectations of many Massa-
chusetts State litigants; (3) it would invite confusion and un-
certainty in the conduct of continuing litigation; and ( 4) it 
might, in the case of property sold pursuant to real estate at-
tachments, create serious title problems."394 To others, how-
ever, the answer has not been so clearcut. Justice Stewart in 
Fuentes felt that the result was clearly anticipated by prior 
cases, 395 and lower courts have applied Fuentes to facts which 
occurred before it was decided.396 Nonetheless, the Second Cir-
cuit held in Tucker v. Maher, that there can be no damages 
awarded for a taking that occured prior to the statute being 
declared unconstitutional. 397 The court appeared uncertain as 
to whether this was a result of immunities granted by the Civil 
Rights Act itself, or because of the "closely analogous wrong" 
of malicious prosecution, which was declared to be the essence 
of the claim, which itself requires a showing of bad faith.398 
While the passage of time reduces the importance of the 
specific retroactivity issue, the basic problem of enforcing due 
312 ld. at 128. 
313 Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973). 
311 !d. at 205-06. 
315 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 71 (1972). 
311 Bay State Harness R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 
n.7 (D. Mass. 1973) (Higley Hill disapproved); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'\ 
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085, 1091-92 n.17 (D. Me. 1973) (same). 
317 Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1974). 
311 ld. at 1315. 
604 1CENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
process remains. Within this there are two major points of 
concern. First, when will a person be relieved from an unconsti-
tutional taking? Second, when may the victim of an unconsti-
tutional taking be awarded damages? If the taker's knowledge 
is to bear on the second issue, then the next question is, how 
specific must knowledge be? Is it sufficient that a similar pro-
cedure has been invalidated by the Supreme Court? Or, must 
the identical procedure be invalidated? Must the decision be a 
specific holding on the precise statute? Must there be some-
thing more to bring knowledge home than constructive knowl-
edge from a judicial opinion? For a damage remedy, must the 
taker have been a defendant in the case striking the statute 
down? 
Answers to these questions can vary depending on the rem-
edy asked. Courts find it easier to upset attachments than to 
award damages. But, merely dissolving existing attachments 
may not deter future attachments; if the practices are to be 
stopped, a deterrent, such as a damage remedy, is needed. 
Damage remedies may influence conduct, especially institu-
tional conduct, by penalizing the wrongdoer. And if the dam-
age remedy is to be a meaningful deterrent, the courts must 
define the knowledge requirement in such a way as to prevent 
any premium that might be derived from remaining ignorant. 
C. Loss of Employment 
The government employment cases are superficially similar 
to the ordinary property cases.399 A person is deprived of a 
significant interest without an opportunity to participate in the 
process. In both, there is a significant threshold barrier. In the 
usual property cases, the courts have struggled with state ac-
tion and color of law. While state action is clear in government 
employment cases, the employee faces the threshold problem 
of showing an interference with a protectable interest in liberty 
or property. When government employment is terminated 
without due process, the remedial response appears to be af-
m If there is a protected interest found, it can possibly be a "property" interest. 
But employment cases are treated independently because of their sometimes unique 
remedial problems, and because the interest protected might be either property or 
liberty. 
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fected by additional complicating factors: the absence of a sin-
gle legal theory, the high order of the asserted citizen interest 
and the desire to preserve administrative discretion. 
There are several legal theories, including both tort and 
contract actions, available to one deprived of government em-
ployment. While there is no single tort which is universally 
applicable, several tort theories are useful in certain cases. 400 
The basic tort remedy is money damage for the harm caused. 
Damages, of course, may also be a contract remedy. 401 The 
contract theory allows recovery for the money benefit of the 
breached obligation. Notwithstanding the importance of these 
traditional common law bases of action, discussion here will 
concentrate on more recently developed constitutional theo-
ries. It has become well established that a government em-
ployee cannot be discharged because of an exercise of the first 
amendment freedoms. 402 Also, government employment cannot 
be terminated in a way that violates either equal protection403 
or due process. 404 
•oo See Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951) (mali-
cious deprivation of a gainful position); Hardy v. Vial, 311 P.2d 494 (Cal. 1957) (mali-
cious prosecution); Ranous v. Hughes, 141 N.W.2d 251 (Wise. 1966) (defamation); W. 
PRossER, LAW OF ToRTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971) (interference with contractual relations). 
401 Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973); Development, 
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1099-1100 (1968). There are significant cpmpli-
cating doctrines in suing on a contract of employment with the government. See 
Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973); Megee v. Barnes, 
160 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1968). · 
m Pickering v. Board ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 
(lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Rainey v. Jackson State College, 
481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 147-48 (W.D. Ky. 1973); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Nebraska Dep't of Roads Employees' Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 
364 F. Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), 
aff'd, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Local594, Teamsters Pub. Emp. Union v. City of 
West Point, 338 F. Supp. 927 (D. Neb. 1972). David Roth, who was held to have had 
neither a liberty nor a property interest in continued employment in Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1973), charged at trial that he was discharged for exercising his 
first amendment freedoms. The jury awarded Roth $5,246 compensatory damages and 
$1,500 punitive. See Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 26, 1973, at 3. 
•u Sparks v. Griffin, 460 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of 
Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971). 
404 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 
F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973). 
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The remedial issues can be examined by analyzing three 
recent cases. Each concerns the remedy for a teacher who was 
fired without due process, yet the remedy differs significantly 
from case to case. In Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Blooms-
burg State College, 405 the court found that the plaintiff was 
denied due process because he should have been given a hear-
ing before being dismissed. He received judgment for one dol-
lar.406 In Karstetter v. Evans401 there had been two purported 
hearings. The plaintiff's salary ceased after the first hearing. 
The first hearing, the court held, did not comport with due 
process but the second hearing did. The facts were the same at 
both hearings but "not having been accorded a hearing which 
met procedural due process, plaintiff was entitled to remain in 
her status . . . until action was taken by the Board at a hearing 
meeting procedural due process."408 Because the second termi-
nation was effective, plaintiff could not be reinstated but she 
was "entitled to receive back wages equal to the amount she 
would have received ... less her earnings, if any, in the in-
terim."409 In Starsky v. Williams, 410 the plaintiff had been fired, 
but a review of the record revealed a lack of substantial evi-
dence of a constitutionally permissible basis for the decision. 
The decision to terminate, therefore, violated due process and 
was ineffective. "The defendants," the court held, "have a 
duty to reinstate plaintiff to his position with all of its emolu-
ments and perquisites as if termination had never occurred. "411 
These three cases run the gamut. In Skehan, the court does 
not give any remedial effect to the denial of due process except 
to vindicate plaintiff symbolically. In Karstetter, the court af-
••• 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 
1974) . 
... I d. at 436 (plaintiff also received costs). 
m 350 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Tex. 1971). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. 
Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973) . 
... Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 212 (W.D. Tex. 1971) . 
... Id. The same situation resulted in the same remedy in Davis v. Barr, 373 F. 
Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). 
uo 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 512 
F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975). 
m Id. at 928 (emphasis supplied). 
1975] THE NEW DuE PROCESS 607 
forded some effect but did not order full pay for the period in 
which plaintiff had not been fired. In Starsky, the court held 
that because due process was not followed, nothing had hap-
pened. Each remedial alternative will be discussed in terms of 
doctrinal consistency and practical considerations. 
In Skehan, the court justified the one dollar award by 
pointing to plaintiff's delay in suing and "the Court's finding 
that the Plaintiff was not discharged for exercising his constitu-
tional rights. " 412 Both reasons can be criticized. Delay in suit 
should affect due process cases as it does all cases. There is an 
applicable statute of limitations.413 If the statute has run, suit 
should be barred. But delay short of the statutory bar should 
not be interposed to attenuate the remedy. If this reasoning 
were attempted in a tort or contract case, it would be repu-
diated immediately. If it appears that plaintiff, aware that he 
was illegally fired, delayed suit to increase the damages, then 
the mitigation principle may be applied. 414 
Skehan was awarded nominal damages because he "was 
not discharged for exercising his constitutional rights."415 This 
assumes dismissal, which appears to be a constitutionally im-
permissible conclusion. If plaintiff's interest was constitution-
ally cognizable, he was entitled to due process before being 
· discharged. Employment is not legally terminated until a legal 
hearing is conducted.416 The right to a hearing prior to a depri-
vation, in the words of Justice Stewart, 
has long been recognized by this court under the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments. Although the court held that due 
412 Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated 
and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974). 
m Boshell v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 473 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1973) (one 
year); Taliaferro v. State Council of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1383-84 (E.D. 
Va. 1974). 
m If the employer proves that the wrongfully discharged employee could, by rea-
sonable effort, have obtained a suitable job, the employee is charged with the income 
he could have obtained. See, e.g., McAleer v. McNally Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 273 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
415 Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated 
and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974). 
41
' This was essentially the court of appeal's view on vacating the district judge's 
opinion. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974). Klein v. New Castle 
County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974); Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 212 
(N.D. Tex. 1971). 
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process tolerates variance in the form of a hearing "appropri-
ate to the nature of the case" . . . and "depending upon the 
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the 
subsequent proceedings [if any] . . . the Court has tradi-
tionally insisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for that 
hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue 
takes effect. 417 
To make the constitutional right to a prior hearing meaningful, 
legally ineffective procedures should not be granted remedial 
effect. Allowing the unconstitutional hearing to reduce the 
remedy is a back door method of allowing a deprivation to take 
effect without a constitutionally permissible procedure. 418 That 
the evidence presented at an illegal hearing may have sup-
ported discharge at a legal hearing is, therefore, irrelevant to 
the remedy. It is accordingly submitted that Skehan and 
similar cases419 are inconsistent with the remedial aims of due 
process. A wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to more 
than a symbolic vindication. 
In Karstetter, the court conferred credence upon due pro-
cess by ordering payment of wages for the period between the 
illegal termination of salary and the due process hearing. In-
terim earnings were allowed as evidence to reduce or mitigate 
damages, which is consistent with the mitigation principle as 
generally applied in public employee cases.420 Some courts go 
farther than subtracting actual earnings from the back pay 
417 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (citations omitted). But cf. Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (apparently allowing the federal government, operating 
under statute and administrative regulation, to give notice of discharge and an oppor-
tunity to submit written material before separation from service but to delay the 
adversary hearing until after the employee is terminated). 
us The court in Skehan gave additional reasons for the one dollar award: 1) Plain-
tiff had failed to request a "hearing by the college on the reasons for his dismissal," 
and 2) he did not "participate in the post dismissal ... hearing .... " Skehan v. 
Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430, 435 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Both also assume the 
dismissal conclusion. See the court of appeals opinion remanding, Skehan v. Board of 
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1974). 
m Johnson v. Netterville, 355 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. La. 1973); Abbott v. Thetford, 
354 F. Supp. 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
420 See, e.g., Williams v. Albemarle CityBd. ofEduc., 485 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.1973); 
United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 325, 831 (D. Nev.1973); Buggs v. City 
of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (D. Minn. 1973); Monte v. Flaherty, 351 F. 
Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
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award and reduce back pay by "earnings from any actual or 
reasonably available employment."421 Few will quarrel with 
reducing back pay by actual earnings; the spectacle of a wind-
fall is not pleasant to contemplate. Reducing the back pay 
award by imputed interim earnings, however, is arguably in-
consistent with the magnitude of the affected interests. The 
mitigation principle was designed for breaches of private 
contracts and is supported by a policy of preventing economic 
waste. The public employee cases grow out of a different envi-
ronment: because the government is the defendant and is 
charged with breaking the law, plaintiff, it may be said, is 
acting as a private attorney general422 insisting that the govern-
ment must obey the law, a social policy of a high order. 
Further, the policy of preventing waste is diminished when 
there were no actual earnings. Much of the plaintiff's time will 
be consumed in preparing his case. But under the Federal Back 
Pay Act, 423 it has been held that the mitigation principle is 
applicable, even though not expressly provided for. 424 This al-
lows an employer to reduce the back pay by the amount the 
employee could have earned if reasonable efforts to locate other 
employment had been made.425 Finally, under traditional due 
process the courts are accustomed to holding that a procedur-
ally defective proceeding involving private litigants is void and 
has no effect. These ideas can be adapted to employee cases. 
If accepted, a former government employee who feels he has 
been wrongfully discharged may take his own chances. He will 
be allowed to pursue his remedy diligently without fear that 
back pay will be cut back for "might-have-been" employment. 
The courts are reluctant to extend a complete remedy to 
a government employee who has been wrongfully discharged. 
Several additional factors must be considered to understand 
m United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 
1973). The limits on required mitigation are stated in Jackson v. Wheatley School 
Dist., 464 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1972). The court held that it was unreasonable for a 
married couple to live apart to reduce damages "caused by the unlawful actions of the 
school board." I d. at 413. See also Williams v. Albemarle Bd. of Educ., 508 F .2d 1242 
(4th Cir. 1974). 
•n Cf. Newman v. Piggy Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
<:13 5 u.s.c. § 5596 (1967). 
m Urbina v. United States, 428 F.2d 1280, 1287 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
ns White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d 1379, 1382 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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this reluctance. The cases just discussed were decided by fed-
eral courts, under federal constitutional law. But many cases 
arise from state employment, and state regulatory and statu-
tory schemes.426 This is especially true when a plaintiff asserts 
a property interest under state law. 427 Federal judges under-
standably hesitate before interposing their judgment in these 
delicate areas of state policy. Due process litigation may also 
originate in a complex collective bargaining environment. 
When employee-employer relations are structured by collective 
bargaining, the courts are more likely to require the parties to 
solve their problems without judicial interference.428 
There are also several federal statutory schemes which 
deal with the remedy available to improperly discharged em-
ployees. 429 In shaping remedies under these statutes, the federal 
courts have attempted to avoid inflexible doctrine, instead ren-
dering remedial decisions that are equitable and flexible.430 
Several other factors appear to enhance remedial flexibil-
ity. Many lawsuits are brought against local governmental bod-
ies. Since these bodies perform socially useful functions on lim-
ited budgets, the courts hesitate to impose excessive financial 
burdens on local school districts.431 There is also the traditional 
420 See, e.g., Sheelhause v. Woodburry Cent. Com. School Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th 
Cir. 1973); Nebraska Dep't of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F. 
Supp. 251 (D. Neb. 1973); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp.1340 (D. Minn. 
1973); Johnson v. Netterville, 355 F. Supp. 921 (M.D. La. 1973); Monte v. Flaherty, 
351 F. Supp. 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1972). Poschmen v. Dumke, 107 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. App. 
1973) was decided on state law in state court but § 1983 supplied one of the theories 
of liability. I d. at 603. 
421 Schultz v. School Dist., 367 F. Supp. 467 (D. Neb. 1973); Buhr v. Buffalo 
School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973). 
423 Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972). 
420 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(6)(1970); Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970). 
430 See, e.g., Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); 
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated and 
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25, 1975) (under Title Vll absence of bad faith 
not a sufficient reason to deny back pay); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 
711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969); Tea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97, 102 (M.D.N.C. 
1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Harper v. City of Baltimore, 359 F. 
Supp. 1187, 1216-17 (D. Md. 1973); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 
1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
431 Cf. Judge Coleman concurring specially in decision to dissolve en bane panel, 
McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School Dist., 486 F.2d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir. 
1973). But cf. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
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judicial policy against ordering adverse litigants to work to-
gether, based on the idea that it is both undesirable and inef-
fective to force personal working relations.~32 The court can 
vindicate the employee by reinstating him, but the judicial 
process inevitably is time consuming and he may have gone on 
to something else. 433 Reinstatement cannot alter either the 
authority structure or the personal feelings of co-workers or 
superiors. Thus, if an employee and his supervisors are at log-
gerheads, the court will be reluctant to reinstate even though 
the discharge was unconstitutional. The employee must be 
content with money damages.434 If, however,the working rela-
tionship is not so close that harmony and loyalty are required, 
reinstatement may be ordered.435 Even so, the employee may 
be uncomfortable, so the court may allow another hearing. The 
defendants may seek new grounds to discharge, and having 
profited from reading the court's opinion, the officials are much 
more likely to discharge correctly the second time.438 Thus, a 
wrongfully discharged employee should not consider the pros-
pect of reinstatement to be a reason to cease looking for another 
job. 
2. Relationship Between Remedy and Interest Affected 
Of particular significance in employment cases is the rela-
tionship between the interest violated by the defendant and the 
remedy extended to the plaintiff. If a property interest in con-
tinued employment has been breached, the courts will respond 
remedially only enough to cover the period of expectancy. If the 
expectancy is indefinite, reinstatement is in order. Most em-
ployees, however, work under less than a lifetime appointment. 
In that circumstance, a court will order reinstatement and back 
m Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Peacock 
v. Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1974); Abbott v. Thetford, 354 
F. Supp. 1280, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 1973); D. DoBBS, REMEDIES 925, 929-30 (1972). 
m The victorious litigant in Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975), apparently appears 
again in Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973). 
Ul Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1973). 
435 Nebraska Dept. of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F. 
Supp. 251, 254-55 (D. Neb. 1973). 
m Karstetter v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 209, 210-11 (N.D. Tex. 1971). 
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pay only for the period of the expectancy.437 The effectiveness 
of reinstatement is limited by the inherent delay in the legal 
process. This is exemplified by a case in which a court in Sep-
tember of 1973 ordered the plaintiff reinstated for the academic 
year 1971-72.438 In these cases, a prompt hearing and perhaps 
a preliminary injunction are in order.439 This ensures that rein-
statement will not be a hollow remedy and that the employer 
will not be required to pay back wages without receiving serv-
ices in return. 
When there is no property interest in employment, a court 
will not order reinstatement and back pay for an illegal dis-
charge. If the discharge does not impinge upon any constitu-
tionally cognizable interest, the former employee is not entitled 
to any remedy. If, however, the employee has no property inter-
est in the employment, but the reasons given or the procedures 
used impinge upon the former employee's future employment 
prospects or present reputation, the court must fashion a rem-
edy commensurate with the impaired interest. Often, an ad-
ministrative hearing on the discharge is the remedy. The hear-
ing is intended only "to provide the person an opportunity to 
clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hear-
ing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him fu-
ture employment for other reasons."440 In passing on public 
employee cases after Roth, the lower. courts have distinguished 
liberty and property cases. In property cases, the remedy is 
reinstatement and back pay. In liberty cases, the remedy is a 
hearing to refute the charges.441 
437 Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (one year constructive 
tenure and one year's back pay). 
433 Starsky v. Board of Trustees, 109 Cal. Rptr. 822 (Ct. App. 1973). 
431 Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974) (commendable 
celerity); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972); Local594 Public Employ-
ees Union v. City of West Point, 338 F. Supp. 929 (D. Neb. 1972). See also Adams v. 
Walker, 488 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.1973) (defendant's request for a stay on appeal denied, 
final opinion affirming discharge, 492 F.2d 1003 (1974). 
~~· Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972). 
m Garcia v. Daniel, 490 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State 
Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156·57 (8th Cir. 1973); Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d 
1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1973); Ferris v. Special School Dist. No.1, 367 F. Supp. 459, 465 
(D. Minn. 1973); Zumwalt v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344, 354 
(Ct. App. 1973) Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 156 (1974) (opinion of Justice 
Rhenquist, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart). 
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The question of what process is due, then, is compelling in 
public employee-liberty cases. Since the process may be the 
only remedy, remedial implications weight the pragmatic pro-
cedural question.442 Generally the problem has been solved as 
follows. If the reasons for dismissal impinge upon the em-
ployee's liberty interest, he is given a choice: He may accept 
the reasons and consider the matter closed, or he may demand 
a hearing. If the employee's choice is a hearing, certain proce-
dural safeguards are required in order to give him a fair chance 
to vindicate himself. Fairly detailed notice of the charges is 
required before the hearing takes place; the decision must be 
made on the record by apparently impartial persons; and the 
employee has a right to retain counsel, to present oral evidence 
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. 443 
Though the purpose of this hearing is to allow the em-
ployee to clear his name, the employer need not abide the 
result.444 The hearing does, however, provide the basis for later 
judicial review of the administrative record for proper proce-
dure. The ambit of judicial inquiry into the weight of the evi-
dence is narrow, but the court will insist upon some evidence 
of a nonarbitrary reason to terminate. 445 If a reason is unrelated 
to employment or working relationships, trivial or unsupported 
in the record, it is arbitrary.448 Because the administrative deci-
m Due process is a flexible concept. In determining what procedure due process 
requires in a particular setting, the institutional and factual context is weighed. See, 
e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Thus, requirements in one setting 
may not carry over into another. 
413 McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 322 (4th Cir.1973); Poddarv. Youngstown State 
Univ., 480 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1973); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College, 471 F.2d 488, 
495 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Vanderzanden v. Lowell School 
Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 73-74 (D. Ore. 1973); Lindsay v. Kissinger, 367 F. Supp. 
949, 953 (D.D.C. 1973); Blunt v. Marion County School Bd., 366 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. 
Fla. 1973); Lowrance v. Barker, 347 F. Supp. 588, 591-93 (E.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 480 
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Board of Directors, 519 P.2d 15 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1974). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (timing of hearing); Ferguson 
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970). 
m Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 u.s. 593 (1972). 
415 Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 146-47 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Bottcher v. Florida 
Dept. of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (no substantial 
evidence); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 804-05 
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (no rule broken). 
411 Wiehart v. McDonald, 367 F. Supp. 530, 533 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 
1110 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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sion is not reviewed factually, it is important to examine the 
composition of the administrative hearing panel. To preserve 
the integrity of the process, the decision-makers should have 
no prior connection with the controversy. 447 In addition to re-
view for arbitrariness, the court will search the record for a con-
stitutionally impermissible reason. If the employee was dis-
charged because of race. or an exercise of first amendment 
rights, the case involves exercise of constitutional rights rather 
than liberty and the employee is entitled to be reinstated with 
back pay.448 One further reason for the hearing is the em-
ployee's entitlement to pay. Though the employer can termi-
nate employment, procedurally improper efforts to terminate 
are legally ineffective. Thus, the employee is entitled to remain 
on the payroll until proper action is taken. 449 
The problem of relating the remedy to the interest affected 
has led to expungement orders. If no adverse action has been 
taken and there is merely an entry in a file, it is not clear 
whether the interest affected is liberty or property.450 Since 
the information remains in the file unless someone removes it, 
it may be disseminated in the future and may injure either 
employment opportunities or reputations. Thus, when file 
417 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Duke v. North Texas State 
Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 841-48 (5th Cir. 1972) (Godbold, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 932 (1973); Lake Mich. Col. Fed. of Teachers v. Lake Mich. Com. Col., 390 
F. Supp. 103, 132-34 (W.D. Mich. 1974); King v. Caeser Rodney School Dist., 380 F. 
Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1974); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 876 (E. 
D. Ark. 1973). Contrast Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1996, 1209-10, 
(W.D. Wise. 1973) (hospital staff privileges). 
413 Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334,.339 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 
(1974); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 147-48 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Ferris v. Special 
School Dist. No.1, 367 F. Supp. 459 (D. Minn. 1973); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 
664 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 476 
F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 
791, 805 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Teamsters Local 594 v. City of West Point, 338 F. Supp. 
927 (D. Neb. 1972); See also Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1972). 
m Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 
1973); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974). But see Arnett 
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. 
Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 501 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1974). 
450 Ortwein v. Mackey, 511 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1975) (not liberty); Wellner v. 
Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973) (liberty); Shriek v. 
Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973) (neither); Suarez v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 678 (7th 
Cir. 1973) (not clear); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 
1123, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (property and liberty). 
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entries are false, courts have ordered the entries expunged.451 
To make this meaningful, one court ordered the file opened so 
that false information could be discovered and corrected. 452 
3. Federal Civil Rights Actions: Remedial Ramifications of 
the "Person" Requirement 
In 1973, the Supreme Court clarified decisions under the 
Civil Rights Act. In City of Kenosha v. Bruno453 and Moor v. 
County of Alameda, 454 the Court held that federal district 
courts had no jurisdiction to hear Civil Rights Act cases 
brought against local government defendants. The defendant 
must be a "person." In public employee cases, the person con-
cept may create remedial difficulties which are more than 
merely symbolic. It will be necessary to discuss the remedial 
aspects of the person concept in public employee cases. 
In Monroe v. Pape,455 the Supreme Court decided that a 
city is not a "person" within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act, 
at least in a suit for damages. But many suits have been 
brought in equity under the Civil Rights Act to desegregate 
schools. Many of these suits were originally brought against the 
school districts as entities. In some, individuals were added as 
defendants.456 The Fifth Circuit considered and resolved sev-
eral procedural issues in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent 
School District.451 Ten black former teachers sued, charging 
that their discharges were racially motivated. The suit was 
brought against the board and the superintendent under the 
451 Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 
1973); Bottcher v. Florida Dep't of Ag. & Cons. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1123, 1132 (N.D. 
Fla. 1973). 
452 Norlander v. Schleck, 345 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 1973). 
'" 412 u.s. 507 (1973). 
454 411 u.s. 693 (1973). 
4 
.. 365 u.s. 167, 188-92 (1961). 
"' See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), 
aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). 
m 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1970)(The most recent 
decision in Harkless, rendered in light of Kenosha, is reported at 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. 
Tex. 1975). See also McLaurin v. Columbia Mun. Separate School Dist., 478 F.2d 348, 
353-54 (5th Cir.), en bane panel dissolved, 486 F.2d 1049 (1973); McFerrien v. County 
Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Smith v. 
Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8 (4th Cir. 1966); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 
390 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
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Civil Rights Act. The district judge granted defendants' motion 
for a jury trial on the back pay issue. When jurors expressed 
unwillingness to hold the officials individually, plaintiffs dis-
missed the defendants as individuals. The trial proceeded 
against the school district as an entity as well as the trustees 
and superintendent in Hrepresentative capacities." Mter a jury 
finding that the discharges were in good faith and not racially 
motivated, the district court granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
On plaintiffs' appeal, the court of appeals resolved 
Monroe's impact on the jury trial question. First, the court read 
Monroe as limited to damage cases and held that the school 
district was "included within the meaning of 'person' in § 1983 
for the equitable relief sought. " 458 Second, the court held that 
the trustees and the superintendent were proper Civil Rights 
Act "persons" in both representative and individual capacities 
"for the purposes of the equitable relief sought here. "459 Finally, 
the court held that the defendants had no right to a jury trial 
on back pay and other factual issues because "the prayer for 
back pay is not a claim for damages, but is an integral part of 
the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement."460 Several 
•
58 Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 991 (1970). Accord, Courtney v. School Dist. No.1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D. Wyo. 
1974). But see Pelisek v. Trevor State Granded School Dist. No.7, 371 F. Supp. 1064 
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 806-
07 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (school district not a person). 
m Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 u.s. 991 (1970) . 
.so Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 991 (1970). See also Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist., 376 F. Supp. 
780 (M.D. Ala. 1974) where the jury was allowed to determine the issues as to the 
lawfulness of the termination, entitlement to reinstatement, and special damages. The 
question of back pay was decided by the judge independently. The jury trial issue has 
been treated recently in three excellent notes and an article which come to differing 
conclusions. See McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 66-70 (1974) (historical analogy: 
Harkless approved); Note, Monetary Claims Under Section 1983: The Right to Trial 
by Jury, 8 HARv. CIV. RraHTS-CIV. Lm. L. REv. 613 (1973) (favoring a result similar to 
Harkless); Note, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift 
in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv., 503 (1973) (favoring a jury trial in all "damage" 
cases); Note, Congressional Provisions for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amend-
ment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973) (no right to jury trial in some statutory civil rights action 
cases). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court held that either party to a 
fair housing act suit could demand a jury trial but specifically declined to pass on 
the problem disc)lssed here. Id. Some government employee termination cases are 
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speculative conclusions may be inferred from Harkless. If, 
under Harkless, the defendants in a wrongful discharge case 
are sued in their representative or official capacities along with 
the entity, it appears that the school district is responsible for 
the back pay rather than the individuals. 461 Also, under 
Harkless, the back pay award is equitable and appears to fol-
low a finding of wrongful discharge. The immunities which can 
be interposed to insulate individual defendants from damages 
are irrelevant to back pay. Immunity, then, only protects de-
fendants when either general or special damages are asked in 
addition to back pay. 
Moor and Bruno taken together destroy Harkless' founda-
tion, the idea that a school district is a Civil Rights Act "per-
son." Moor held that a county is an improper Civil Rights Act 
defendant in a suit for damages.462 Bruno held that a city is an 
improper Civil Rights Act defendant in a suit asking an injunc-
tion. 463 Both are grounded upon the word "person" in the act 
and the relevant legislative history. Thus, a federal district 
court appears to lack Civil Rights Act jurisdiction over a school 
district defendant. 464 
Bruno's full remedial impact on school desegregation cases 
remains to be considered. 465 Are the federal courts abandoning 
tried to juries. See, e.g., Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 
(E.D. Tenn. 1972) (ruling on defendant's post trial motions). See generally F. JAMES, 
CML PRoCEDURE §§ 8.1-.11 (1965). 
m Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1973) (instructive but not con-
clusive on this point). But see Courtney v. School Dist. No. 1, 371 F. Supp. 401 (D. 
Wyo. 1974) where the court stated that "the board may be vicariously liable for the 
actions of its agents." Id. at 404 . 
.., 411 u.s. 693, 698-710 (1973) . 
... 412 u.s. 507, 509-11 (1973). 
"' Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975); Harkless v. 
Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Lopez v. Williams, 372 
F. Supp. 1279, 1294-95 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1974); Vanderzanden v. 
Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Ore. 1973); Contra, Johnson v. 
Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974) (correctional institution immune from 
suit). See also Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1017 n.2 
(4th Cir. 1974) (state board of education is not a person); Taliaferro v. State Council 
of Higher Educ., 372 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (E.D. Va. 1974) (state council is not a person). 
In Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx. L. REv. 703 at 720-21 
(1974) he suggests that § 1983 be amended to allow suits against a local government 
for damages arising from deliberate torts by local officers. Professor Davis asserts that 
the present system is "almost completely ineffective as a deterrent . . . because the 
chances that an officer will have to pay a judgement ... are too remote." ld. at 721. 
415 For an analysis of the impact of Bruno on Harkless see Cason v. City of Jack-
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their historic effort to desegregate schools? Recently, the Fifth 
Circuit remanded a teacher's appeal in a case against a school 
district and other defendants in their official capacities: the 
district court was instructed to consider the jurisdictional ques-
tion "in the light of City of Kenosha v. Bruno. " 466 In another 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not state 
a claim against a municipality and remanded for the district 
court to consider whether injunctive relief requiring affirmative 
action by municipal officials was proper "in light of 
Kenosha."467 The Fourth Circuit has also expressed, by a per 
curiam opinion, that it does not consider a school board to be 
a "person;" in so doing it followed Bruno and remanded an 
award granted against a school board. 468 
Despite the seeming import of these decisions it must be 
remembered that fifteen days after Bruno the Supreme Court 
decided Keynes v. School District No. 1.469 This was another 
Civil Rights Act case involving a governmental defendant, in 
which the Court discussed equitable relief at length without 
mentioning the jurisdictional bar in Bruno.410 Moreover, unless 
Ex Parte Young471 is overruled, a federal court's jurisdiction to 
enjoin a state official from interfering with a federal right con-
tinues unimpaired. This will prevent teachers from being re-
mitted to less sympathetic state forums and will allow the 
courts to order reinstatement. 
sonville, 497 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1974) (injunction against city to enjoin the city from 
allowing admittedly white racist organization from renting civic auditorium for meet-
ing vacated because city is not a "person"); Thompson v. Madison County Bd. of 
Educ., 496 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974) (remanded for argument and briefs regarding 
availability of back pay award from board of education); Howell v. Winn Parish School 
Bd., 379 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1974) (school board is not a "person" as contemplated 
by Civil Rights Act); Thomas v. Ward, 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (Bruna 
denies award of damages against school board). 
m Campbell v. Masur, 486 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1973). The issue was resolved 
in Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975). 
417 Jenkins v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1974). 
'" Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974) . 
... 413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
m This argument was considered and rejected in Adkins v. Duval County School 
Bd., 511 F.2d 690, 694-95 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 
(1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Moore v. Knowles, 
482 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1973) (post-Kerwsha case seemingly holding that the 
school board as a corporate body was an indispensable party). 
m 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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If, however, the "person" requirement does prevent 
actions against the employing governmental bodies, and if, as 
Harkless held, the equitable remedy of reinstatement includes 
back pay, the court can still extend full relief in three ways. 
First, the court can manipulate the fiction of suing individual 
defendants in their official capacities. This serves the symbol-
ism of Young and Kenosha, yet allows the defendants to be 
named in their official or representative capacities. Then, fol-
lowing the inference from Harkless, the immunity is avoided 
and the entity may be liable for back pay awards.472 If, however, 
Kenosha repudiates Harkless, this fiction may be too much to 
bear. Thus, the back pay award may be remedially severed 
from reinstatement in Civil Rights Act cases.473 
The second alternative for the wrongfully discharged pub-
lic employee is to sue under the 1972 amendments to Title Vll 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.474 If the local governmental em-
ployer is guilty of "an unlawful employment practice" after 
March 24, 1972, the court may order the employee reinstated 
with back pay.475 Unlawful employment practices are defined 
as hiring or discharge decisions based on race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin.476 Unfortunately, a discharge which de-
nies due process is neither an unfair employment practice nor 
a basis for reinstatement and back pay. The statute is explicit: 
"no order . . . shall require . . . reinstatement . . . or back 
pay, if such individual was ... discharged for any reason other 
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or 
m Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Idaho 1974). But cf. Williams v. 
Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 429 (lOth Cir. 1971) (money damages interdicted because defen· 
dants sued in individual capacity and action "in essence" to recover from the state 
which is immune); Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 747 (S.D. 
Tex. 1975); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Del. 1974)(same); 
O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Del. 1973)(same). , 
.,. Cf. "We do not read Ex Parte Young .•. to indicate that any form of relief 
may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely it may in practice 
resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so long as the relief may 
be labeled 'equitable' in nature." Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Nunn v. 
City of Paducah, 367 F. Supp. 957 (W.D. Ky. 1973). 
m 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1974). 
415 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·5(g) (1974). See also United States v. Chesterfield County 
School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 
(4th Cir. 1973); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board ofEduc., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971). 
471 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1974). 
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national origin . . . "477 Thus a public employee who is dis-
charged without due process has no remedy against the entity 
unless the substantive reasons are interdicted by Title VTI 
standards.478 While it might have been hoped that a teacher's 
right to due process would not be less prominent under Title 
VTI than under the Civil Rights Act, 479 the contrary appears to 
be true. 
The third answer to the absence of Civil Rights Act juris-
diction over the entity is to ask for damages from the individual 
official. 480 In the damage part of the case, plaintiff merely sties 
the person who caused the discharge in his individual capacity. 
Plaintiff can additionally ask for an injunction to bind those 
currently in positions of authority. 481 
Suing the defendant individually for damages has advan-
tages. If officials are individually responsible, wrongful dis-
charges may occur less frequently. The individuals would likely 
be less willing to act unless they were positive their course was 
correct, and irresponsible behavior would be deterred. Suing 
individuals directly, however, entails difficulties. On one hand, 
an individual defendant may be charged damages for simply 
carrying out a governmental poljcy.482 On the other, a wrong-
fully discharged employee may be deprived of recovery because 
an official is insolvent or deceased.483 In addition, if the individ-
uals are sued for damages, a major remedial difficulty arises 
from personal immunity.484 There are two personal immunities, 
m 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(g) (1974). 
478 But cf. Ward v. Kentucky State Univ. Bd. of Regents, 360 F. Supp.1179 (E.D. 
Ky. 1973). Plaintiff combined § 1983 and Title Vll, charging that his discharge violated 
due process and free speech as well as being racially motivated. Defendants moved to 
dismiss, asserting absence of color of law and lack of a constitutionally cognizable 
interest, and asking the court to abstain. The motion was denied. 
m Cf. United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 
1973). 
480 Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442, 449 (E.D. Va. 1975); Puckett v. Mobile 
City Comm'rs, 380 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1974)(Kenosha prevents suit against entity; 
Kenosha allows damage suit against individuals; damages granted against commis-
sioners in individual capacities). 
481 Less personal involvement is required to enjoin than to impose damages. See 
Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969). 
482 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExT § 26.03 (1972). 
483 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
4M Some courts use the capacity fiction to confuse sovereign and personal immuni-
ties as follows: If an official is sued in his "official" capacity, it is, in reality, a lawsuit 
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absolute and qualified. The type of activity performed by the 
defendant determines whether an immunity applies and, if so, 
whether it is absolute or qualified. Judges, it is clear, are enti-
tled to an absolute immunity while "lesser" officials must be 
contented with a qualified immunity.485 Immunities are avail-
able only in damage actions; even a judge can be enjoined.486 
In Civil Rights Act cases, the immunities have a procedural 
effect. If the defendant is entitled to an absolute or judicial 
immunity, the trial judge will grant defendant's pre-trial mo-
tion either to dismiss or for summary judgment.487 This results 
in the lawsuit being short-circuited before trial. In contrast, if 
the immunity is qualified, the plaintiff can allege enough to 
avoid a motion to dismiss488 and show a triable issue of fact to 
avoid summary judgment.489 In government employment cases, 
the courts uniformly protect legislative and administrative de-
fendants with a qualified immunity because these officials ex-
ercise judgment and discretion.490 Thus, a former employee who 
is asking damages can avoid pretrial dismissal and take his 
against the state and therefore barred by sovereign immunity. Williams v. Eaton, 443 
F.2d 422, 429 (lOth Cir. 1971); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. 
Del. 1974); O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D. Del. 1973). This approach 
reveals a profound conservatism about awarding damages, a touching faith in the 
reality of fictional concepts and an inveterate belief in the propriety of established 
authority. It is well illustrated in Judge Barnette's separate opinion in Smith v. Losee, 
485 F.2d 334, 345-51 (lOth Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (concurring and 
dissenting). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed sovereign immunity. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But this approach was categorically rejected in Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The problem is discussed in Part I. 
us Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-58 (1967). In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 
(1974) the qualified immunities were described as follows: "in varying scope, a quali-
fied immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the 
variation dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and 
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which 
liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief 
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief 
that affords basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the 
course of official conduct." See also Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975). 
4
" See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1971). 
m See, e.g., Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). 
"" See, e.g., Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973). 
"' See, e.g., Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831-34 (D. Nev. 
1973). 
410 See, e.g., Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Anderson, 
370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974). 
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claim to the fact-finder.491 
It is more difficult to generalize about the effect of immun-
ities upon the doctrinal standard or the burden of proof or 
persuasion. The officials, it may safely be said, are not liable 
for damages if they act in good faith but are liable if they act 
in bad faith. 492 At this point, diversity arises. In the First Cir-
cuit, plaintiff must show that defendants subjectively intended 
to deprive him of a constitutional right, 493 yet the neighboring 
Second Circuit has hinted that it is enough for the defendant 
to participate in depriving plaintiff of a constituional right.494 
The Seventh Circuit apparently equates liability with lack of 
immunity: if the defendants prove that plaintiff was properly 
discharged, they are immune, but if the discharge was unjusti-
fiable, defendants are not immune.495 The Tenth Circuit seem-
ingly requires something less than malice, recently holding that 
while board members who participate without wrongful intent 
are immune, a finding that administrators were malicious is 
ample to overcome whatever immunity existed.496 On the other 
hand, a district court in Oregon said that breach of constitu-
tional rights overcomes a board member's immunity but that 
the administrator could not be liable because he had no statu-
tory power to hire and fire. 497 The Eighth Circuit specifically 
rejected specific intent-malice as compensatory damage 
thresholds for school officials' qualified immunity and held the 
good faith test to be objective.498 
"' See, e.g., Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1972). 
m Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232 (1974); Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 
1972). 
483 Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248, 1251 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Nelson v. Knox, 
256 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1958); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 92 
(D. Del. 1974). 
m Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971) (prison case). 
m McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Vanderzan-
den v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 72 (D. Ore. 1973) ("if plaintiff's 
right to freedom of speech was violated it would justify a monetary award."). But cf. 
"Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity ... is a recognition that they 
may err." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
'" Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 343-44 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
908 (1974). See also Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 882 (lOth Cir. 1974). 
m Vanderzanden v. Lowell School Dist. No. 71, 369 F. Supp. 67, 72, 75 (D. Ore. 
1973). But see McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1974). 
m Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded 
sub. nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). 
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In Wood v. Strickland,499 the Supreme Court clarified a 
school board member's immunity. While the opinion dealt with 
expelling students rather than discharging teachers, it proba-
bly states the general ambit of the board member's immunity. 
Steering carefully between strict liability and subjective in-
tent, the Court held: 
that a school board member is not immune from liability for 
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have 
known that the (official) action ... would violate the consti-
tutional right of the student affected, or if he took the action 
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights or other injury to the student. 500 
This retains the good faith standard and contains elements of 
both objective and subjective. 501 
It is nearly impossible to reconcile the citizen's interest in 
his constitutional freedom with the court's desire to avoid cur-
tailing legitimate exercises of governmental power. But the 
courts seek a word formula to focus judgment upon the critical 
issues, and the immunity concept is the best analytical tool the 
courts have. The malice-intent-good faith spectrum is, none-
theless, ambiguous and pliable.502 One very unfortunate, yet 
inevitable, result of courts' development of doctrine is that it 
tends to petrify the law and prevent the courts from coming to 
grips with the facts of the individual case and the social envi-
ronment.503 In the public employee discharge cases, qualified 
immunity established a different standard for equitable relief 
.(reinstatement) than for legal relief (back pay). Thus, if an 
official discharges an employee unconstitutionally but in good 
faith, the employee can be reinstated but denied back pay.504 
m 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). 
500 Id. at 1001. 
501 Id . 
.. z L. GREEN, LITIGATION PRocESs IN ToRT LAw 63 (1965). 
503 Id. at 128-40. 
504 Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. School Dist., 388 F. Supp. 738, 747-48 (S.D. Tex. 
1975); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D. Del. 1974); Nebraska Dep't 
of Roads Employees Ass'n v. Department of Roads, 364 F. Supp. 251, 258 (D. Nev. 
1973) (procedure ostensibly legal); See also Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12 (S.D. 
Me. 1970). But see Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School Dist., 490 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), rev'g 
376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1974). There the district court granted back pay but 
refused reinstatement. The court of appeals reversed, saying that refusal to reinstate 
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Because the employee is deprived of the governmental entity 
as a defendant, and because the officials are insulated by quali-
fied immunity, a wrongfully discharged employee receives less 
than a full remedy. If constitutional rights are to be protected 
from illegal incursions, adequate remedies must be available. 
Reinstatement without back pay is inadequate to deter the 
callous and recalcitrant. In Smith v. Losee, Judge Doyle advo-
cated an objective standard to determine whether the officials 
acted reasonably.505 Because the citizen interests are both cru-
cial and fragile, Judge Doyle's standard is commendable. His 
test seems also to protect official discretion for it allows the fact 
finder fully to evaluate official conduct from the viewpoint of 
an outside observer. 
In addition to legal barriers to remedy, a discharged em-
ployee faces imposing proof barriers. When the case comes to 
trial, the authorities have spoken; and it is customary and 
convenient to believe them. The employee has, 1n all probabil-
ity, been a dissenter; and troublemakers inevitably collect ene-
mies. The fact finder must unravel a complex factual environ-
ment and deal with relationships and motives over an extended 
period of time.506 Moreover, the authorities are often canny, 
secretive, and skilled in bureaucratic maneuver. This often re-
sults in facts being concealed or de-emphasized, and motives 
being dissembled. There is often an ambience of arbitrariness, 
nondisclosure, secret meetings, ostensible reasons, catch-all 
euphemisms, blanket conclusions and lies. 507 If this veil is to be 
because it would only revive antagonisms is improper. Apparently, the court ruled that 
if one's rights have been violated, he is entitled to a full remedy: back pay and reinstat-
ment. Lyman v. Swartley, 385 F.2d 661 (D. Idaho 1974) (back pay and reinstatement 
because discharge wrongful; money damages from individuals denied because dis-
charge in good faith); Soni v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) 
(back pay from date of termination granted). 
505 Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 352 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 
(1974). See also Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975) . 
... Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (lOth Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); 
Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1974); Adamian v. University 
of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825 (D. Nev. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Phila-
delphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Starsky v. Williams, 353 
F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded, 512 F.2d 109 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
507 Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); 
Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
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pierced, a sensitive fact finder is vital. 
Due process decisions are remedial in the short run and 
preventative in the long run. The affected bodies must have 
some incentive to begin procedures which will open the deci-
sion-making process. Advance notice, hearing both sides, an 
opportunity to confront accusers and informers, and a decision 
on the record are central to a democratic decision-making pro-
cess. These simple procedures advance the official body's 
legitimacy and efficiency. In Board of Regents v. Roth, Justice 
Marshall noted that "a requirement of procedural regularity at 
least renders arbitrary action more difficult" and that "proper 
procedures will surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that 
results not from malice, but from innocent error."508 Moreover, 
when embarrassing and institutional issues are discussed 
openly, the public interest is advanced. The obvious conclusion 
is that due process is in the best interest of both the public and 
the employer. But arbitrary power will not be surrendered 
without a struggle. To insure future compliance, remedial deci-
sions in a particular case must consider both the specific defen-
dant and other potential defendants. A damage verdict may 
encourage the authorities to comply. 
The employee's interest presents additional reasons to 
consider a remedial decision's admonitory effect. Careers have 
been ruined by illegal, malicious or dishonest official miscon-
duct. In addition, an illegal firing may cause the employee to 
suffer extreme emotional and financial hardship.509 The em-
ployee must also bear the uncertainty and delay inherent in the 
litigation process. Obviously a hearing, reinstatement and a 
damage award cannot unring the bell;510 the real goal should be 
to prevent similar misconduct. There is a growing body of case 
law which affirms the principles of due process by affording 
true remedial effect to denials of due process. As noted above 
when faced with unconstitutional discharges, many courts 
501 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (dissenting opinion). See also 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 160 (1974) (Justice Marshall dissenting) . 
.., See Harris, A Scrap of Black Cloth, NEw YoRKER, June 17, 1974, at 37; June 
24, 1974, at 37, discussing the case apparently reported as James v. Board of Educ., 
385 F. Supp. 209 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Long, A Reporter at Large: Love of Country, NEW 
YoRKER, July 30, 1973, at 35. 
511 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
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have ordered the authorities to. reinstate the employee with 
back pay.5" 
The remedial arsenal in due process cases also includes 
recovery for emotional and mental distress512 as well as out-of-
pocket loss513 and punitive damages.514 If incurred, damages for 
expenses such as job searches and moving expenses should be 
allowed. Plaintiffs, however, often fail to sue on available pen-
dent causes of action for defamation515 or do not prove impalpa-
ble damages satisfactorily.516 Because attorney's fees are an 
imposing burden for an individual who is only awarded the 
income he should have received, the courts should award attor-
ney's fees more frequently than they do.517 When there are ac-
511 Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State 
Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1973); Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 
(9th Cir. 1973); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 326 (4th Cir. 1973); Vega v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 385 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226 
(D.P.R. 1974); Young v. Hutchins, 383 F. Supp. 1167 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Sigmon v. Poe, 
381 F. Supp. 387 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Dahleuger v. Town Bd., 381 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. 
Wis. 1974); Parker v. Letson, 380 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Kingv. Conservatorio 
de Muscia, 378 F. Supp. 746 (D.P.R. 1974); Wagner v. Little Rock School Dist., 373 
F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp.l39, 150 (W.D. Ky.l973); 
Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Black v. Rizzo, 360 F. Supp. 
648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. 
Pa. 1973); Adamian v. University of Nevada, 359 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Nev. 1973); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 
511 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Snead v. Dep't of Social Servs., 355 F. Supp. 764, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973), uacated, 416 U.S. 977 (1974), reaffirmed, 389 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 
Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 928 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, reu'd in part, 
remanded, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 
344 F. Supp. 791, 805 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Poschman v. Dumke, 107 Cal. Rptr. 596, 604 
(Ct. App. 1973). 
512 See Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970). 
513 See Dause v. Bates, 369 F. Supp. 139, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1973). 
514 See Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
908 (1974); Wall v. Stanly County Bd. ofEduc., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967). Cf. Lee 
v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970). For a collection of 
cases, see Annot., Punitiue Damages for Violations of Federal Ciuil Rights Acts, 14 
A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1973). 
515 See, e.g., Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (lOth Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
908 (1974) (no suit for defamation). 
510 See, e.g., Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist. No. 28, 489 F.2d 608, 612-13 (8th 
Cir. 1974); Wright v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist., 376 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Ala. 1974) 
(reinstatement ordered but not entitled to back pay; failure to discharge burden of 
proof of lost income); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 
806 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (loss of reputation, mental pain and anguish not proved). 
517 See, e.g., Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487F.2d 153, 157 (8th 
Cir. 1973); Gonzalez v. Gonsalez, 385 F. Supp. 1226, 1241-44 (D.P.R. 1974); James v. 
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tuallosses, the court must do more than admonish the authori-
ties to "go forth and sin no more." 
D. Deprivation of Liberty 
Under liberty two types of cases will be considered. First, 
ex parte mental health commitments will be analyzed under 
new and traditional due process. The cases fall into the same 
groups as the property and employment cases, some failing to 
recognize due process, others finding denials of due process but 
refusing to provide remedy and, finally, cases grappling with 
the remedial implications of a denial of due process. Mter the 
mental health cases, the discussion will turn to procedurally 
defective prison discipline and will discuss only remedial prob-
lems. In both mental health and prison cases, liberty is re-
stricted by the official action denying due process. Also, the 
legal and remedial theories are similar. Moreover, in both men-
tal health and prison cases there are two major hurdles in the 
path of remedy. They are the plaintiff's custodial status and 
the courts' apparent desire to protect official discretion through 
immunity doctrines. 
1. Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill 
Due process in mental health commitments has an almost 
circular history.518 Earlier in American history there were rela-
tively few commitments. When institutions became fashiona-
ble, strict procedural safeguards were written into the statutes; 
and several state courts applied a rigorous due process analy-
sis.519 Notice and a right to be heard, it was held, were impera-
tive before a person could b.e deprived of his liberty. The opera-
tive fact of insanity had to be established before liberty was 
breached. Contrary arguments, the courts held, assumed the 
"insanity" conclusion which the judicial inquiry was designed 
Board ofEduc., 385 F. Supp. 211, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Klein v. New Castle County, 
370 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D. Del. 1974); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 664 (N.D. Tex. 
1973); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 807 (N.D. Iowa 
1972). 
m For an exhaustive work on involuntary commitment, see Developments, Civil 
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190 (1974). 
511 See, e.g., In re Lambert, 66 P. 851 (Cal. 1901); Allgor v. New Jersey State 
Hosp., 84 A. 711 (N.J. Eq. 1912); Ex Parte Allen, 73 A. 1078 (Vt. 1909). 
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to develop.520 
Due process protections then receded. Three possible rea-
sons for this development can be discerned. First, courts and 
legislatures began to defer to medical discretion. Second, in the 
early 20th century, the parens partriae doctrine enchanced 
state power to "help" the unfortunate. Finally, Supreme Court 
rulings eroded the earlier cases' due process foundation.521 
While a few states retained strict standards, 522 the trend was 
decidedly away from the earlier posture,523 as noted by the Su-
preme Court in 1972, when it expressed surprise at the small 
amount of litigation in this area.524 But, by that year, the tide 
was reversed. Medical expertise is no longer greeted with uni-
form approbation, and parens patriae, as a touchstone of state 
power to "help" the individual, is on the decline.525 The Su-
preme Court began to construe due process in a variety of situa-
tions. Mental hospitals now face lawsuits based on numerous 
theories. 526 
Under the present state of mental health due process, peo-
ple who present a danger to themselves or others may be com-
mitted immediately. Due process, it has often been said, only 
mandates a hearing before indeterminate commitment. This 
hearing may be held some time after the initial commitment.527 
Phillips v. Giles,528 a recent Alabama case, is typical. The peti-
520 In re Lambert, 66 P. 851, 854 (Cal. 1901). 
m See, e.g., Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U.S. 455 (1917); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 
427 (1901). 
522 See, e.g., Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964). 
523 See, e.g., In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Whittington v. John-
son, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1953). 
m Jackson v. Indiana, 405 U.S. 715, 736-39 (1972). 
523 See, e.g. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975); Inre Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); Winters v. Miller,' 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 
325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971). 
528 See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (right to treat-
ment: false imprisonment); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (state must 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt); Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. 
Minn. 1974) (due process requires that realistic opportunity to be cured or improve 
mental condition accompany involuntary commitment); Wyatt v. Adubolt, 503 F.2d 
1305 (1974) (right to adequate treatment). Editor's note. In O'Conner v. Donaldson, 
43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975), the Supreme Court held that the state could 
not confine without treatment a person who is neither dangerous to himself nor others. 
on See, e.g., Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970). 
528 252 So. 2d 624 (Ala. 1971). Alabama's commitment statute was construed to 
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tioner, who had been in jail in Montgomery, was comitted to 
the Veterans Administration Hospital in Tuskeegee. The com-
mitment order recited that three witnesses had been examined 
under oath by Judge Hooper. In fact, however, there was nei-
ther notice to the petitioner nor any formal commitment hear-
ing. The order was signed by the chief clerk of the County 
Probate Court. The commitment was based on affidavits of the 
witnesses. The petitioner knew nothing about the commitment 
until he arrived at the hospital where he was placed in maxi-
mum security. The action was initiated by his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus; the circuit court denied the petition and 
he appealed. The appeal presented a single due process issue: 
was the commitment order "void because it was made without 
prior notice to him and without giving him a hearing prior to 
commitment and an opportunity to defend at a prior hear-
ing."529 The court held that the commitment did not deny due 
process. The confined individual, the court said, "has the im-
mediate right to test the legality of his detention in a habeas 
corpus proceeding."530 In that proceeding, the petitioner is enti-
tled to a jury trial in which the burden of proof on the issue of 
sanity is placed upon the authorities.531 
The propriety of "confinement first, hearing later" is now 
seriously in question. Emergency commitments without notice 
and a hearing appear to be infirm under the new due process 
cases. First of all, the requisite citizen interest in his liberty 
cannot be seriously contested.532 One who is confined in a men-
tal hospital is, perforce, restrained bodily. He may be subject 
to drugging, electroshock, isolation and demeaning treatment. 
conform to Lessard in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 578 (D. Ala. 1974). See also Logan 
v. Arfeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (D. Conn. 1972) (emergency commitment without 
notice and hearing did not violate due process because judicial review available before 
order becomes final). 
•:zt Phillips v. Giles, 252 So. 2d 624, 628 (Ala. 1971) (petitioner's sanity was alleged 
but, according to the majority, not tried). 
530 I d. at 629. 
531 !d. at 629-30. Four justices concurred specially finding that the sanity issue had 
been tried and found adversely to petitioner. 
m Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975). Editor's note. While affirming the 
liberty interest in mental health commitments, the Supreme Court said, "We need not 
decide ... by what procedures •.. a mentally ill person may be confined .... " 43 
U.S.L.W. at 4933. 
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A mental health "record" is also a stigma and may include a 
loss of civil rights.533 If a constitutionally cognizable interest is 
present and there is not an "emergency," the interest cannot 
be impaired without due process, that is, before notice and a 
hearing. 534 
Emergency mental health commitments cannot be justi-
fied by asserting that because review is available soon after the 
commitment, the subject is merely deprived of liberty tempo-
rarily. First, "temporary" commitments may not be very tem-
porary, some lasting as long as six months.535 Second, there is 
no "temporary" exception to due process when one is deprived 
of other protected interests. If a property interest is taken, the 
hearing must precede the taking: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10 day or 50 day 
deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property is 
within the purview of the Due Process Clause."536 To illustrate 
the Supreme Court's emphasis, in Division N of Fuentes, the 
Court uses the word "before" four times; it is italicized three 
of those times. 537 The Court finally held "if the right to notice 
and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then it is clear that it 
must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be 
prevented."538 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court said, "[T]his 
Court has not . . . embraced the general proposition that a 
wrong may be done if it can be undone. "539 
Nor may ex parte commitments be defended by arguing 
that notice and hearing are unnecessary because commitment 
is therapeutic and for the subject's own good. In a democracy, 
the choice between freedom and confinement is the indivi-
daul's, not the state's.540 Thus, courts have disavowed parens 
533 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), uacated and 
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 
1973). 
533 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) . 
.., Roth, Daley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency 
Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 400, 414-15 (1973). 
533 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). But cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 
416 U.S. 600 (1974) (where property secured and interests dual, taking may precede 
notice); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (semble). 
531 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-83 (1972). 
538 Id. at 81, 96-97; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Har-
lan, J., concurring). 
53
' Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). 
51° Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). "[U]nder our free enterprise 
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patriae as a state interest, 541 the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals stating recently that parens patriae as an interest 
"largely dissolves upon closer inspection."542 Asserting a thera-
peutic purpose assumes two conclusions: that there is a need 
for therapy and that the state can decide without assistance. 
Finally, even assuming a benign purpose, the need for notice 
and a hearing is not obviated. Due process, the Court said in 
Stanley v. Illinois, was "designed to protect the fragile values 
of a vulnerable citizenry from overbearing concern for effi-
ciency and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy gov-
ernment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre 
ones."543 
If ex parte mental health commitments are to be upheld 
at all, they must be upheld under the "extraordinary situa-
tions" or emergency exception. In Lessard v. Schmidt, the 
court allowed the authorities to detain a person without notice 
and hearing for two days if the "subject" threatens violence to 
himself or others. 544 In cases decided after Fuentes the emer-
gency exception is being clarified by requiring two things: a 
statute which defines emergency realistically and narrowly, 
and an emergency on the particular facts. 545 Many statutes are 
defective on the first point, simply not defining an 
emergency.546 Even if the statute is adequate, difficulty lurks 
in defining a factual emergency and maintaining state control 
over ex parte process. For, sd' long as an emergency can be 
found from one sided charges, there is a risk that private par-
ties may employ state power to settle private grievances. The 
emergency is the matter at issue. Unless there is an adversary 
proceeding, that issue is determined without hearing the one 
to be confined. The most rigorous standard may degenerate 
system, an individual's choices in the market-place are respected however unwise they 
may seem to someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due process 
rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices .... " Id. 
5u See cases cited supra note 525. 
m In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
5n Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
511 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. 
Ala. 1974) (7 days); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974) (5 days). 
515 See, e.g., Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
541 Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note 535, at 412-16. 
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into a meaningless conclusion. "The state," in the words of 
Justice Stewart, "acts largely in the dark."547 
Further doubts based on recent cases must be expressed. 
Is an important public or private interest advanced when the 
loser of a domestic squabble is hospitalized?548 If the subject is 
confined in jail, is there any need for swift action?549 When a 
commitment grows out of form affidavits and is approved by a 
clerk, does the state retain strict control over the procedure?550 
Thus, the emergency exception may justify some ex parte 
statutes and certain of the commitments, but many other ex 
parte commitments even under the proper statutes may still be 
unconstitutional. · 
Mental health commitments present a compelling case for 
due process. Both the legitimacy and the effectiveness func-
tions of due process operate. If therapy is to take place at all, 
the individual should feel that the committing process is legiti-
mate and rational. Chief Justice Cooley stated this cogently 
almost a century ago: 
An insane person does not necessarily lose his sense of justice, 
or of his right to the protection of the law; and when he is 
seized without warning, and without the hearing of those 
whom he might believe would testify in his behalf and deliv-
ered helpless into the hands of strangers, to be dealt with as 
they may decide within the limits of a large discretion, it is 
impossible that he should not feel keenly the seeming injus-
tice and lawlessness of the proceeding.551 
If involuntary commitments are untherapeutic, 552 commit-
ments both involuntary and ex parte are bereft of benefit to the 
person committed. If personal improvement is anticipated, it 
is difficult to conceive a process more self-defeating than gov-
ernment by ukase. 
:w7 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972); Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note 
535, at 424. 
513 See, e.g., Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (Cal.1961); Stowers 
v. Wologzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971). 
s.g Phillips v. Giles, 252 So.2d 624 (Ala. 1971). 
$50 ld. 
551 VanDeusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 130 (1879). 
55z S. HALLECK, THE POLlTICS OF THERAPY 205 (1971); Developments, Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv 1190, 1220 n.100 (1974) cites several authori-
ties for the proposition that involuntary patients are less likely to benefit from treat-
ment. 
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The other value advanced by due process is accuracy or 
efficiency. When the standards are vague and conclusory, the 
decision-maker should consider all available information. If 
the process is one-sided, the decision-maker may frequently 
be led into error by the malicious, over zealous or simply mis-
taken applicants seeking a certain result. "Experience teaches 
... that the affording of procedural safeguards, which by 
their nature serve to illuminate the underlying facts, in itself 
often operates to prevent erroneous decisions on the merits 
from occurring."553 Observers have noted that the commitment 
process is inveterately inaccurate, with a pronounced tendency 
to over-predict and to commit excessively.554 Adversary proce-
dure will not end unnecessary commitments, but it might re-
duce the frequency. 
In Lessard v. Schmidt555 a three judge federal court con-
tributed significantly to due process in mental health commit-
ments. Several important points in Lessard can be summa-
rized. The court held that involuntary confinement in a mental 
hospital is a "significant deprivation of liberty," and that no-
tice must be given with some kind of hearing conducted within 
48 hours. A full hearing must be held within 14 days. 556 Detailed 
notice is required; the subject must be informed of the legal 
standard, the reason for the hearing, the right to a jury trial 
and the names of all witnesses together with a summary of their 
anticipated testimony. At the hearing counsel is required, hear-
say is forbidden, the privilege against self-incrimination may 
be claimed, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt and less 
restrictive alternatives to commitment must be considered. 557 
Lessard breaks new procedural ground with the potential 
of affecting thousands of commitments. Though time must 
pass before the full impact can be determined, it is possible 
that the nation's mental hospitals could be held to be full of 
illegally detained people. Two matters must be noted. First, in 
w Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963). 
551 Roth, Daley & Lerner, supra note 535, at 428-33, 440. 
555 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 
(1974). See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne 
County Gen. Hosp., 314 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974). 
su Id. at 1103. 
551 See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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the abstract, to delay a hearing for two days after confinement 
appears to be inconsistent with Fuentes which requires a hear-
ing before interfering with a constitutionally cognizable inter-
est. In specific commitments under a properly drawn statute, 
the extraordinary situations exception may obviate notice. 
This apparent incongruity needs to be clarified. Second, on the 
defendants' appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the order in 
Lessard.558 After the district court opinion, judgment was or-
dered "in accordance with the opinion heretofore entered." 
Thus, except for the opinion, no injunctive order existed. On 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, the Supreme Court 
observed that the opinion merely told the defendants "not to 
enforce 'the present Wisconsin Scheme' " and held th~t the 
order must be vacated and the cause remanded because Rule 
65(d) which requires specific terms in an injunction was not 
satisfied: "in the absence of specific injunctive relief, informed 
and intelligent appellate relief is greatly complicated, if not 
made impossible."559 The district court later issued another 
order.560 
Lessard and the foregoing analysis provide a sufficient 
basis to discuss remedy. The focus will be on release and dam-
ages. The Lessard court did hold that the plaintiff's commit-
ment was constitutionally invalid. No notice was served on the 
plaintiff before she was confined.561 Absent either notice and a 
hearing or a valid emergency, a mental health commitment is, 
it may be concluded, constitutionally defective. Under tradi-
tional due process, if no notice precedes adjudication, no juris-
diction over the person is secured. The proceeding is void even 
though the claim may be legitimate. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the 
Supreme Court said "the validity of every judgment depends 
upon the jurisdiction of the Court before it is rendered, not 
upon what may occur subsequently."562 Thus, when a person is 
confined without notice, traditional due process appears to 
.. s Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) . 
.. t Id. at 476-77. 
580 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
581 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). 
582 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877). See Justice Bloodworth concurring 
specially in Phillips v. Giles, 252 So. 2d 624, 630-31 (Ala. 1971); The case of the 
Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 686, 77 E.R. 1027 (1613) (subject matter jurisdiction). 
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compel immediate release.563 But Miss Lessard had been re-
leased earlier and the district court did not decide whether she 
was illegally confined. The court merely declared Miss Les-
sard's order "invalid" or "defective." 
Plaintiff Lessard also represented a class: "all persons 18 
years of age or older who are being held involuntarily pursuant 
to any emergency, temporary or permanent commitment provi-
sion of the Wisconsin involuntary mental commitment stat-
ute. "564 The court struck down the statute but did not require 
the authorities to release members of the plaintiff class; rather, 
ninety days were granted to the authorities to review proce-
dures and individual cases. To justify continued involuntary 
confinement, the authorities were compelled to hold "new 
hearings . . . in conformity with this opinion."565 The state was 
allowed the time because "a number of the patients are un-
doubtedly properly institutionalized, despite defective proce-
dures. " 566 
The idea that a proceeding which is not preceded by notice 
is void and ineffective has been disregarded in recent mental 
health commitment cases. The decisions do not annul the early 
commitments and command immediate release. Instead the 
courts allow the authorities to retain the person in custody and 
to commit under proper proceedings. This deprives due process 
of its full remedial thrust. It is difficult to distinguish cases 
voiding ex parte money judgements from ex parte mental 
health commitments. In both, the truth-seeking process is frus-
trated. Certainly liberty should be as fully protected as prop-
erty. Yet, in contrast to the traditional due process cases, the 
mental health cases afford some effect to a decision reached 
513 Allgor v. New Jersey State Hosp., 84 A. 711 (N.J. Eq. 1912) (immediate release 
ordered). See also Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (sexual 
psychopath statute unconstitutional; incarcerated members of plaintiff class ordered 
released). 
Ml Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and 
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). 
Ms I d. at 1104. See also, Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell 
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney 
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 973 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (60 days to discharge or recommit); Barry 
v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (five days to release or commence proper 
proceedings). 
Ma Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1104 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated and 
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). 
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without notice. If there has been no valid adjudication of men-
tal illness, it is difficult to understand why the person is not 
entitled to his liberty. 
Why are the courts unwilling to extend a full remedial 
effect when due process is denied in a mental health commit-
ment? First, tradition probably accounts for much of the reluc-
tance. Legal analogy is powerful. In prisoner habeas corpus 
cases, where a convict is illegally confined under an invalid 
conviction, courts do not order unconditional release. Instead, 
if the conviction is illegal, a conditional release is ordered. The 
authorities are given a period of time to release or retry.567 The 
prisoner cases, however, deal with procedural defects in the 
course of the proceedings, not with failure to give notice ~t all. 
In addition, prisoners, even unjustly convicted prisoners, seem 
to be both more dangerous and more likely to flee than people 
unconstituionally confined in mental institutions. 
Another reason may be mentioned. The courts in mental 
health cases afford the earlier illegal decision a credence which 
is not extended to an illegal money judgment because of the 
differences in the labeling process. A medical-legal label such 
as "mentally ill" or "insane" carries considerable stigma and 
causes the individual to be shunned as irrational and de-
viant.568 Such a label is easy to affix but hard to erase. Even 
former mental patients suffer serious social disabilities. For 
example, note Senator Eagleton's short-lived 1972 vice-
presidental campaign. In failing to order unconditional release, 
courts may reflect the social stigma which society attaches to 
the mentally ill. But the social stigma might well impel the 
courts in precisely the opposite direction. The label's serious-
ness should force the courts to scrutinize the process used to 
-attach it. If the committing proceeding was ex parte and one-
sided, the victim could be granted his liberty and the record of 
the illegal proceeding extirpated. If due process is to be mean-
ingful and liberty is to be protected, an adequate equitable 
remedy for unconstitutional mental health commitments is 
587 See, e.g., Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 123 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1001 (1968) (one year to retry). See also State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 204 
N.W.2d 13 (Wis. 1973) (incompetency to stand trial found unconstitutionally: 60 days 
to commit or release). 
m S. HALLEcK, supra note 552, at 111-20. 
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immediate release and expungement. 
Equitable remedies, however, fail to recompense for the 
time spent in illegal confinement. Thus, it is necessary to turn 
to false imprisonment and money damages. The interest in 
freedom from restraint upon movement is protected by the tort 
of false imprisonment.569 Confinements without legal authority 
are false imprisonments. Neither ill will nor spite is required; 
intent to confine is all that is necessary.570 One can conclude 
that an improper mental health commitment is a false impris-
onment.571 The tort can be shown by proving a confinement 
without proper procedure.572 False imprisonment is both a com-
mon law tort and a "constitutional tort": if the defendants 
acted under color of law to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional 
right, a false imprisonment is actionable under the Civil Rights 
Acts. 573 Detention in a mental hospital is a loss of liberty in the 
most fundamental sense. 574 Confinement without proper proce-
dure raises due process issues. If the decision-making process 
of the state is used, commitments are under "color of law." 
Thus, an improper mental health commitment may be a Civil 
Rights Act false imprisonment.575 
The false imprisonment tort, suprisingly, has not been a 
practical limit on questionable mental health commitments. 
The citizen interest is significant, and it appears that there are 
many unnecessary commitments.576 In the false imprisonment 
"' W. PRossER, LAw OF ToRTS § 11 (4th ed. 1971). 
571 Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1973). 
571 Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961); Stowers v. Wolodzko, 
191 N.W.2d 355, 363-64 (Mich. 1971); see cases collected in Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 523 
(1970). But see Maniaci v. Marquette Univ., 184 N.W.2d 168 (Wis. 1971) (not false 
imprisonment but may be abuse of process). See also Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 
(2d Cir. 1971) (battery); Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973) (malprac-
tice); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 455 (1970). These and other relevant torts such as malicious 
prosecution are beyond the scope of this article. 
m Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961). 
573 Anderson v. Nasser, 438 F.2d 183, 194 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en bane, 456 
F.2d 835 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972). 
574 In Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971), plaintiff was taken from 
her home by force without being allowed to use the telephone, placed for 6 days in a 
room bare except for a bed, forcibly injected with medication and told that if she tried 
to contact certain relatives, "you will never see your children again." See generally 
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and 
Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1151-68 (1972). 
575 Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973). 
571 Morris & Luby, Civil Commitment in a Suburban County: An Investigation 
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cases, plaintiffs have encountered the usual gamut of tort diffi-
culties, 577 from proximate cause578 to legal protection of medical 
discretion.579 Civil Rights Act cases have encountered two 
major difficulties. If state officials are defendants, judicial or 
prosecutorial immunity is a defense. If private citizens are de-
fendants, there is no color of law.580 Thus, there are only a few 
successful plaintiff's cases.581 
Charging a private person with common law false impris-
onment in a court of general jurisdiction presents only doc-
trinal problems. Consequently, the ensuing analysis will pass 
lightly over problems presented by ordinary tort law, concen-
trating instead on the problems encountered in suing official 
and private defendants in federal court under a constitutional 
tort-Civil Rights Act theory.582 With regard to the former, suf-
fice it to say that a person whose liberty is circumscribed by 
an unconstitutional proceeding has been falsely imprisoned. If 
an adequate defendant and a proper forum can be found, the 
victim may be entitled to damages. 
The local governmental body itself is the most obvious and 
solvent defendant in a mental commitment civil rights action, 
but in many states, recovery from a governmental defendant 
is barred by sovereign immunity.583 Moreover, under Moor v. 
by Law Students, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 518 (1973). 
577 Rawls v. Daughters of Charity, 491 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1974). 
018 Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973). 
518 Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1961); Belger v. Arnot, 183 
N.E.2d 866 (Mass. 1962). 
""' See Annot.16A.L.R. Fed. 440 (1973).Butcf. Delattev. Genovese, 273F. Supp. 
654 (E.D. La. 1967) (coroner not immune). 
581 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974) (ground-breaking case 
affirming a plaintiff's verdict for $38,500), vacated and remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 
(U.S. June 26, 1975); Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971) (plaintiff's 
verdict for $40,000 affirmed). 
582 The constitutional tort, the reader should bear in mind, is viewed within the 
framework oftraditonal tort liability. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Thus, 
while tort problems are ignored herein, they may be significant in a Civil Rights Act 
case. See, e.g., Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973) (no proximate cause). 
See generally, Note, Constitutional Torts: Section 1983 Redress for the Deprived 
Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627 (1973). 
583 Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del.1974); Fish v. Regents ofUniv. 
of Cal., 54 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Ct. App. 1966); W. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS 975-87 (4th ed. 
1971). State sovereign immunity is changing rapidly. The particular jurisdiction's 
statutory and decision law should be reviewed carefully. See Dennison v. New York, 
267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ($115,000 damages for erroneous commitment). 
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County of Alameda, 584 a local governmental body cannot be a 
Civil Rights Act defendant in a suit for damages because it is 
not a "person." Nor can § 1988 be used to add a state claim 
under a tort claim act. 585 Thus, a person who is wrongfully 
confined in a mental hospital cannot use the Civil Rights Act 
to sue a state or local government for damages, 586 but must 
choose persons as defendants. 
The person sued under the Civil Rights Act, however, must 
have acted under "color of law." The conduct of a private 
person is not actionable.587 Thus, Civil Rights Act cases against 
private physicians, 588 private hospitals589 and attorneys, 590 have 
been dismissed for lack of color of law. 591 Still, there are several 
ways to escape this difficulty. F.irst, private persons can be 
sued for the common law tort in a court of general jurisdic-
tion.592 Second, plaintiff may sue under§ 1985(3) charging that 
private persons conspired with public officials to deprive him 
of a constitutional right. 593 The conspiracy is difficult: specific 
facts as well as at least one overt act must be pleaded and 
$U 411 u.s. 693 (1973). 
w Id . 
... Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mich. 1973). 
m Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1973); C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL 
CML RIGHTS ACTS: CML PRA<:mCE § 36 (1971). 
w Bryne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1965), 
rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 914 (1965), motion to file for rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 994 
(1965); Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); Spampenato v. M. Burger & 
Co., 270 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 944, rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 973 
(1960); Whittington v. Johnson, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 
(1953) (persuasive dissent which anticipates Lessard v. Schmidt) . 
.. , Tennessee ex rel. Davis v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). 
410 Cooper v. Wilson, 309 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Kenney v. Hatfield, 132 F. 
Supp. 814 (W.D. Mich. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 
(1956). 
511 McCormack observes that the color of law cases may be better explained as 
turning on personal immunity. McCormack, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1974). 
51
' If a Civil Rights action is brought against public officials, pendent jurisdiction 
cannot be used to join the private defendants despite the "common nucleus of opera-
tive fact," C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS 65 (1970). If, however, all defendants are state 
officials, related state claims or theories may be joined to the Civil Rights Act claims. 
Anderson v. Nasser, 438 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en 
bane, 456 F.2d 835, cert. denied sub. nom Nosserv. Bradley, 409 U.S. 898 (1972); Whirl 
v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 793 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). 
513 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th 
Cir. 1972); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966); Curtis v. Peerless Ins. 
Co., 299 F. Supp. 429 (D. Minn. 1969). 
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proved.594 Third, color of law does not always require a state 
officer. If a private citizen "willfully" acts in "joint activity" 
with a state agent, color or law may be upheld.595 Finally, courts 
have found that private defendants who took advantage of a 
statutory procedure engaged in state action.596 The color of law 
concept is similar to, if not broader than, state action. 597 If color 
of law were found when private individuals unconstitutionally 
confine a plaintiff, one of the principle purposes of due process 
is advanced. A remedy is provided for a person who, without 
notice and a hearing, is the victim of private abuse of state 
power.59s 
The next group of potential defendants includes police, 
hospital officials and administrators. All these groups are pro-
tected by personal immunity, either qualified or absolute. The 
cases which deal with the immunities available to court person-
nel, hospital officials and police are in utter disarray. 599 All, 
stated generally, may be protected by a qualified immunity. 
Unless the plaintiff shows lack of good faith, members of these 
groups may be exonerated from responding in damages. Thus, 
a custodian acting under apparently legal regulations may be 
forgiven from false imprisonment liability even though the reg-
.,. See, e.g., Lucas v. Kale, 364 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (W.D. Va.1973); C. ANTIEAu, 
supra note 587, at§§ 105-06. 
••• Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Undergraduate Student 
Ass'n v. Peltason, 359 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. lll. 1973) (private person in concert with 
state officials). 
m See Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 
781 (1st Cir. 1971); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); rev'd, 502 F.2d 
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); MacQueen v. 
Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. 
Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 
(1973). But see cases holding "no state action" in § 9-503 self help repossessions: 
Greene v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of 
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (M.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank of Amer-
ica, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 295 A.2d 402 
(N.J. Super. 1972) . 
.., See Part I(b)(2) supra for a comparison of these concepts. 
••• Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-95 (1972) . 
• ,. See Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 
F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1972); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Joyce v. 
Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 
1973); Wade v. Bethesada Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Delatte v. Gen-
ovese, 273 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. La. 1967). See generally Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232 (1974). 
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ulations are later declared unconstitutional. 800 So also, consti-
tutional prescience is not exacted from a police officer. 801 
There is, however, contrary authority. In Johnson v. 
Greer, 602 the Fifth Circuit dealt with false imprisonment 
brought as a constitutional tort by a person who had been 
confined in a mental hospital. The defendant was the clinic 
administrator. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and 
the administrator appealed. The plainitff, the court held, 
"need not show malice or ill will": if he was actually deprived 
of a constitutional right by state action, "good intentions which 
do not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully 
required cannot justify false imprisonment. " 803 Johnson may be 
read several ways. First, it may merely reject parens patriae as 
a reason to confine. This is consistent with other recent author-
ity.804 Second, it may stand for a qualified privilege. If the 
defendant had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff is detained 
lawfully, the defendant need not respond in damages. Third, 
it may stand for absolute liability. If the plaintiff was illegally 
confined, false imprisonment is shown. There is Fifth Circuit 
authority for the proposition that absence of wrongful intent is 
not a defense to false imprisonment as a constitutional tort. 805 
The plaintiff, it can be argued, should be able to recover 
from a custodian if, at the time of confinement, the defendant 
could have known that the plaintiff was detained contrary to 
existing law.808 This places the burden of knowing the applica-
ble law on institutional custodians.807 Under this rule, it is im-
possible to feign ignorance of present law but unnecessary to 
100 See Clarke v. Cade, 358 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D. Wis. 1973). 
"'
1 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
112 477 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1973). 
112 Id. at 105. 
"'' See cases cited supra note 525. 
105 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975) (vacated and remanded to be recon-
sidered in light of qualified immunity); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 788 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969). Plaintiff was held in jail without legal authority. 
"Neither good faith nor non-negligence can exculpate" defendant. Id. at 790. A jury 
verdict for defendant was reversed and a directed verdict for plaintiff was ordered. I d. 
at 793 • 
..,. Cf. Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973). 
107 In Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975), the Court said "a school board 
member .•• must be held to a standard of conduct based . . . on knowledge of the 
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges." Id. at lQOQ.Ol. 
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anticipate future changes in the law.608 Directors of custodial 
institutions may be under a statutory obligation to be sure that 
commitments are in order. 609 Tort liability for damages merely 
extends a remedy to one who suffers when this duty is 
breached. Good faith is an appropriate defense for a policeman 
who must make split-second decisions. But "a jailer, unlike a 
policeman, acts at his leisure."610 Even so, to prevent remedy 
from being converted into revenge, if the confinement is illegal 
only in retrospect, the defendant is immune. Thus, the stan-
dard does not impose strict liability. 
This standard considers the illegal restraint imposed upon 
the plaintiff. "Good faith may clear the conscience, but it does 
not redeem or purge the act."611 In viewing the defendant's 
state of mind, the law should not ignore the plaintiff's loss of 
liberty and need for recompense. As Judge Goldberg wrote elo-
quently in Whirl v. Kern: 
Unfortunately non-malicious restraint is no sweeter than re-
straint evilly motivated, and we cannot sanction chains with-
out legal justification even if they be forged by the hands of 
an angel. Neither the sheriff's tears of regret nor explanations 
keyed the lock to unmanacle Whirl. Though we apply all the 
benign adjectives in our lexicon to Kern's watchman-
ship-these do not make Whirl a November to July free 
man.at2 
The suggested standard, which allows recovery from custodians 
if confinement was currently illegal, is preferable because it 
protects the interest in freedom from illegal restraint. 
Another possible defendant is the committing judge who, 
if the plaintiff is confined without due process, could possibly 
be sued in a Civil Rights Act case. Here the most imposing 
barrier to success is judicial immunity. Following Pierson v. 
Ray, a state or local judge acting within his jurisdiction is 
'
08 Again in Wood, the Court said "ignorance .•• of settled indisputable law, on 
the part of one entrusted with supervision ... [cannot justify] an act violating a 
student's constitutional rights." Id. at 1000. 
'
0
' See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 37.1-68 (Cum. Supp. 1973). 
010 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 
(1969). 
011 Id. at794. 
'
12 Id. at 794-95. 
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completely immune from damage claims.613 But, applying some 
of the reasoning previously developed, an effective argument 
for damages can be mounted. 
The immunity granted a judicial officer in exercise of his 
judicial function is intended to allow the judge to exercise that 
function without fear of lawsuits being brought by disap-
pointed litigants. To effectuate this freedom from lawsuits al-
leging malice or corruption, the judge's privilege in a suit seek-
ing damages is absolute. Ordinarily this allows a judge to end 
the litigation before it goes to trial;614 and allegations of corrup-
tion and malicious motive are not sufficient to defeat that 
immunity. But this pervasive immunity can lead to injustice. 
A judge can use the perquisites of his office to carry out a 
personal vendetta615 or can use the criminal arm of his court to 
advance his private debt collection business. 616 Oppressive and 
abusive conduct is an evil, but it is felt to be a lesser evil, with 
unredressed actual injustice being the price paid for judicial 
independence. 617 
Because immunity prevents recovery for an otherwise via-
ble cause of action, courts confer it reluctantly and apply it 
sparingly.618 Likewise, judicial immunity is limited to its proper 
purpose. A judge is not immune for his nonjudicial activities: 
113 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). But see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 
558-67 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) Gudge not immune for knowingly and willfully 
depriving plaintiff of constitutional right); Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745, 752-
53 (Iowa 1969) (Rawlings, J., dissenting) Gudge not immune for malicious or corrupt 
act). A judge who interferes with civil rights may, however, be enjoined. See, e.g., 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Littleton v. Berbing, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 
1972), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Doe 
v. Ceci, 384 F. Supp. 7, 9 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305, 310-
11 (D.R.I. 1973), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 819 (1975) (remanded with instruc-
tions to be dismissed as moot). Sutton v. County Ct., 353 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Wis. 
1973); Rosen v. North Carolina, 345 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D.N.C. 1972). See McCormack, 
60 VA. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1974). 
114 See, e.g., Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). "The privilege would 
be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and 
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of a pleader .... "Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 
564, 575 (1959) (plurality opinion), citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 
(1951). 
115 See the allegations in Boydstun v. Perry, 359 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Miss. 1973). 
111 Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745 (Iowa 1969). 
117 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1969) (plurality opinion). 
••• See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971), modified 
en bane, 456 F.2d 835 (1972); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970). 
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"A judge does not cease to be a judge when he undertakes to 
chair a PTA meeting, but, of course, he does not bring judicial 
immunity to that forum either."619 
In addition, judicial immunity arises only when the judge 
acts within his jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a chameleon word 
which has various meanings in different contexts. In judicial 
immunity, jurisdiction appears to mean conventional jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate, that is, jurisdiction over the subject matter 
of the action and the person of the defendant. Most of the 
reported opinions turn on jurisdiction over the subject matter: 
if the judge is deciding one of the general classes of cases within 
the constitutional and statutory capacity of his court, he will 
be absolutely immune from damage claims.620 If, on the other 
hand, an act is not authorized by statute or constitution, the 
judge is not shielded by immunity.621 Thus, if a person is com-
mitted to a mental hospital by an official who lacks authority 
to commit, the immunity barrier is avoided. 
Jurisdiction over the person is more appropriate for the 
present inquiry. It has been argued that, following traditional 
due process, unless a person receives notice before he is con-
fined in a mental hospital, there is no jurisdiction over his 
person. This procedural defect, it was asserted, voids the pro-
ceeding and compels immediate release. Does it also vitiate 
judicial immunity and render the committing judge amenable 
to damages? Many judicial immunity cases state that if the 
court had no jurisdiction over the person, a judge is not im-
mune, 622 but jurisdiction over the person has rarely been a con-
110 Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) (dicta). 
129 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th 
Cir. 1973); Boyer v. Wisconsin, 345 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Broom v. Douglas, 
57 So. 860 (Ala. 1912). 
121 See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lucarell v. 
McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972); Manning v. Ketcham, 58 .F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 
1932); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971), reconsideration 
denied, 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Joyce v. Hickey, 147 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 
1958); Hoppke v. Klapperick, 28 N.W.2d 780 (Minn. 1947), Annot., 173 A.L.R. 802, 
819. But see Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1972) (statute repealed: 
judge nevertheless immune). 
122 Ryan v. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 58 (lOth Cir. 1957); Thompson v. Herther, 235 
F.2d 176, 177 (6th Cir. 1956); Link v. Greyhound Corp., 288 F. Supp. 898, 899 (E.D. 
Mich. 1968); Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.W. Va. 1965); Williamson v. 
Waugh, 160 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.W. Va. 1958); Pierce v. Caldwell, 360 P.2d 992, 994 
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tested issue in recent judicial immunity cases. 623 There is, how-
ever, some precedent. In Duncan v. Brothers, 624 the judge tried 
plaintiff without notice, convicted him and ordered him im-
prisoned. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that no personal 
jurisdiction was obtained and judicial immunity was not avail-
able to shield the judge against plaintiff's suit for false impris-
onment. 
Should this reasoning apply to an ex parte mental health 
commitment? Such a commitment is likely to be both inaccur-
ate and untherapeutic. The person committed loses his liberty 
and is likely to be subjected to humiliating and degrading 
treatment. Personal possessions may be confiscated; he may be 
stripped, examined and reclothed in institutional garb; he may 
be denied normal amenities such as tobacco, water and tele-
phones; and his mind may be muddled by drugs administered 
against his will.625 Merely ordering the release of illegally com-
mitted persons may not deter future illegal confinements. Fur-
thermore, since the hospital authorities are immune from lia-
bility if acting pursuant to ostensibly legal commitment, it is 
clear the deterrent posed by the possible imposition of damages 
is totally absent if the judge is protected by immunity. Judges 
control the committing process, and if the judge relies on cur-
rently knowable law, he would be protected by a qualified 
immunity. But an ex parte commitment is seriously defective 
procedurally and has extreme consequences for the victim. The 
law should provide a meaningful remedy. Traditional due pro-
cess applied to judicial immunity is a doctrinal model to ac-
comodate these interests reasonably. 
2. Prison Due Process 
A workable frame of reference for prison discipline is the 
Landman litigation, which involves four reported cases result-
ing from Landman's controversies with Virginia prison ofii-
(Idaho 1961). But see Williams v. Sepe, 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). "The test for the 
abrogation of judicial immunity is a clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject 
matter." Id. at 914. 
•n Huendling v. Jensen, 168 N.W.2d 745, 749 (Iowa 1969). 
m 344 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961). See also Sukeforth v. Thegen, 256 A.2d 162 (Me. 
1969) (committing physician did not obtain jurisdiction over the person). But see 
Quindlen v. Hirschi, 284 P.2d 723 (Okla. 1955). 
11
• E. GoFFMAN, AsYLUMs 18-23 (1961). 
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cials. 626 In the last two opinions, Virginia officials were cited for 
contempt and required to pay damages, but while these orders 
were on appeal the litigation was settled. The state agreed to 
pay $43,525.70 to Landman's attorney and to continue to ex~ 
tend due process. In return, the injunction, the contempt cita~ 
tion and the damage judgment were dissolved. 627 The Landman 
litigation allows the reader to examine the ambit of qualified 
immunities and to consider contempt as a remedy. 
The application of due process concepts to prisoners while 
incarcerated is a recent development. Only ten years ago state 
prisoner litigation about prison conditions was almost laughed 
out of federal court. 628 This situation was dramatically reversed 
when, upon granting plenary hearings, the shocking and ap~ 
palling conditions in many prisons became apparent. 629 Pris-
oner litigation today is extensive and volatile. Judge Lawrence 
of the Southern District of Georgia observed that "actions by 
state prisoners under § 1983 are the most prolific single source 
of civil litigation in this District."630 
The due process scheme can be outlined briefly. Because 
of past unlawful conduct, a prison inmate's liberty is somewhat 
circumscribed. But this does not mean that he no longer has 
any constitutional rights. In determining the threshold ques-
tion, whether due process is required, many courts ask whether 
the prisoner suffered a grievous loss.631 This standard follows 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 632 a parole revocation case, rather than the 
"constitutionally cognizable interest in liberty or property" 
analysis set out in Roth, Perry, Mitchell, and Fuentes. Though 
the tests are thus stated differently, they do not appear to 
produce differing results in prison cases. Grievous loss appears 
021 Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. 
Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973); 
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
m Washington Post, Nov. 24, 1973, at B1, col. 3. 
szs Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 546 
(1964). 
"' The seminal case is Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). See also 
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). 
130 Heard v. Caldwell, 364 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Ga. 1973). 
131 See, e.g., Knell v. Bensenger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973); Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Diamond v. 
Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 664 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (Johnson, C.J.). 
132 408 u.s. 471 (1972). 
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to mean changes in the "liberty" to come and go, with the 
result that generally due process attaches if confinement be-
comes more burdensome or privileges are withdrawn. For ex-
ample, due process often is required to transfer, 633 to segregate 
or isolate and to r~vbke good time credits. 634 Likewise, when a 
prisoner is called before a prison discipline committee on 
charges of misconduct, it is a violation of his due process rights 
if he is not given notice of the charges before being called before 
the committee, or if he is not given a written statement by fact 
finders.635 The lower courts differed on the question of what 
process is due, some spelling out requirements specifically,636 
others satisfied with more general formulas. 637 In 1974, the Su-
preme Court resolved the problem. 638 
133 See, e.g., Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 24 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Ault v. 
Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 291-95 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. 
Supp. 659, 664-65 (M.D. Ala. 1973); White v. Gellman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 66 (S.D. Iowa 
1973). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process in the Involuntary Institutional 
Transfer of Prisoners, 60 VA. L. REv. 333 (1974). 
au See, e.g., Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 
933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 714-
15, 717 (7th Cir. 1973). But cf. Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 294 (W.D. Ky. 1973) 
(isolation less than 10 days does not require due process). 
135 Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901 (D. Mont. 1974). Damages were denied based 
upon the officials' good faith and reliance on established prison practice. Id. at 911. 
131 United States· ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 716 (7th Cir. 1973); 
(written advance notice, a hearing and opportunity to explain, right to call witnesses, 
factual decision by an impartial decision-maker); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 
621, 653-54 (E.D. Va. 1971) (opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses and, in some instances, a lay advisor to assist the prisoner at the hearing). See 
also Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 665 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (similar to Landman). 
Inmate 24393 v. Schoen, 363 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1973) (settlement: Prisoners 
abandoning retroactivity and damage claims in exchange for elaborate procedural 
protections); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 115 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974); White v. Gellman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 66-67 (S.D. Iowa 1973); 
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1083-92 (M.D. Fla. 1973). 
137 Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 940 (3d Cir. 1973) (facts rationally deter-
mined); United States ex rel. Tyrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1203 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 1972) (on 
remand, the district court found for defendants on the merits, finding no denial of due 
process. Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974)); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 
F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1079 (1972). In Wolffv. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court considers the type of procedures necessary at length, 
and to that extent resolves the debate over what procedures are necessary. 
133 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (197 4). The Court required written notice of 
charges, a written statement of evidence and reasons, impartial fact finders and sug-
gested an opportunity to present witnesses. But the Court rejected counsel for the 
prisoner and the right to cross-examine. 
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When due process is violated, courts typically attempt to 
fashion legal or equitable remedies that are most appropriate 
for the violation in question. Where the violation is of one par-
ticular prisoner's rights, such as when an inmate has been re-
moved to solitary without due process, the simplest type of 
equitable order, affecting only that prisoner, can require his 
release into the general prison population. The order is often 
accompanied by an allowance to the authorities of a reasonable 
time to retry the charged infraction.639 Improving the institu-
tion as a whole is a more difficult task. Realizing the limits of 
injunctive power and deferring to the expertise of the prison 
administrators, a court may disdain to rule on some matters. 640 
If the court decides to act, it may issue a limited order and rely 
on the official's propriety to ensure compliance, 641 or it could 
make detailed findings and issue a complex and sweeping 
order. 642 Underlying a grant of such prospective injunctive relief 
is a purpose to improve prison procedure, 643 and in order to 
administer such a prospective injunction, a court may retain 
jurisdiction and require periodic reports, 644 or enter an order to 
close a facility unless a plan for elimination of unconstitutional 
conditions is submitted within a given time. 645 
Equitable relief may be retrospective. For example, if 
there is an illegal and damaging entry on a prisoner's record, 
the court may order the authorities to expunge it.646 These 
paper changes do not disrupt prison routine in any meaningful 
sense. Similarly, good time credits shorten the time a prisoner 
is incarcerated. When good time credits have been taken with-
83
' Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 627 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
sea United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 713 (7th Cir. 1973); 
Landman v. Rosyter, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
"
1 White v. Gillman, 360 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D. Iowa 1973). 
812 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. 
Whittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). 
su Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
su See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
su Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (order supplementing 
order in 371 F. Supp. 594), aff'd on merits but vacated on remedy, 507 F.2d 333 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
su United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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out due process, courts have ordered the authorities to restore 
them.647 
Preiser v. Rodriguez848 and Wolff v. McDonnell849 alter this 
remedial scheme. Before Preiser, many state prison conditions 
cases were brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal district 
court. Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust available state 
remedies. In Preiser, the Court examined the tension between 
federal habeas corpus which compels a state prisoner to seek 
redress first in a state forum and the Civil Rights Act which 
does not. The Court held that challenges to the length of con-
finement fall "squarely within the traditional scope of habeas 
corpus."850 The equitable remedy of restoring good time credits, 
the Court held, is inappropriate in a Civil Rights Act case. This 
is true whether the remedy is immediate discharge or an ex-
punging order short of release. Thus, all state prisoner chal-
lenges to length of confinement brought in federal district court 
must be by habeas corpus, with the corollary that the peti-
tioner must first exhaust state remedies. 851 Preiser was reaf-
firmed by Wolff wherein Wolff established the threshold inter-
est for due process, and held that, under the procedural 
structures assailed (which were held defective), prior discipli-
nary records should not be expunged.852 But Wolff did not deal 
with damages. 
Several comments are in order. First, there must be an 
intelligible and discernible state remedy to exhaust. 853 If there 
is none, federal habeas corpus may be brought forthwith. Sec-
ond, a state prisoner may still use the Civil Rights Act to chal-
lenge the conditions of his confinement or to sue for dam-
ages.854 Alternatively, he may challenge both the length and the 
117 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 
1049 (1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 657 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
'" 411 u.s. 475 (1973). 
Ill 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
150 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973). 
151 Pryor v. Regan, 370 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hard v. Boren, 36&F. Supp. 
1321, 1325, 1327 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Mukmuk v. Commissioner, 369 F. Supp. 245, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
15% Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974). 
153 Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). 
151 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F. 
2d 978 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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conditions of confinement in federal habeas corpus. 655 He may 
litigate a state challenge to length of confinement simultane-
ously with a federal challenge to conditions of confinement.656 
The many possible combinations are patent. Preiser, as 
the dissent points out, will lead to duplicated and possibly 
conflicting adjudications. 657 Further, the decision may cause 
confusion, uncertainty and delay, and allow federal constitu-
tional claims to be frustrated by unsympathetic state courts.658 
The dissent by Justice Brennan suggests that the majority has 
chosen the wrong variable; that the habeas corpus cases are 
based upon comity, which compels respect for the state judici-
ary, and that comity is the policy that should be advanced. To 
preserve comity, it is improper to classify on the basis of reme-
dies. Rather, prisoner cases required to be brought as habeas 
corpus should be sorted from Civil Rights Act cases according 
to the decision-making body the prisoner assails. If it is a con-
viction (i.e. a state judicial decision) that is attacked, the 
plaintiff is remitted to habeas corpus which compels him to 
exhaust state remedies. If, however, a prison administrative 
decision is attacked, the plaintiff may proceed forthwith under 
the Civil Rights Act. 659 
The dissent thus exposes the majority opinion's critical 
defect-the majority confused comity with remedy. Comity 
mandates the federal district courts to defer to state courts. In 
suggesting that comity requires the federal court to withhold 
action when restoration of good time is asked, the Court ignores 
the fact that such restoration is merely a remedial device used 
in an action in which the federal district court has full jurisdic-
tion. The federal district court has jurisdiction over questions 
of denial of constitutional rights by state authorities. In a suit 
where such is charged, the plaintiff merely asks that he be 
made whole. If from the facts proven the court concludes that 
plaintiff was indeed denied due process, it is incumbent upon 
the court to fashion a remedy. To recover damages, the plain-
tiff must first show that his rights were breached and that he 
es> Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). 
150 Id. at n.14. 
157 Id. at 500-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. 
mId. at 521. 
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suffered actual damage. Then he must overcome an immunity. 
Now Preiser precludes the court from restoring the illegally 
taken good time credits. The court can importune or suggest.660 
The court can tell the authorities not to do it again. But the 
court's remedial hands are partially tied: it cannot extend com-
plete relief. If the federal district court can hear and decide 
questions about constitutional rights but not grant a complete 
remedy, is it functioning as a court?661 
The majority's error is clearer when the result in Preiser is 
compared to the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. Under pendent 
jurisdiction, if federal jurisdiction exists, the district court may 
decide all the questions in the case. When a case is presented 
to the district court on a state and a federal theory and both 
theories "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact," the 
district court has discretion first to consider judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness to litigants, and then to discard the 
federal theory and decide the case on the state theory.662 Preiser 
appears to be contrary to almost every policy exhibited by 
pendent jurisdiction. The theory of liability is exclusively fed-
eral, yet federal courts must defer to state remedies. Economy, 
convenience and fairness to litigants dictate a single proceed-
ing when two remedies grow out of "a common nucleus of oper-
ative fact." Yet Preiser compels litigants to either delay or 
fragment federal remedies. The federal court has the expertise 
and the detachment but, under Preiser, is a remedial eunuch. 
Wolff's impact on the material discussed herein is less 
clear. Damages were not at issue. The Court refused to expunge 
records of discipline imposed under the previous procedural 
scheme. 663 Yet the previous scheme, while informal, provided 
an opportunity to ventilate the truth of the charged infrac-
tion. 664 In addition, the Court limited the denial of retroactive 
expungement relief to the facts of the case: "we do not think 
that the error was so pervasive in the system under the old 
procedures to warrant this .... "665 Thus, Wolff's implications 
for remedy may be limited. 
110 Heard v. Boren, 368 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (E.D. Ark. 1974). 
111 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803). 
111 UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966). 
113 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 573-74 (1974). 
111 I d. at 548-53. 
au Id. at 574. 
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While injunctive relief may operate in either the future or 
the past, even a retrospective injunction cannot repair all the 
effects of prior deprivations of due process. Restoring good time 
does not return the time illegally spent in punitive segregation. 
Illegal isolation is much like false imprisonment. If there was 
no notice before confinement, it is, under traditional due pro-
cess, a legal non-event. May the inmate recover money dam-
ages? 
Several barriers to damages will be considered. The first 
set of reasons for judicial unwillingness to impose damages 
stems from general hesitancy to interfere in prison administra-
tion. Initially, the federal courts have a general reluctance to 
interpose the federal judiciary in state administration.666 More-
over, prison administration is a specialist task. Judges hesitate 
before substituting their judgment for a specialist's expertise. 
Judges lack empirical evidence of the effect a change in the 
rules may have on the goals of the institution.667 Finally, 
judicial decisions may mandate massive and expensive 
changes. The court does not control the source of the money. 668 
In Civil Rights Act cases, the courts have developed an 
immunity barrier to protect officials from unwarranted damage 
verdicts. Immunities are supported by sound policies. If offi-
cials were unprotected, the threat of personal liability might 
deter people from accepting positions in prison administra-
tion. 669 If officials were easily held liable, the risk of liability 
might inhibit vigorous policy making and innovation. 670 
When the immunity decisions are examined, a good deal 
of diversity appears. Many decisions set up a qualified immun-
ity which, stated briefly, defeats personal liability for money 
damage when the act was done in good faith. 671 The gravamen 
111 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1049 (1972). But see Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 
507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). 
117 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 
(1972); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 113 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 705 
(8th Cir. 1974). But cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 657 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
113 Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971). 
"' United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
110 Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. 
Supp. 1156, 1164 (W.D. Wise. 1973). 
111 Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1974); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 
F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719-21 
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of immunity appears to be reliance in good faith upon the 
ostensible legality of existing practice. 672 Other cases do not 
consider the immunity, 673 apparently do not allow the immun-
ity674 or reject good faith as a defense. 675 The Third Circuit 
applies an immunity which looks to the type of decision instead 
of the mental state of the official: if policy judgments are ques-
tioned, the first question is whether the official is responsible 
for making policy; if the decision is within the ambit of official 
discretion, immunity is established.676 Thus, as long as an act 
of judgment is reasonably connected with official duties, the 
official is immune even though he may be activated by malice 
and the act may be unconstitutional. 677 This may be criticized 
as expanding absolute immunity beyond reasonable bounds, 
protecting officials unnecessarily and circumscribing the ag-
grieved plaintiffs' opportunity to recover compensatory dam-
ages. The Third Circuit test for routine tasks is different. If 
judgment is not exercised, the official is not immune from suit 
but may escape liability by showing good faith. 678 
Next to be examined is the good faith reliance standard. 
The question pursued is how reasonable it is to rely on the 
legality of an existing practice. It is also hoped that further 
generalizations will emerge concerning the law's progress in 
accommodating the compensatory purpose of damages with 
(7th Cir. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. Supp. 1156, 1163 (W.D. Wis. 1973); Jones v. 
Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
172 See Cox v. Cook, 95 S.Ct. 1237, 1238-39 (1975); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 
539 (4th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 (7th Cir. 
1973); Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 911 (D. Mont. 1974). United States ex rel. Bracey 
v. Rundle, 368 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Clarke v. Cady, 358 F. Supp. 1156, 
1163 (W.D. Wis. 1973). Chief Justice Burger stated qualified immunity this way: "It 
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in the light 
of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords basis for qualified 
immunity .... "Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). 
173 United States ex rel. Nial v. Walfe, 346 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(immunity not considered). Cf. United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 
807 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (damage hearing following defendant's default). 
m Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 
(1972) (apparently not allowing immunity). 
115 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 948-49 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
m Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1973). 
m !d. at 826. But see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974) (rejecting 
absolute executive immunity). 
11
" Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1973), citing Pierson v. Ray, 
386 u.s. 547 (1967). 
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the discretion-protecting function of qualified immunity in a 
period of rapid social and legal change. 
Immunity is easiest to justify when the prison officials 
have relied on a procedure which is later held to be unconstitu-
tional. Future denials of due process may be enjoined but the 
officials responsible for the deprivation will not be required to 
pay damages to the aggrieved prisoner.679 Like a police officer, 
a prison official is not "charged with predicting the future 
course of constitutional law."680 But the surprise cases have 
already been written; and a decision that it is unconstitutional 
to remove an inmate to punitive segregation without notice and 
a hearing can no longer come like a bolt out of the blue. In 
addition to legal changes, it is generally understood that pris-
ons are in a execrable state. 681 These factors tend to discount 
blanket claims of good faith reliance. 
At present, most courts appear to reject "constructive" 
knowledge of due process from social and legal trends and to 
require actual knowledge that a practice was unconstitutional 
when the deprivation took place. For example, an Alabama 
inmate argued that the official's qualified immunity was nulli-
fied by a Pennsylvania decision two months before the uncon-
stitutional act. The court upheld the immunity stating "there 
was no evidence that the order was called to [the official's] 
attention or otherwise could provide a warning to officials of 
the Alabama Prison System in such a short time. " 682 A Fourth 
Circuit case is similar. Even though there was a precedent in 
the circuit, the court held that if, as a factual matter, the 
official reasonably and in good faith relies on the legality of 
existing practice, he will be immune from a damage award.683 
On the other hand, a Kentucky district court held that the 
870 Cox v. Cook, 95 S. Ct. 1237 (1975); Clarke v. Cade, 358 F. Supp. 1156, 1163 
(W.D. Wis. 1973). Wolff strengthens this conclusion. It holds that due process require-
ments will not be applied retroactively to require the officials to expunge procedurally 
defective prison discipline. 
180 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); Eslingerv. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
181 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1971) (Lay, J., concurring); 
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); 
Hirschkop & Milemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 
(1969). 
832 Claybrone v. Thompson, 368 F. Supp. 324, 327 (M.D. Ala. 1973). 
083 Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973). 
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authorities did not show good faith in view of clear Supreme 
Court precedent. Given the authoritative statement of the law, 
the official did not prove a reasonable belief that the act was 
constitutionally permissible.884 The Kentucky judge's approach 
approximates the Supreme Court's formulation in Wood v. 
Strickland. 885 The Court announced a mixed objective-
subjective test with strong "should know" aspects. Ignorance 
of "settled, indisputable" law will not justify a constitutional 
violation; the official's standard of conduct includes "knowl-
edge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his 
charges."888 The key to the test is reasonableness. As time pas-
ses, courts will be increasingly justified in examining the fac-
tual basis for reliance. Since it is unlikely that there should be 
a premium on ignorance, at some point a court will be justified 
in holding that knowledge was pervasive and that the official 
had to know. 
How specific must the law be to overcome this barrier and 
to constitute knowledge that a particular practice was uncon-
stitutional when it took place? Generally, if the law is "unset-
tled" when the illegal deprivation takes place, the official will 
be immune; as the law becomes more specific, immunity is less 
likely to be afforded.887 If Wood applies to prisons, the officials 
are required to be aware of what the constitution requires. But 
constitutional commands are sometimes less than crystal clear. 
Additional answers to this question are found in the Landman 
litigation. 888 It is useful to examine a related issue at the same 
time. That issue is the degree to which an official defendant 
must know of and participate in the unconstitutional depriva-
tion before individual liability may be affixed. 
District Judge Merhige, in ruling on liability earlier, con-
cluded that conditions were appalling enough to merit broad 
"' Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (authorities refused 
to post a series of letters; immunity depending on the state of the law as of the date of 
refusal). 
, .. 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). 
"' Id. at 1000-01. 
117 Cox v. Cook, 95 S. Ct. 1237 (1975); Ault v. Holmes, 369 F. Supp. 288, 293 (W.D. 
Ky. 1973); Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973). Dictum and later 
holdings do not refute immunity, but prior Supreme Court precedent refutes immun-
ity. Id. at 18-19. 
"' Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
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prospective relief.689 At the hearing which led to the instant 
order, evidence was introduced on the issue of damages for 
deprivations which occurred before the prospective relief. The 
court found that one of the inmates was placed in isolation 
because he sued to desegregate the prison690 and that Landman 
was the victim of "deliberate efforts ... to de-humanize" 
him. 691 There were physical and psychic injuries of some magni-
tude.692 
The first question on the immunity issue was whether the 
prison officials knew that the deprivations of constitutional 
rights were contrary to law. In holding that they did, the court 
looked to earlier litigation in which Landman had participated. 
In 1965, he had initiated a lawsuit charging that certain P.rison 
practices were cruel and unusual punishment. While the dis-
trict court rejected the cruel and unusual theory and the court 
of appeals affirmed, 693 the affirming opinion was qualified 
throughout. The basis for the decision was the district judge's 
factual determinations, and the court of appeals could not hold 
these findings of fact to be clearly erroneous. 694 There was, 
moreover, in 1966 a dearth of prison law. Even so, the court of 
appeals discussed corrections theory and expressed a sympa-
thetic and compassionate view. In the next to the last para-
graph the court stated, "Where the lack of effective supervisory 
procedures expose men to the capricious impositions of added 
punishment, due process and Eighth Amendment questions 
inevitably arise."695 Landman took the court's advice and 
brought the next case on a due process theory. 696 In dealing with 
the damage claim and the immunity, the court placed on the 
officials the burden of proving a reasonable belief that the prac-
tices were constitutionally permissible. 697 The director of the 
corrections division denied knowledge, but the court rejected 
his testimony. In view of "the clear words" in the 1966 court of 
08
' Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
800 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
111 Id. at 1313 (the interested reader should consult the report for details). 
112 Id. at 1307, 1313. 
103 Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966). 
mId. at 139. 
mId. at 141. 
m Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
"' Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1318 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
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appeals opinion, "ignorance of the law" was "incomprehen-
sible. " 698 In addition, some of the prison practices were found 
to "violate the lowest standards of decency" and to be "of such 
a shocking nature that no reasonable man could have believed 
they were constitutional. " 699 Thus if a responsible defendant 
could be identified, plaintiffs were entitled to damages back to 
the statute of limitations. 7oo 
The inquiry next turns to the extent the defendant must 
know and participate to affix personal damage liability. Civil 
Rights Act liability is highly individualized, because damages 
are granted against officials in their "personal" capacity only. 
For, the court held, to allow recovery of damages against offi-
cials in their official capacity would be to grant recovery 
against the state.701 The official must also be alive, the court 
held, because in Civil Rights Act cases charging an interference 
with "personal" rights the damage remedy fails to survive 
against the estate of a deceased defendant.702 To affix damage 
responsibility the plaintiff must also prove the official's actual 
conduct. When an official is in a supervisory position, he may 
be liable either if he directs a deprivation or if he acquiesces 
in the deprivation with actual knowledge that it is taking place. 
In Landman, the court held that the cabinet level supervi-
sor was not liable because he was "too far removed" from the 
deprivation, did not control the illegal conduct, and lacked any 
m Id. Editor's note. In Cox v. Cook, a case that arose in Virginia, the Supreme 
Court said, "We do not regard the uncertain dicta in Landman v. Peyton . . . as laying 
down a rule binding on petitioners .... " 95 S. Ct. 1237, 1239 n.3 (1975). 
"'Id. -
700 Id. at 1314-15. The court gave collateral estoppel effect to the 1965 case and 
held that, because the cumulative injury was caused by a continuing wrong, the statute 
of limitations did not begin to run until the defendant's wrongful conduct stopped. I d. 
See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 43 U.S.L.W. 4929 (U.S. June 26, 1975). 
701 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315-16 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
702 Id. at 1315. But see Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961) (Civil 
Rights Act silent on survival; § 1988 allows court to apply state law; action survived 
against administrator of deceased defendant). Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (widow allowed to pick up state survival statute to sue defendant for depri-
vation of deceased spouse's rights: "§ 1988 declares a simple, direct abbreviated test: 
what is needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the civil rights statutes 
fully effective?" Id. at 409). Both Pritchard and Brazier are cited in Moor v. County 
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973). The Court states: "Properly viewed then, § 
1988 instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in causes of action arising under 
federal civil rights acts." Id. at 703. 
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real knowledge of it.7°3 The director of the corrections division 
was, however, required to respond in damages. He denied re-
sponsibility for the deprivation, but the court found that he 
approved some of the policies, had specific knowledge of cer-
tain illegal confinements and encouraged what appeared to be 
a personal vendetta against one of the plaintiffs.704 Thus it was 
unnecessary to consider other theories such as respondeat supe-
rior or negligent failure to supervise.705 The director was re-
quired to pay three of the plaintiffs a total of $21,265.45 com-
pensatory damages.706 
Landman v. Royster follows the proper approach to the 
damage issue. If sufficient knowledge that the acts are illegal 
and participation in the illegal conduct are found, the interest 
in protecting official discretion no longer exists. The dual inter-
ests in compensating over-reached inmates and deterring over-
reaching officials become more prominent. A contrasting and 
incorrect approach to damages, the retroactivity analysis, will 
be examined next. 
United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle dealt with damages 
for an unconstitutional punitive segregation which took place 
in 1970.707 A court of appeals opinion in 1972 held the discipli-
703 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
70~ Id. at 1312-13. See also, United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 
939, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (prison superintendent liable because he should have been 
aware of unconsitutional procedure; deputy superintendent liable because he was in 
charge and did not stop unconstitutional action). But cf. Mukmuk v. Commissioner, 
369 F. Supp. 245, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (personal responsibility necessary); Black v. 
Brown, 355 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Til. 1973) (personal involvement must be alleged to state 
claim for damages), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
705 Generally, knowledge and participation appear to be required. See, e.g., Ander-
son v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), modified en bane, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972). The perplexing question is the requisite extent 
of knowledge and participation. See Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (lOth Cir. 1974); 
McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1972); Rob-
erts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Adams v. 
Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971); Note, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 61Nn. 
L. REv. 509 (1973). 
701 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1319 (E.D. Va. 1973). This was a 
conservative figure. Under the extreme facts presented, the compensatory damages 
might have totaled $200,000 and punitive damages may have been merited. In Novem-
ber of 1973, the Landman v. Royster litigation was settled for $43,525.70. Washington 
Post, Nov. 23, 1973, at Bl, col. 3. See also Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 
(W.D. Ky. 1973) ($25 for failing to mail legally-oriented letter). 
707 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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nary practices unconstitutional. 708 The Jones court, as part of 
the immunity issue, held that good faith was not a defense and 
thus did not consider whether officials relied on the ostensible 
legality of the practice at the time it occurred. 709 The court 
asked whether the 1972 opinion was to be applied retroactively 
or prospectively. 710 In this branch of the case, the court followed 
the retroactivity analysis from criminal cases under the Bill of 
Rights. 711 For damages, the Jones court decided that the 1972 
opinion was not retroactive. The court stressed three things. 
First, the officials had reasonably relied on previous standards. 
Second, it is open-ended simultaneously to create new law and 
damage liability for past acts. Third, damage liability would 
affect both prison administration and administrators. "The 
consequence would be the end of the prison administration 
because any sensible prison administrator would immediately 
resign because it would be virtually impossible for him to pro-
tect himself from civilliability."712 The Jones court applied the 
1972 opinion retroactively for equitable relief ordering the au-
thorities to expunge the solitary notation and to restore the lost 
good time.713 
The retroactivity analysis is questionable for several rea-
sons. First, procedural protections are intended to assure at 
least minimal accuracy in the fact-finding process. The Su-
preme Court has been almost categorical in holding that when 
a new constitutional rule improves fact-finding ability, it will 
be applied retroactively despite official reliance on the former 
practice and the new rule's severe impact on the administra- · 
tion of justice.714 It follows that decisions requiring notice and 
a hearing before imposing prison discipline are, perforce, retro-
active because notice and a hearing are so basic to accurate 
fact-finding.715 In denying retroactivity to the 1972 decision, the 
701 Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972). 
7
" United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
m Id. at 949-52. 
711 United States ex rel. Arizonica v. Scheipe, 474 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1973). 
712 United States ex. rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 952 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
71
' Id. See also Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973). Wolff pro-
scribes expungement relief when the procedure followed was reliable but ultimately 
held to be unconstitutional. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 (1974). 
m Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). 
715 Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1973). 
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Jones court recognized improvement in fact-finding as a de-
termining factor in retroactivity. But the court chose to apply 
the 1972 opinion only prospectively, because the aggrieved 
inmate may be partially protected by an injunction and be-
cause the consequences of an erroneous decision to impose dis-
cipline are not so severe as a criminal conviction/16 
In Adams v. Carlson,711 the Seventh Circuit also applied 
the retroactivity analysis. This case did not involve damages, 
but concerned the question of whether disciplinary hearings 
which arose out of a work stoppage in 1972 were to be governed 
by a 1973 circuit court decision. The court followed the retroac-
tivity analysis and, emphasizing "the accuracy of the factual 
determination", held that the charged infractions must be re-
heard under the 1973 guidelines/18 While Adams v. Carlson 
does not reach the damage question, the court deals correctly 
with the retroactivity variables. Thus, properly applied, the 
retroactivity analysis almost always leads to a retroactive ap-
plication of the decision. 
An additional reason to abjure the retroactivity analysis 
emerges from a review of the immunity concept. In Jones, the 
court determined that the 1972 decision was not retroactive. 
The court stressed the threat of personal liability and reliance 
on previous judicial decisions. These are precisely the factors 
other courts have emphasized in passing on immunity from 
damage. In Skinner v. Spellman, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the prison official had a qualified immunity in damage actions. 
This immunity turned on whether the official "was acting in 
reasonable good faith reliance on standard operating proce-
dure."719 In Barr v. Matteo, Justice Harlan upheld executive 
immunity from a defamation suit because "the threat of 
[damages] might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, 
718 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
While the procedure condemned in Wolff did provide rudimentary notice, the Court 
refused retroactive expungement relief noting, (1) less is at stake in prison discipline 
than in a criminal trial; (2) officials relied on former practice; (3) retroactivity would 
have a significant impact on prison administration; and (4) the formerly prevailing 
system did not produce enough error to "warrant this cost or result." Wolffv. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 544 (1974). Thus a procedure without notice might result in retroac-
tive expungement relief because of inaccuracy. 
717 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973). 
718 I d. at 627. 
m Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973). 
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and effective administration of policies of government."720 
Thus, had the Jones court considered reliance when analyzing 
immunity rather than as part of the retroactivity analysis, the 
result would almost certainly have been the same. Because of 
the ostensible legality of the practice at the time the illegal 
discipline occurred, the qualified immunity would bar dam-
ages.721 Thus Chief Judge Lord in a similar case declined to 
follow the retroactivity analysis, applied qualified immunity, 
and held the official immune.722 By stressing reasonable reli-
ance on the apparent legality of the practice, the same result 
is reached without torturing the retroactivity analysis. 
The retroactivity analysis, moreover, diffuses the inquiry. 
It may lead to misplaced emphasis and incorrect decisions. In 
Black v. Brown,123 the court followed the retroactivity analysis. 
Good time credits had been taken, apparently without due 
process, but the court refused to restore the credits because it 
"would lead to needless and endless litigation."724 Several fac-
tors appear to compel an opposite result: inaccurate fact-
finding is inescapable in ex parte proceedings; a file entry is 
relatively easy to change; and the inmate has a high stake in 
his liberty. This leads to the conclusion that good time credits 
could be restored, with the officials allowed a reasonable period 
to retry the charges. The rehearing would not be an unbearable 
burden because such rehearings are less complex than a crimi-
nal trial.725 The threat of a deluge of prisoner litigation seems 
an unrealistic fear in view of the possibility of the use of class 
actions for plaintiffs and broad injunctive relief. 726 These fac-
tors appear to require equitable relief in some form.727 But, in 
728 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959) (plurality opinion). 
721 In Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973) the court held that the later 
opinion was retroactive to require rehearings but hinted that the immunities applied 
to a damage action. Id. at 629 n.16. 
722 United States ex rel. Bracey v. Rundle, 368 F. Supp. 1186, 1188-90 (E.D. Pa. 
1973). 
m 355 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Til. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 
513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975) (adopting views very similar to those stated in the previous 
textual paragraph). 
721 Id. at 927. 
725 Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1973). 
721 Cf. Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 21-22 (W.D. Ky. 1973). But see Wheeler 
v. Procunier, 508 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1974). 
727 United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973), granted 
equitable relief and gave the grant of equitable relief as a reason to deny a damage 
remedy. !d. at 951-52. 
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applying the retroactivity analysis, the court may emphasize 
one factor over others. The court in Black v. Brown incorrectly 
stressed the effect on administration of justice of applying the 
decision retroactively. The retroactivity analysis, it may be 
concluded, creates theoretical and practical problems. The 
immunity analysis turns on a factual inquiry, analyzes the pro-
per variables and better serves the interests of all concerned. 
From the discussion above, one general conclusion is clear. 
The courts hesitate before awarding an inmate compensatory 
damages. When the law is non-existent or uncertain, this is 
justified under a qualified immunity. Compensatory damages 
will be awarded only in exacerbated instances. 
Will inmates be awarded damages when the officials break 
law that is certain beyond doubt? To answer this question, we 
turn again to the Landman litigation.728 In 1971 the district 
court ordered extensive changes in prison practices. Plaintiffs 
charged that the officials violated the injunction and asked the 
court to hold the officials in civil contempt.729 The defendants 
could not assert that they relied on the ostensible legality of 
conduct which was contrary to an injunction that defined the 
law. The court found that the officials had violated the 1971 
injunction, another injunction and "simple fairness." The offi-
cials, the court said, failed to recognize "that a prison adminis-
tration is not a fief unto itself' and attempted to "envelop the 
system with a massive veil of secrecy."730 The officials and their 
attorneys, the court speculated, either did not understand the 
injunction or intended to "thwart" it. 731 The officials failed to 
inform both the lower-level employees and the inmates of the 
order and its terms. They also refused to implement the proce-
dural protections required by the order. Finally, the officials 
isolated inmates in high security areas both arbitrarily and 
without due process. These acts, the court held, constituted 
contempts.732 The conduct may have been criminal contempt 
1
'" See also Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (clear 
Supreme Court precedent: no immunity). 
720 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
130 Id. at 1299. 
73t Id. 
131 Id. at 1300. See generally Dobbs,_ Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 183 (1971). 
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and serious enough to impose a punitive fine.733 The court clas-
sified the contempt as civil and imposed a coercive sanction.734 
It fined the named, living defendants $25,000 but suspended 
the fine upon the condition that the injunction's terms be "car-
ried out on every level of the prison system."735 Even though 
this extensive coercive remedy was ordered, no remedial relief 
was ordered. The court doubted that there had been a quantifi-
able injury and noted that, in any event, there was no evidence 
of compensable loss.738 
Contempt is a distinct remedy for denials of due process. 
For compensatory contempt there must be an injunction which 
binds the defendants, breach of the injunction, and damages. 
Remedial or compensatory damages may be awarded as part 
of the civil contempt sanction.737 But, as illustrated by the 
contempt branch of Landman, it takes very compelling facts 
to overcome judicial reluctance. For this there are several rea-
sons: contempt is both extraordinary and flexible; courts pause 
to think before finding contempt; finally, after contempt is 
found, courts mold the remedy carefully.738 Federal courts, 
moreover, are disinclined to hold state and local government 
officials in contempt.739 When a governmep.t official is found in 
contempt, courts tend to threaten sanctions in the future 
rather than to impose sanctions immediately.740 One purpose of 
civil contempt is to coerce: to encourage the defendant to obey 
an injunction. A threat of future, tangible sanctions may ac-
733 Dobbs, supra note 732, at 235-49, 261-63. In Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 
1292, 1300 (E.D. Va. 1973) the court found a lack of "willfulness." This is inconsistent 
with almost every other factual conclusion in the opinion. 
731 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1300-02 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
m Id. at 1301-02. See Dobbs, supra note 732, at 244-45. This was dissolved along 
with the injunction when the case was settled. Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1973, at B1, 
col. 3. 
731 Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
m Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932). 
738 Harthman v. Witty, 480 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Swingline, 
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp. 
881 (N.D. lll.), a/f'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). 
m See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965); Class v. 
Norton, 376 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1974) (contempt citation not warranted though 
there was substantial and widespread noncompliance. But officer, in individual capac-
ity, had to pay $1,000 in attorney's fees to petitioner). 
741 See, e.g., Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 1973); Doe v. 
Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970). 
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complish this purpose. But another purpose of civil contempt 
is to compensate. If compensation is merited, it should be 
awarded. 
E. Summary 
Part II collects remedies available to one whose due pro-
cess rights have been violated. It demonstrates that courts have 
adopted traditional legal and equitable remedies and applied 
them to due process cases. Significant problems, nevertheless, 
remain. 
Equitable remedies include injunctions which may be 
broad or narrow. Defendants may be compelled to reform pro-
cedure in an entire institution or to reinstate a discharged em-
ployee. Injunctions are enforced by contempt or the threat of 
contempt. The equitable order to expunge should be particu-
larly noted in a record-oriented society. If an entry is wrong-
fully placed in a file, the court may order it extirpated.741 
The injunctive remedy has two drawbacks. First, many 
injunctions are prospective. They tell the defendant not to do 
it again742 but the defendant pays no price for his illegal con-
duct and the plaintiff receives no compensation for his loss. 
The court can, however, order damages or substituted relief. 
Damage remedies comprehend nominal damages, 743 actual 
m See Wellmer v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 
1973); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 
968 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Tatum 
v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1315 (D.D.C. 1974); Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 
377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974); Warren v. National Ass'n of Sec. Prin., 375 F. Supp. 
1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 598 (D. Minn. 1973); 
Dobbs, supra note 732. Interestingly, in Irby v. Gowan, 380 F. Supp. 1024 (S.D. Ala. 
1974), the court ordered an entry of "Dismissed-Non-Cooperative" expunged from 
teacher's personnel records even though the court held for the defendant school offi-
cials that the teacher was non-tenured, thus having no contractual right to remain 
employed; and the entry and dismissal were held not to impose a "stigma" in the Roth 
sense. The entry created no stigma because it was not publicized by the school officials. 
The court merely said that since a letter of resignation was subsequently accepted by 
the school system, the entry should be expunged "in the spirit of equity." Id. at 1031. 
The expungement remedy is broad indeed. 
742 Note, Governmental Employee Liability, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 624, 635-36 
(1973). 
7
" Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1973); Berry v. Macon County Bd. of 
Educ., 380 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 
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damages,744 compensation for impalpable losses745 and punitive 
or exemplary damages.746 Damages may compensate and deter, 
and thus ameliorate some problems left by an injunction. 
The injunction's second drawback is that it is difficult to 
administer. Rules 25(d) and 65(d) cast a responsibility net over 
successors, agents, employees and those "in active concert or 
participation." The court may be required to supervise care-
fully by retaining jurisdiction and calling for periodic reports. 
When, as is generally true in Civil Rights Act lawsuits, the 
injunction binds state or local government officials, the court 
is thrown into a political thicket. Generally, judges affix legal 
consequences to discerned past conduct and leave uniform, 
prospective rulemaking to the legislature. The broad injunction 
in a Civil Rights Act case strains this generalization. 
The problems of administering equitable relief are antici-
pated by the problems of managing a class action. If the defen-
dants are within the injunctive responsibility net, an injunc-
tion binding them will protect as adequately as a plaintiff 
class. But if both the plaintiffs and the defendants are diffused, 
defining the groups benefiting and bound presents excruciat-
ing problems. 747 In the consumer or "property" class actions, 
the defendants are not held together by agency or concert. 
This difficulty in defining and administering relief may be one 
practical reason for decisions finding an absence of state 
action in creditor conduct under ex parte statutes. When the 
groups are ill defined, a great deal of the decision~s effect de-
pends upon the defendant's propriety and good faith. 748 Per-
(E.D.N.C. 1974) ($100 nominal damages awarded); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 
572, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1972). Dobbs, supra note 732, at 191. 
m Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.1049 
(1972); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
7
" Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973); Cf. Magnett v. 
Pelittier, 488 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1973); Gonzales v. Fairfax Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. 
Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
711 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 
F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973); For a collection of cases, see Annot., Punitive 
Damages for Violations of Federal Civil Rights Acts, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1973). 
111 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 500-04 (1972). 
741 Compare Schneider v. Margossion, 349 F. Supp. 741, 746 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd 
sub nom. Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974) (clerks not certified as 
defendant class because it appeared that decision will be obeyed) with Callahan v. 
Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (after supreme court affirmed case, state attorney 
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haps the better remedy from an invalidating decision is that it 
may stir an inactive legislature into action. Significant and 
general reform may result from an unwelcome dialogue.749 
The damage remedy is intended to compensate and deter. 
But there are several barriers to damages in due process cases. 
First, many courts are hostile to any damage remedy in due 
process cases/50 Not much can be said about these cases except 
that they are wrong. 
Second, many due process-civil rights cases embody genu-
ine measurement problems. Constitutional rights are valuable. 
When constitutional rights are impaired, damages may be 
inferred.751 But when defendants exclude plaintiffs from a polit-
ical speech they really do not care to attend, how are plaintiffs 
injured?752 If a plaintiff is injured physically or mentally, ar-
rested, confined, fired or subjected to bad publicity, damages 
can be awarded.753 But when a "wholesale assault upon the civil 
rights and liberties of numerous citizens, in violation of the 
First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ... ''754 
causes no "injury," there is not much to compensate. The law, 
however, has always compensated intangible injuries, for ex-
ample, false arrest and defamation.755 
There is a lesson to be learned from copyright infringement 
cases. When infringement damages are difficult to measure or 
small, but part of a pattern of illegal behavior, the courts look 
beyond the particular case to the general purpose of damages. 
The damage award, in addition to restitution and compensa-
tion, is "designed to deter illegal conduct," thus, "even for 
uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright, the court 
may, if it deems just, impose a liability within statutory limits 
to sanction and vindicate the statutory policy."756 Surely con-
general apparently advised that opinion only applied to particular county: instant case 
necessary to attain an injunction against a defendant class). 
m Osmond v. Spence, 359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972). 
750 See, e.g., Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
751 United States ex rel. Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 810-11 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). 
m This is one of the problems Judge McMillan left for later in Sparrow v. Good-
man, 361 F. Supp. 566 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
7u Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973). 
m Sparrow v. Goodman, 361 F. Supp. 566, 584 (W.D.N.C. 1973). 
750 D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 7.13 (1973). 
7
•• F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). 
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stitutional rights are as highly valued as copyright. In addition, 
assessing damages calls the government to account. But while 
the Copyright Act contains a minimum damage schedule, 757 the 
Constitution, unfortunately, does not. Surely this does not 
mean that the government can ignore the Constitution with 
impunity or that the government responds to a lower standard 
than a private person. Nonetheless, the idea of imposing mini-
mum damages to deter illegal conduct might be adapted to 
constitutional violations. 
Third, sovereignty's perquisites exacerbate the search for 
a solvent defendant. The immunities cannot be interposed to 
prevent a defendant from obeying an injunction, 758 but the law 
prevents plaintiffs from suing the entity at all759 and attenuates 
liability except from actual participants and superiors who di-
rect or acquiesce.760 The policy of the personal immunities is to 
protect the official who legitimately but erroneously exercises 
official discretion.761 The immunity decisions are characterized 
only by diversity. 
Scheuer v. Rhodes162 will bring needed clarity to the im-
munities. First, the Court rejected blanket claims of executive 
immunity. Second, it stated the factors to be analyzed in pass-
ing on personal or qualified immunity: 
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to offi-
cers of the executive branch of Government, the variation 
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities 
of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably 
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought 
757 Copyright Act § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); See also 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. 
1974) (civil damage schedule for illegal wiretap). 
m See, e.g., Stephen v. Drew, 359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
751 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (sovereign immunity); Moor v. County 
of Alemeda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (Civil Rights Act jurisdiction). Professor Kenneth 
Davis suggests that § 1983 should be amended to allow recovery against a municipality 
for deliberate torts committed by police officers. Davis, supra note 464. 
7
" Downs v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 F. Supp. 454, 464 (E.D. Pa. 1973); 
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 599 (D. Minn. 1973); McGhee v. Moyer, 60 
F.R.D. 578, 586 (W.D. Va. 1973). 
711 See, e.g., Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 189-91 (8th Cir.1973), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975); Stephen v. Drew, 
359 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1973); McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578, 585 (W.D. Va. 
1973). 
m 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
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to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the 
belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good faith belief, that affords basis for qualified 
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the 
course of official conduct.763 
This standard focuses judgment on the critical issues, good 
faith and legitimate discretion. It combines the "objective" 
and the "subjective" standards artfully enough to reach sub-
stantial justice in most cases and should eliminate both exces-
sively broad and excessively narrow immunity decisions. 
The immunity analysis is sufficiently serviceable to ac-
comodate damage awards to legal change. The criminal law 
retroactivity analysis is a device to face the problem but.shirk 
a solution. Granting or denying a class action leaves the retro-
spectivity question unsolved and may conceal the real issues.764 
Injunctions and declaratory judgments change the rules pro-
spectively without affecting past conduct.765 But if it is neces-
sary to evaluate the ostensible legality of past conduct, only the 
immunity formula allows the fact-finder to analyze the defen-
dant's state of mind in light of the then available facts and 
law.766 
The damage remedy, it must be concluded, is too often an 
aspiration rather than a policy. Even when the imposing legal 
barriers are surmounted, plaintiffs frequently cannot find a 
solvent, responsible defendant.767 Nevertheless, even the possi-
783 !d. at 247-48. See also Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 992, 1001 (1975): "we hold 
that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if 
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, 
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights or other injury to the student." 
"' Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd sub nom. 
Ruotolo v. Gould, 489 F.2d 1324 (1st Cir. 1974). 
785 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declara-
tory judgment but no injunction assuming future obedience); Marin v. University of 
Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974) (declared unconstitutional but not en-
joined; court presumes that the university will heed declaratory judgment). 
m See Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970) (no personal liability 
for conduct colorably legal but unconsitutional in retrospect). 
107 See, e.g., SotiTHERN JusTICE 55-56 (L. Freedman ed. 1967) (case settled for 
costs); Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at Cl, col. 7-8. (jury awards inmates $8,000 
from guards: one guard no longer works at the jail; the other suspended without pay; 
appeal considered but money for legal fee lacking; neither jail nor city responsible). 
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bility of recovering damages may have several salutary, though 
noncompensatory, effects. First, when a damage remedy is 
known to be available, official behavior tends to become more 
civilized. 768 Second, once a lawsuit is commenced, the request 
for damages prevents the declaratory-injunctive part of the 
case from becoming moot. 769 Third, the media and professional 
organizations tend to pick up the fact of the judgment; and 
even though the judgment is uncollectable, it has an educa-
tional or socializing effect. 
The non-utility of the damage remedy is palpably unsatis-
factory. Two things may be suggested to invigorate damages as 
a remedial tool. The insolvent defendant problem can be amel-
iorated by allowing recovery on official bonds.770 A more general 
and more satisfactory solution is for the governing body to 
purchase insurance for its employees.771 Neither of these de-
vices interfere unduely with sovereignty's perquisite·s because 
there is no "liability which must be paid from public funds in 
the state treasury."772 Both will compensate for actual losses. 
Today a victorious case seldom generates enough recovery 
to compensate the plaintiff, much less to remunerate his law-
yer. Moreover, the plaintiff, generally represented by a private 
attorney, frequently faces a defendant represented by sophisti-
cated government counsel.773 Correcting denials of constitu-
tional rights vindicates the public interest but, as observed 
above, often does little more. 
7
'
1 Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at Cl. col. 7-8. Warden is quoted as saying that 
damage verdict for prisoners against guards "will help curb brutality of prisoners by 
guards who in the past have thought their word would automatically prevail over that 
of an inmate." 
m McGhee v. Moyer, 60 F.R.D. 578, 585 (W.D. Va.1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke 
Realty Co., 300 N.E.2d 710, 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 174 (1973). 
771 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781,796 (5th Cir.1969); Gaston v. Gibson, 328 F. Supp. 
3 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); City of Advance v. Maryland Cas. Co., 302 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1957). 
771 Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for UnconstitutioTUJl Conduct: The After-
math of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548, 558 (1972). After the 
Landman litigation was settled, the Virginia authorities purchased liability insurance 
for welfare and institution's employees. Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1974, at C4, col. 8. 
m Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). Professor Kenneth Davis has 
suggested a third alternative: to amend § 1983 to allow recovery of damages from a 
municipality for deliberate torts committed by municipal police officers. Davis, supra 
note 464. 
m See, e.g., Heard v. Boren, 368 F. Supp.1321 (E.D. Ark.1974) (defendants sued 
as individuals but represented by state attorney general). 
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While winning plaintiffs occasionally recover attorney's 
fees, 774 the substantial although intangible public benefit is 
inadequately considered. Instead the courts focus on the defen-
dant's conduct seeking, it seems, callous defiance. When a law-
suit is not fee-generating but advances the public interest in 
the government obeying the law, the plaintiff is acting as a 
"private attorney general." It follows that his attorney should 
be compensated, in order to make it financially possible for 
him to vindicate the public interest.775 
In later Civil Rights Acts, Congress has recognized the 
above mentioned factors and provided for attorney's fees.176 
None, however, are mentioned in § 1983. Allowing attorney's 
fees more liberally under § 1983, which is now over a century 
old, would advance Congress' expressed policy to allow 
attorney's fees in civil rights cases.777 In any event, Congress 
should consider amending § 1983 to bring it into line with more 
recent statutory statements of policy. Then the courts could 
focus on whether the law was clear and whether defendant's 
conduct was clearly unreasonable. 
714 Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) (award of attorney fees against 
defendant individually not barred by eleventh amendment); Comist v. Richland 
Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 
191 (8th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 95 S. Ct. 
992 (1975); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Act. Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233, 
1244-53 (D. Kan. 1974); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Ind. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 663 
(S.D. Tex. 1972); Warren v. National Ass'n of Sec. School Prins., 375 F. Supp. 1043, 
1048 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Diamond 
v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 668 (M.D. Ala. 1973). But see Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 
F. Supp. 585, 597-98 (D. Minn. 1973) (A.C.L.U. attorney); Griffin v. Jackson Parish 
School Bd., 60 F.R.D. 671 (W.D. La. 1973). 
775 Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1974). See 
generally Naussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 
301 (1973); Mause, Winner Takes All: A Reexamination of the Indemnity System, 55 
IowA L. REv. 26 (1969); Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees to the "Private Attorney 
General", 24 HAsTINGS L.J. 733 (1973). Editor's note. The Supreme Court rejected the 
private attorney general theory of awarding attorney's fees in Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975). 
771 20 U.S.C. § 617 (Supp. 1974) (school desegregation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) 
(Supp. 1974) (public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. 1974) (employ-
ment discrimination). 
m Cf. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). But see Fleishman 
Dist. Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (comprehensive statutory trade-
mark protection scheme without referring to attorney's fees provided for in parallel 
patent and copyright acts: attorney's fees precluded). 
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Two additional remedial-tactical issues remain to be con-
sidered. Most due process cases are class actions in federal 
courts. While both choices are sound in many cases, there are 
times when the proper course of action is to consider alterna-
tives. The class action's utility cannot be denied. A class action 
allows the parties to aggregate small claims into an economical 
lawsuit and the court to concentrate on small injuries to many 
people. There is a concomitant risk, however, that a large 
plaintiff class will alter the focus from an individual grievance 
to the substantive principle's broad implications and the diffi-
culties inherent in implementing wide spread relief. A defen-
dant class should be examined more skeptically. When an 
agency or concert nexus ties the defendant group together, an 
injunction may do as well. When there is no nexus, the cost of 
notice may be prohibitive. 
Due process plaintiffs almost always choose a federal 
forum. This is usually the correct choice, but for some cases a 
state forum might be considered. If plaintiff alleges a constitu-
tional deprivation, federal jurisdiction appears to be clear. But 
the Civil Rights Act plaintiff must sue a "person" who acted 
"under color of law." Difficulties grow out of this near contra-
diction in both the property and the mental health cases. A 
state forum may avoid these problems; the litigation may con-
centrate on the alleged constitutional deprivation. For exam-
ple, in many of the opinions holding against the plaintiff in 
self-help repossession cases, it is not certain whether the courts 
turn the case on lack of fourteenth amendment state action or 
on the absence of color of law depriving the court of Civil Rights 
Act jurisdiction. A state forum avoids the federal jurisdiction 
issue and focuses directly on the constitutional issue. 
Plaintiff's attorneys have felt in the past that the federal 
bench is more amenable to due process interests. Exhibiting a 
touching faith in constitutional remedies, good tort theories 
have been passed up in favor of dubious constitutional 
claims.178 The present course of Supreme Court decisions is to 
limit federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act719 and to 
na Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973). Compare Johnson v. Horace 
Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So.2d 588 (La. Ct. App. 1970). 
n• Prieser v. Rodriguez, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alemeda, 411 U.S. 
693 (1973); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
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cease expanding due process principles.780 Some state courts 
may be more receptive to due process claims than federal 
courts.781 If the lawsuit is to be brought in federal court, the 
plaintiff should bear in mind the common law torts and pen-
dant jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
Michigan's Institute for Social Research reports that the 
public is cynical toward government and that this cynicism is 
rising sharply. In the fall of 1973, 66 percent of the sample 
responded that they trusted the government only "some of the 
time," an increase of 20 percentage points over a similar survey 
taken one year earlier. Fifty-three percent think that "quite a 
few" government officials are crooked, in contrast to 38 percent 
a year earlier. But between 1972 and 1973 confidence in the 
Supreme Court increased from 26 to 39 percent.782 
The public respects the judicial system in part because of 
continuity and principled decisions, but this respect is frag-
ile.783 Also, law reaches the public through remedies. If a sub-
stantive theory is not realized in practice, the public may con-
clude that the law displays one set of values and uses another. 
Due process compels institutions to broaden participation in 
decision-making to those affected by the decisions. It exposes 
institutional contradictions and ameliorates their effect. But 
the court system cannot correct all institutional blunders: the 
vast majority of decisions must be made on an administrative 
level. This is the long term effect of a remedial decision in a 
due process case. It must be weighed when passing on a discrete 
lawsuit. 
In the past twenty years, the educational system has prob-
ably been scrutinized more carefully than any other. Racial 
discharges are clearly illegal. Yet a southern regional confer-
780 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134 (1974). 
781 Compare Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961,113 Cal. Rptr. 
145 (1974) with Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). But cf. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 520 P.2d 441, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974). See, Comment, Scaling ~he Welfare Bureaucracy: Expanding 
Concepts of Governmental Employee Liability, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 624, 663 (1973). 
782 Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1974, at A7, col. 1. 
733 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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ence on employment displacement in education estimates that 
31,500 black teachers have lost their jobs because of school 
desegregation.784 The advance sheets bring a steady stream of 
lies/85 sexism,786 violence,787 psychiatric tyranny/89 campaigns 
against dissenters/90 class-room shouting matches,791 police 
state tactics, 792 and bad grammar. 793 Discounting the peril of 
generalizing social or even legal trends from decided cases,794 it 
may appear that the rising generation's minds are shaped in an 
atmosphere where conformity is mandated, free inquiry is sti-
fled and eccentricity is squelched. Educational institutions, 
moreover, are ostensibly open institutions, in contrast to pris-
ons and mental hospitals which are "total institutions"795 
where change might be expected to come more gradually. 
Thus, one who seeks fundamental change concludes that 
due process is a cop-out. The reformer should aim his efforts 
at the substantive rules.796 The impoverished tenant appre-
ciates notice before being evicted. Notice allows him to get his 
711 The black teaching force decreased from 21% of the total teaching force to 19% 
between 1954 and 1970 in seventeen southern and border states. Smith & Smith, For 
Black Educators: Integration Brings the Axe, 6 THE URBAN REv. No. 3 at 8 (1973). 
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787 Kota v. Little," 351 F. Supp. 1059, 1064 (E.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 1 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
7ss United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); 
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meager possessions together. But he would rather not be 
evicted at all. To paraphrase the late Professor Chafee: thirsty 
people don't want due process; they want beer. 
Nonetheless, due process promotes sound and fair deci-
sions under existing substantive rules. This advances both le-
gitimacy and effectiveness. In addition, due process educates 
the participants, raising political consciousness. It prevents the 
groveling dependency mentioned by Orwell: 
At the time I could not see beyond the moral dilemma that 
is presented to the weak in a world governed by the strong: 
Break the rules, or perish. I did not see that in that case the 
weak have the right to make a different set of rules for them-
selves; because even if such an idea had occurred to me, there 
was no one in my environment who could have confirmed me 
in it.797 
Thus, if social change is viewed as an evolutionary process, due 
process performs a valuable office. 
This virtue can be converted into a defect. Due process is 
a powerful instrument of conservative social control precisely 
because more participate. It requires change agents to channel 
efforts through existing institutions and holds out the hope that 
fundamental transformation is possible. Procedure is a waning 
majority's first line· of defense. It trains conformity, stamps 
autocracy with legitimacy's imprimature, and leads only to 
delayed or cosmetic modifications. This method of varying au-
thority's forms without altering power realities is called "for-
mal co-optation."798 The leaves fall, but the roots, the trunk 
and the branches stay the same. 
The author cannot refute this argument. He merely replies 
that due process is only part of the effort to build a better 
society. 
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